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Abstract
Web search, the process of seeking and finding information online, is an
ubiquitous activity engrained in the lives of many individuals and much
of broader society. This activity, which has brought many benefits to in-
dividuals and society, has also opened the door to many harms, such as
echo chambers, loss of privacy and exposure to misinformation. Members
of the information retrieval (IR) community now recognize the dangers
of the search technologies commonplace in our daily lives. The upshot
of this recognition are growing efforts to address these dangers by the IR
community. These efforts focus heavily on system oriented solutions, but
give limited focus on behavioural and cognitive biases and behaviours of
the search and even less attention to interventions designed to address
these biases and behaviours. As such, a theoretical framework is pro-
posed, with behavioural and cognitive strategies as a core component of
interactive Web search environments designed to minimize harm.
Using the framework as the foundation, this thesis presents a number
of offline and online studies to evaluate nudging , a popular intervention
strategy rooted in the field of behavioural economics, and boosting , a
successful intervention strategy from the cognitive sciences, as strategies
to reduce risk of harm in Web search. Overall the studies produce find-
ings in line with the theories underlying the behavioural and cognitive
strategies considered. The key takeaway from these studies being that
both boosting and nudging should be considered as viable approaches for
harm prevention in Web search environments, in addition to pure system
and algorithmic solutions. Additional contributions of this thesis include
methods of study design for the comparison of multiple paradigms that
promote improved decision making, along with a set of evaluation met-
rics to measure the success of the IR system and user performance as
they relate to the harms being prevented. Future research is needed to
confirm the effectiveness of these strategies for other types of harms.
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1.1 Harms from Web Search
It seems no better place than to begin this thesis with stories that demonstrate
the potential harms of Web search.
Story 1 Brenda is expecting the birth of her first child. In an online search for med-
ical check-ups for children she finds information about vaccines. Exploring the
topic in detail, the results she visits suggest a high risk for lifelong disabil-
ity. She posts this information in a social media group for first-time parents,
where many members respond with articles confirming the claim. This con-
vinces Brenda (and others) to not have their children vaccinated. Years later,
an outbreak of one of the diseases covered by the vaccine occurs. Unfortu-
nately, Brenda’s daughter and many other children become ill with long-term
complications, including some who had been vaccinated.
Story 2 Brian has felt sadness for some time and begins searching online about the
problem. An advertisement for a well-being test appears as the first result in
the search engine. Brian goes to the test, and as directed in the test, gives
honest responses including suicidal thoughts. He gets help, as suggested by the
website. This website shared his data with 3rd party companies, including his
favourite social media site, whom years earlier allowed his insurance company
access for reduced premiums. Now his insurance company will not give him
life insurance and is tripling the price of his health insurance, placing him and
his family in a challenging financial situation.
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Are these stories far fetched? The fact of the matter is that, though these
stories are entirely fictional, there is sufficient evidence demonstrating how they can
happen, and in some cases already have happened.
Take Story 1 for a start. It is established that a now rescinded scientific article
about links between autism and the MMR vaccine is still regularly presented as fact
in various forms across the Web [218]. Complicating matters further are the biased
results of information retrieval platforms and the behaviours of the users themselves
[179, 244]. Furthermore, the interactive data collected online allows companies to
target individuals based upon their beliefs, including beliefs in pseudo science [195].
Specific to the anti-vaccine movement, there have been repeated cases of outbreaks
for diseases once thought to be under control [218].
Turning to Story 2 , recent evidence demonstrates how 3rd party companies learn
about the mental health status of individuals [181]. A court decision in New York
state now allows life insurance companies access to social media data [201]. In this
example, it was the social media platform and the insurance company partnership
that scored Brian as a higher risk. Partnerships like this already exist1, and govern-
ments (e.g. China) assign risk scores to their citizens [33].
Common Themes to Harms from Web Search Looking across these stories,
there some common themes that stand out.
First, Web search is not specific to the search engine it self. In the examples,
social media platforms play a role. Recommender systems, not mentioned in the
stories, but also borne out of the IR community, are another approach to help the
individual find information they might find important and / or interesting, but the
1Facebook partners with insurance at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/02/admiral-
to-price-car-insurance-based-on-facebook-posts (LA: 2020-10-26)
4
1.1 Harms from Web Search
user does not enter a query in the traditional form of search. The takeaway message
is that Web search is broad, however for this thesis, we focus on the traditional
query based Web search.
Second, harm from Web search does not necessarily happen to the individual and
in many cases can impact social circles (e.g. families) and in some cases communities
and broader society (as in Story 1 ).
Predominant in both of these examples is the interaction between the user and
the system. In both stories, the searcher interacts with the system, the system
collects the interactive data linked to the information they viewed. The underlying
algorithms learn something about the searcher from their interactions, resulting in
new information being served to the searcher (and potentially other searchers), and
ultimately leading to unfortunate outcomes for many.
These stories only demonstrate some of the challenges.
Data collected across various platforms has been shown to radicalise views [230]
and to alter outcome of elections [39]. Furthermore, their is some evidence to sug-
gest that information online and the platforms used to find that information can
lead to addiction [169]. The addiction problem is not surprising, given that some
data scientists are assigned with the task of tuning the ranking and recommender
algorithms for maximum engagement [52] and profit [267]. Tuning for engagement
on search, video and social media platforms, also increases the carbon footprint for
delivery of these services, a footprint that far exceeds air transport [136]2.
In summary, the potential harms can become quite dystopian [231], however
cataloguing these harms is not the purpose of this thesis.
2It is currently estimated that deliver of YouTube alone uses the equivalent power of 1.7 million
homes in the United States [136]
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Instead, we wish to focus on methods that may in fact prevent them from oc-
curring, or at the very least reduce the risk of their occurrence.
How to prevent harms? On a positive note, there has been growing focus (and
pressure) in the IR community to develop algorithmic and scalable solutions to ad-
dress potential harms, with research in areas including explainable AI and unbiased
algorithms. A look at the paper sessions and workshops at SIGIR and SIGCHI
over the past couple of years supports this trend. For instance, SIGIR 2019 had 3
workshops, SIGIR 2020 had 2 paper sessions and SIGCHI 2019 had 2 sessions en-
tirely devoted to areas related to harm prevention in Web search environments (e.g.
misinformation, privacy, bias, explainability, better decision making). However, we
note that the large majority of the strategies published are algorithmically focused
and give very limited focus on direct communication with the user about risks.
In commercial platforms (e.g. search engines and social media) where search for
information is common, there are occasional actions taken to protect their users, such
as content moderation and warning notices. Earlier this year, both Facebook3 and
Twitter4 began providing notices about information that may be dubious. However,
these notices appear to be quite selective given their focus on Covid-19. Furthermore,
dependent on the nature of the information, they may employ a take down approach.
Such approaches, though well intentioned, do not provide an opt-out (or opt-in)
mechanism for the user, and therefore have the potential for a ‘chilling effect’ that
threatens freedom of expression and gives rise to possibilities of censorship [25, 26]
and becomes an issue in the domain of human rights [221, 222]. These approaches
3Facebook Notice about Misinformation at https://about.fb.com/news/2020/06/more-context-for-
news-articles-and-other-content/ (LA: 2020-10-26)
4Twitter Misleading Information Policy at https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2020/updating-
our-approach-to-misleading-information.html (LA: 2020-10-26)
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also raise questions about the evaluation methodologies used, as demonstrated by
earlier failed attempts by Facebook to combat misinformation5.
One counter example to the take-down approach in modern Web search is related
to adult safe-search, where popular search engines in the English speaking countries
(e.g. Google, Bing, Yahoo and Duck Duck Go) all include either an opt-out (or
opt-in) mechanism for explicit content (e.g. profane language and pornography). In
some cases, such as Bing, the default is to have some level protection from explicit
content, and requires the user to opt-out if they want explicit results included. As
this thesis will define in the later background section, the approach used by Bing is
a nudge, and falls within the scope of behavioural and cognitive strategies, which
are a main focus of the overall research goal.
Nudging is just one approach one might consider that gives protection, but still
allows the searcher autonomy in their decisions. Another approach that will be the
focus is known as boosting , which enables individuals with cognitive skills to more
safely navigate environments. Behavioural and cognitive strategies such as these, are
far different from the earlier mentioned approaches, such as content moderation (and
removal) that is flagged by imperfect humans and algorithmic models6. They have
the benefit of retaining freedom of choice, a matter important for human rights, and
simultaneously addressing risks of harm, a matter important for both the individual
Web searcher and more broadly to society.
5Facebook ditches fake news warning at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-42438750 (LA:
2020-10-26)
6Identifying information that is harmful (and sometimes hateful) is challeng-





1.2 Scope of Harms
Modern computing has enabled great advances in broad areas such as communi-
cation, commerce and entertainment. Email, online store fronts, video conferencing,
social media platforms, travel booking websites and online banking are but a few ex-
amples of services now ubiquitous in our society made possible by computer science.
Usage of any of these services, along with the devices they operate on, opens the
door to harms to the individual and potentially to the entire globe (e.g. computer
viruses).
Several demonstrating examples are provided in this section to highlight the
broad scope of harms one might encounter in computing along with common ap-
proaches to prevent them. Following this, the harms this thesis aims to address are
outlined.
Computing and its Broad Set of Harms The advent of email being made
available to the broad population through services such as AOL and Outlook has
provided the benefit of much faster and more affordable communication around the
globe. Emails have the potential to contain malware (e.g. viruses) and/or spam
(e.g. phishing scams), which are two common types of harms one may encounter
online. Technology has advanced greatly in response to these issues, and problems
such as these are regularly addressed by software that scans computers for viruses
and machine learning models that classify messages as spam or not spam.
The development of online banking and online store fronts are technological
advancements that greatly reduce the need for tedious activities such as writing
cheques and travelling to stores to buy goods. Nonetheless, fraud is now a common
enough harm that banks and online store fronts are moving towards the requirement
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of technologies such as two-factor authentication [44]. Such technologies are also
being applied to prevent password theft for accounts for a broad set of online services.
There is also the risk of information being stolen (e.g. via hacking) for a mul-
titude of purposes, such as financial gain, blackmail or espionage. Such harms are
seemingly more commonplace as more corporate and government data is housed
in large data centres as time progresses. Technologies such as encryption play an
important role in reducing the risk of these types of harm.
These are only some examples where harms may occur as a result of the techno-
logical environment in which our daily lives operate.
Harms Relevant to this Thesis In the context of this thesis, the focus is given
to harms related to interactions with information in an information retrieval (IR)
system during the process of search. The process of searching for information on
the Web itself includes the risk of harms due to the various types of information
collected about the searcher and found by the searcher.
Provided a set of results in an IR system a searcher will be faced with a multitude
of actions (e.g. visit Web page X vs. Y, read a snippet, enter another query, read the
Web page they visit), for which the actions may have different harms associated with
them. In this thesis, the action of choosing a Web page to visit is given particular
attention. This action is motivated by a need for information, therefore the decisions
produced and pathways taken when the need for information has been satisfied are
seen as highly important too.
For this thesis, the central goal is the evaluation of novel methods and IR systems
designed for better privacy protection that simultaneously result in no increased
exposure to misinformation and negative search outcomes. Therefore, we introduce
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the following definitions of harm for which the underlying causes of these harms are
introduced in Section 2.4:
• Privacy Harm - A significant loss of privacy for one Web search environment
compared to another.
• Misinformation Harm - A significant increase to exposure of misinformation
as a result of the Web search environment.
• Search Task Harm - A significant reduction in positive outcomes for a search
task when comparing Web search environments used for the task.
Privacy harm is the main harm for which the interventions (IR systems) intro-
duced in later chapters are tested and is therefore the harm most relevant to this
thesis. Nonetheless, these harms are not exclusive from one another. For example, a
privacy harm may result in an individual being served an advertisement containing
misinformation (misinformation harm) or an entirely different searcher receiving
misinformation (misinformation harm) in their search results due to the nature of
collection search log data (privacy harm). There is also the issue of trade-offs to not
be overlooked, where an intervention reduces one harm but increases one or more
other harms. Ultimately, we view the search task harm as the most critical to avoid,
and it is assumed that increases in the other two harms will greatly increase this
harm.
1.3 Research Questions
Taken together, this leads to the main goals of the thesis: to identify behavioural
and cognitive strategies with proven success for harm reduction to individuals and
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broader society in other domains and to evaluate them in the domain of Web search
environment.
Evaluation is a crucial aspect, given that an intervention designed to reduce risk
of one particular type of harm (e.g. loss of privacy) may have the trade-off (or cost
if you will) of some side-effect elsewhere in the search process (e.g. increased time
to find information). There is always the potential that a harm prevention strategy
produces significant negative side-effects (such as with Facebook’s warning sign),
and one must therefore question the feasibility of a roll-out of such an approach in
real-world applications.
Thus, we formulate the guiding questions this thesis aims to address (denoted
as G-RQ-# ).
G-RQ-1 “Are the proposed behavioural and cognitive strategies viable for preven-
tion of harm during Web search?”
G-RQ-2 “Which of the proposed behavioural and cognitive strategies are most ef-
fective at harm prevention?”
As the thesis gives attention to two very different behavioural and cognitive
strategies (nudging and boosting), there are theories that suggest the effects they
will produce when compared with one another, but with little research performed
to compare these approaches. This motivates a research question important for the
application in Web search and for broader applications as well.
G-RQ-3 “To what extent do the claims about boosting compared to nudging exist




The work presented in this thesis has produced several novel contributions for
the general research community, along with several notable publication.
Theoretical Contributions The framework introduced in Chapter 3 is a novel
theoretical component that is threaded throughout the thesis. This theoretical
framework is a provided as a template for future research aimed at reducing harms
in Web search.
Findings related to G-RQ-3 (in Chapter 9) are used to test broader theories
(beyond Web search) related to nudging and boosting , theories which claim that
boosting will be overall more effective nudging . To date, there is no known published
work that compares these paradigms to test this theory.
Methodological Contributions Though several studies of note (introduced in
the background chapter) have evaluated behavioural and cognitive strategies for
harm prevention in interactive search environments, none of these studies evaluate
multiple strategies within the same study. The general methods used to perform
comparisons in this thesis, along with the more detailed specifics for empirical stud-
ies, are seen as novel contributions.
Similarly, the behavioural and cognitive intervention strategies, which are based
upon the risk prevention paradigms known as nudging and boosting . Though the de-
signs used in the studies were influenced by previous research, the are novel methods
as well that may be useful for future research.
Multiple evaluation measures are introduced throughout the general methods
12
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chapter as well as the subsequent empirical chapters. Some of the novel measures
were introduced to measure harms to the individual searcher during the process of
Web search. Other novel measures take into account the attitudes and actions of the
individual searcher (outside of the lab setting) towards the harm being prevented.
Finally, several novel evaluation measures for system performance (which adapt
existing IR metrics e.g. precision) are introduced as methods to compare across the
search systems.
Methods in one study (Chapter 7) demonstrate how environmental cues for risks
of harm can be extracted from log data. The general methods demonstrate how the
cues identified here, or for any other type of harm in Web search, can be linked to
multiple behavioural and cognitive approaches (Chapter 8 and 9).
Evaluation Test Sets Evaluation test sets from studies in Chapters 5 and 7
have been made publicly available in open data repositories mentioned within each
publication.
Published Works The efforts on this thesis have produced multiple published
works listed below. Links to full citations in the bibliography are provided.
The first empirical Chapter resulted in two separate papers.
An overall comparison of strategies in Chapter 5 and findings were pre-
sented at the 2019 Conference on Human Interaction and Information
Retrieval (CHIIR ’19). See [266].
Findings specific to user actions and concerns and their interactive be-
haviours with a warning light nudge (Chapter 5) were presented at the
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42nd International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Develop-
ment in Information Retrieval (SIGIR ’19). See [265].
Methods and findings in empirical Chapter 7 were presented at the 2020 Con-
ference on Human Interaction and Information Retrieval (CHIIR ’20). See
[264].
Sections from the thesis background and framework (Chapters 2 and 3) were
presented at the SIGIR ’20 Workshop for Bridging the Gap between Informa-
tion Science, Information Retrieval and Data Science - BIRDS. See [262].
Research performed in the earlier stages of thesis research resulted in two
publications, are included here (but not part of the main thesis):
Much of the theory underlying the behavioural and cognitive approaches
and motivations for their use in IR were presented at the 41st Interna-
tional ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Development in Infor-
mation Retrieval (SIGIR ’18) Doctoral Consortium. See [260].
Initial focus for this thesis was on system oriented solutions for detection
of hate speech. It was during this research that the major gaps in inter-
active cognitive approaches were identied, result in a major shift in focus.
Nonetheless, this earlier research of my thesis resulted in a neural ensem-
ble approach for the identification of hate speech, and was presented at
the 10th International Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation
(LREC ’18). See [261].
1.5 Presentation Style
Stylistically, the presentation of the thesis is inspired by David Maxwell’s PhD




Language The thesis is written in British English, with a mixture of the active
and passive voice. Though third person language (e.g. ‘we’, ‘our’) is regularly used,
the thesis is single authorship.
URLs For some claims and demonstrating examples, external Web resources were
utilized. When a web resource is introduced for the first time, such as a hyperlink
with embedded URL, a footnote7 will include the full URL and date last accessed.
For any subsequent uses of the same hyperlink, the full details are generally not
provided.
Hypotheses and Questions
Example-1 is the style used to present hypotheses and research questions
Document Navigation References to key points (e.g. research question Example-1
and style section 1.5) in the thesis may be clicked for fast navigation. Bibliographic
references are also navigable (see [261] as an example).
Evaluation Measures Each time an evaluation measure is introduced for the
first time within an empirical chapter, the measure is emphasised like this. Some
measures are used in multiple empirical chapters, and are given the same emphasis
when introduced for the first time in the specific empirical chapter.
7hyperlink with embedded URL at http://dummy.url (LA: 2020-10-31)
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Evaluation Test Sets Evaluation test sets are commonly used in IR and inter-
active IR studies. Though different test sets are mentioned throughout the thesis,
any test set used within this thesis is indicated like this: example test set.
Strategies and Framework Concepts Strategies introduced in the general meth-
ods (Chapter 4), and concepts for the framework introduced in Chapter 3 are asso-
ciated with alpha numeric characters with a box drawn around them (e.g. strategy
S1 and framework component FC-Policy ). This style is carried throughout the
chapters that follow their introduction.
Emphasis on Concepts Important concepts central to this thesis, such as nudg-
ing and boosting , are emphasised like this throughout. Other important concepts,
but less central to this thesis, are emphasised like this.
1.6 Thesis Structure
The thesis is divided into two parts.
Part I - Theory The background provided in Chapter 2, along with introduction
Chapter 1, are used as motivation for a framework for harm prevention in Web
search introduced in Chapter 3.
Part II - Empirical Studies The empirical studies, five in total (of which four
are user based) are iterative in nature. Each study is performed in turn and used
to inform later studies and allow for refinement of the general methods.
The general methodology is introduced in Chapter 4, which presents the harm
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prevention strategies and introduces some of the search systems evaluated in later
studies. General techniques used to evaluate the systems and strategies are intro-
duced in this chapter, including considerations for study design, search task and
type of harm to prevent.
Nudging , as a behavioural strategy, is the central focus of empirical studies pre-
sented in Chapters 5 and 6, of which both are user based. The first nudge study is
performed in an offline environment, and compares three diverse systems and strate-
gies against a control search system, with all systems connected to a static evaluation
test set. The second study compares the same strategies, but is connected to a live
dynamic search environment and is therefore online in nature.
Chapter 9 evaluates a set of environmental cues currently available in most com-
mercial search engines. The cues were evaluated with respect to two different harms
regularly discussed in the mainstream: (a) loss of privacy and (b) exposure to mis-
information common in Web search. The findings from this study informed the
direction of the final two studies.
Several boosting strategies are introduced and evaluated in Chapter 8 with data
collected via a crowd sourced pilot study.
Using boost and nudge strategies found to be both viable and effective (G-RQ-1 and
G-RQ-2 ), Chapter 9 compares nudging and boosting strategies against a control
system to answer G-RQ-3 . This study is fully interactive, with an offline static
test set similar to the first study, and performed with users in a lab like both nudge
studies.
A discussion comparing the strategies, main study findings as well as limitations







Information retrieval, as defined by Salton [194], is a field concerned with the
structure, analysis, organization, storage, searching, and retrieval of information.
This field has produced many ubiquitous applications, such as search engines, that
allow individuals to find information easily and for information to flow quickly
through society. Though IR research has traditionally focused on the retrieval of
text, other types of media fall into play as well, including images and video [51]. IR
methods are applied in many different domains, that allow end users to more easily
find the most relevant information, with examples including the entire open internet
[170], an enterprise (such as a large corporate Intranet) [128] and commercial sites
recommending different products (e.g. books to sell, movies to watch) [186].
Indeed, the field of IR and Web search is quite broad, and in general the back-
ground in the following sections is presented with this broad scope in mind. However,
the empirical chapters presented later, for which this background forms the founda-
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tion, focus on Web search in a traditional search engine and textual information.
This background chapter will introduce (Section 2.2) some of the core theories
and concepts specific to the search processes, of which many are rooted in the
research from information science (IS). Additionally, there will be an introduction
(Section 2.3) to the basics of an information retrieval (IR) system and establish what
is minimally necessary to create a modern search engine for the Web. Also, we will
drill down extensively (Section 2.4) into the various sources of harm in Web search,
such as system elements and human biases, which influence user decision making
processes during Web search. An introduction to interactive information retrieval
(IIR) is provided in Section 2.5. IIR a more recent area of research that considers
both the IR system and the users of those systems as one together, and is the area
of research most specific to this thesis. In Section 2.6, a brief survey of behavioural
and cognitive interventions that promote decision making for reduced risk of harm
is provided.
Throughout this chapter, a recurrent theme of the decision making processes
inherent during Web search is intertwined. This is an important point to make, at
the root of many intervention strategies to improve the Web search environment
(e.g. a warning label about misinformation, an algorithm to provide faster results,
log analysis for query recommendations, changes to snippets in the results page,
etc. etc.), the decision making process will almost certainly be impacted. One
must understand these impacts, as they certainly have the potential to have both
positive and negative impacts, which motivates the attention given to commonly
used evaluation approaches for IR and IIR research (in Section 2.7).
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Advancements of modern information retrieval (IR) systems, such as commercial
search engines and social media news feeds, have been guided by multiple views
of the search process. Information seeking [251] and information foraging [177]
are two examples; views which aim to model how humans search for and interact
with information. These models have inspired the development of many automated
methods in the field of IR to help meet an individual’s information need [245],
including automatic discovery of web documents [170] and automated assessment of
relevance [108]. While the advancements inspired by these views have made positive
changes for the world we live in, it is worth exploration of the underlying views
guiding IR design as they provide insights into where risk may present itself in
the search process. The following sub-sections highlight a sample of predominant
views guiding IR design, with some examples framed within these views to highlight
potential avenues for harm to individuals as well as society as whole.
2.2.1 Searching the Library
From a historical standpoint, IR design has been heavily influenced through
research of the search process in the library setting. In his review of user interactions
with search systems, White [245] states with respect to user information seeking
behaviour:
. . . the reference librarian model (of a human search expert trying to
satisfy a patron’s information needs) remains the prevalent interaction
model in many search systems, including commercial Web search engines.
The primary difference is that in these systems human librarians have
been largely replaced by automation in the retrieval process (including
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formulating effective queries via tools such as query auto-completion,
query suggestion, and backed query alterations), and by the searcher
themselves (for example, in decisions regarding the relevance, filtering,
and synthesis of the retrieved items) to generate a set of relevant infor-
mation items, and ultimately, one or more answers to the questions that
motivated their search.
Example Beginning with the reference librarian, they may be biased towards a
subset of reference material, perhaps due to their own views about credibility of the
sources. Over the years, the patron has established trust in their reference librarian,
and this trust bias results in them believing they have the best information at hand.
These biases of the patron and the librarian translate to risk for individuals and
society as whole. Most immediately, the risk to the patron is that some relevant piece
of information will be missed. Dependent on the information need of the patron,
the potential loss (risk) due to this missed piece of information could be high (e.g.
the missed piece of information contained the safest treatment for a medical issue).
Perhaps this patron had the medical issue and is trying to find the best treatment.
Alternatively, the patron could be a medical professional treating 100s of patients,
some of whom have this medical issue in question. The patron is now a source of
risk to greater society (e.g. some of the patrons patients end up dying) as they are
yet aware of the safest treatment available. As a medical professional, the patron’s
reputation is also potentially at risk (e.g. word might spread about prescription of
unsafe treatments).
This toy example is intended to demonstrate the potential harms due to the
biases and beliefs (biases and beliefs and their role in search are further detailed in
Section 2.4.5) of actors in the process of searching for information, and it further
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demonstrates that harms might occur regardless of the search environment (be it a
library or search engine). Additionally, it is plausible that neither the librarian or
the patron were aware of their biases. In present times, the role of the librarian is
more often replaced by automated IR systems. Thus, to minimize risk to the patron
(the searcher) and broader society via their contacts, interventions should address
the biases of the librarian (IR system) and the patron (the searcher). In summary,
this example demonstrates risks of harms in the library, which apply to Web search
as well.
2.2.2 Information Behaviour and Information Seeking
Multiple models of information seeking and information search have been pro-
posed, including Maxwell’s recent model of stopping behaviour [148]. Wilson’s gen-
eral models are discussed broadly in literature and are quite useful for the demon-
stration of many of the issues with Web search.
Information seeking behaviour is framed within Wilson’s nested general model
[253] of information behaviour, which combined together encapsulate information
search behaviour. Using this nested model, Wilson [254] defined information be-
haviour as
. . . the purposive seeking for information as a consequence of a need to
satisfy some goal.
and information search as
. . . the ‘micro-level’ of behaviour employed by the searcher in interacting
with information systems of all kinds.
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His research produced various models, based upon interdisciplinary research (in-
cluding information science, psychology and decision theory), to better explain the
motivation (e.g. risk/reward, solving a problem, addressing uncertainty) for an
individuals information need [251, 252, 253].
In Wilson’s original model of information behaviour [251] (see Fig. 2.1), two
human entities stand out. There is the ‘Information user’ (depicted at the top
of model) and ‘Other people’ (depicted at lower right of the model). This model
(simple as it might be) describes how information flows between these entities and
‘information systems’ (e.g. a modern IR system). Using alternative language in the
model, and replacement of the entities ‘Information user’ and ‘Other people’ with
the synonyms ‘individual’ and ‘society’ respectively, is useful for an example in the
frame of information behaviour and information seeking.
Figure 2.1: Wilson’s Original Model of Information Behaviour [251]. -
Example Consider two ‘individuals’ independently but simultaneously addressing
the same information need (e.g. What is the best treatment for alcohol withdrawal?)
using the same IR system built within the Wilson’s models of information seeking.
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These ‘individuals’ continue to interact with the IR system until their search is
successful and information need is satisfied. For individual 1, based on the infor-
mation viewed, they are now convinced that benzodiazepines are the most effective
treatment. Individual 2, based on the information they encountered, are now quite
certain that going cold turkey and sitting out the withdrawal is the best treatment.
Each of these treatments comes with the possibility for harm, of which the second
treatment is quite dangerous (e.g. due to inherent risk of death from convulsions).
At this stage, the risk is only to each of these individuals. However, one or both
of these individuals could share this information with another individual (‘Other
people’ in Wilson’s model), at which point the potential for societal harm becomes
a concern.
In addition to highlighting the potential for risk of harm to individuals and so-
ciety1, this example is useful to identify other concerns. First, understanding of a
user’s information need is not sufficient for harm prevention. Even though both
individuals had the exact same information need, the outcome of their seeking be-
haviour was very different. Biases of the information system or the individuals using
them are factors [16, 244] that may have played a role in this outcome (see Section
2.4.5). Second, the example suggests the value and importance of evaluation of
successes and failures (both highlighted in Wilson’s model) of the seeking process.
In the example provided, the information was relevant and satisfactory for both
individuals, but this information produced two very different outcomes. Therefore,
commonly used approaches (e.g. TREC evaluation and graded relevance) to evalu-
ate modern IR systems and the information seeking process are not enough. A more
recent proposal, evaluation of search outcomes (e.g. positive health outcome after
1Wilson’s later model of information behaviour [253], does consider an element of risk / reward in
the search process for consideration of information sources, and is a rare example within a model
of the search process where risk is explicitly considered. However, this consideration appears to
be from the view of risk to the individual and not broader society.
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information seeking is complete) as a measure of success [244], is one possible ap-
proach to address the discrepancies of success for the two individuals. Evaluation is
covered further in Section 3.2.4, and it is an important consideration for IR systems
and Web search.
2.2.3 How Information is Used
Beyond the views and models of how individuals search for information, it is
important to understand how information is used. White [245] breaks down the us-
age of information into four ares: sense-making, exploratory search, problem solving
and creativity. We focus on the first two, as sense-making and exploratory search
are often a part of the decision making process [245], which implies the potential
for consequences (including harmful outcomes) beyond completion of the search
process. Both exploratory search and sense-making are important areas related to
search [56, 145, 178, 245, 247], for which we can only scratch the surface of their
importance; we begin with Dervin’s view of sense-making.
Sense-making Dervin’s model of sense-making (see Figure 2.2) is an intuitive
view of the processes involved to make sense of information [56], for which she uses
the metaphor of a bridge being built across gaps. These gaps represent voids in
knowledge that an individual has come to recognize [178], for which gap recogni-
tion has many possible triggers [56] (e.g. individual does not know an answer to
a particular question, uncertainty about dietary choices and health implications).
Sense-making applies to many different types of information, including television and
virtual environments in gaming [185], however the current concern remains within
documents found on the Web.
The process of sense-making is two way, where an individual’s reality about a
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Figure 2.2: Dervin’s Sense-making Process - Figure from Reinhard and Dervin
[185]
knowledge gap can be bridged and then un-bridged [56] (e.g. through realization that
knowledge they had was incorrect). It is a continuous process of framing hypotheses
based on the data, and placing appropriate data to fit within a hypothesis [178, 245].
In many cases, a decision will be made using the knowledge gained through this
process [56, 178, 245].
Pirolli and Card [178] suggest that ingrained beliefs and biases (e.g. confirmation
bias) play an important role in the sense-making process and ultimately the decision
making process. They furthermore suggest that biases are one possible avenue for
technological innovation. When considering the sensemaking process of connected
individuals [245], it is also possible these biases are influenced by our cultural and
societal networks
Sense-making as a whole, undoubtedly has elements of decision making for the
individual. In Dervin’s model (see Figure 2.2), it is clear that outcomes are a part
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of the sense-making process, outcomes which may impact the user positively or
negatively [56, 185]. This view suggests that outcomes of the search process are an
important consideration when designing systems to support Web search.
Exploratory Search Marchionini, a pioneer in the field of exploratory search,
highlights that this type of search is fundamental to human behaviour, yet there are
limited tools available to support this important process on the Web [145]. Com-
pared to other views of the search process, there is quite limited research producing
formal models of exploratory search, however more formal models may be helpful
[245].
White [245] frames exploratory search as a contextual problem that may be open-
ended and long lasting as well as a process that can be repeatable and opportunistic,
and may be used in the broader decision making process. Overall, the goal of
exploratory search is one of two outcomes: a "knowledge product" (e.g. research
paper) or underpin a future action (e.g. choosing a holiday destination, choosing
a medical treatment). Unlike the knowledge gap in sense-making, which implies a
clearly defined goal, the ultimate goal of exploratory search is much less defined. The
process of exploratory search may be driven by curiosity and often takes place across
multiple search sessions and temporal scales of days, weeks and months. Perhaps
most important of all, is the embedded element of learning. On the topic of learning
White states:
Exploratory searches can have a profound impact on searchers’ personal
development, because they reflect the pursuit of higher-level learning
objectives.
This potential for profound impacts through the process of exploratory search
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[145, 245, 247], is certainly a potential pathway for harm in Web search.
Implications Both views of information usage discussed (sense-making and ex-
ploratory search) suggest possible implications of the information encountered by
the searcher, implications that could be both negative or positive to the individ-
ual searcher, their direct social network and / or more broadly to society as whole.
Though developing models that identify and mimic such search behaviour (e.g. mod-
els that identify search tasks that are exploratory [121]) are beyond the goals of the
current research, such models are indeed a promising direction when it comes to
potential harm reduction strategies for Web search.
Combining such models with topical models of the search space, an intelligent
search system may be able to intervene and steer a user towards content that still
gives broad perspectives but having a goal that minimizes potential harm. Topical
areas where this may be relevant include those related to health and medicine as well
as topics with a high likelihood of addictive behaviour, with other topics one might
consider too. For instance, if the search system can identify the search behaviour
as sense-making of a particular medical treatment, the system could filter results
that are linked to low risk outcomes. Alternatively, imagine a teenager, who is
quite curious and susceptible to a "profound impact" to their development. If this
teenager is performing exploratory search for information in the topical space of
sex and sexuality (or drugs, weapons, etc.), there are many impacts that might
occur and it is therefore considering interventions for harm prevention. These are
but two illustrative examples, which provide motivation for further development of
such models, in addition to motivation for identification and evaluation of more
immediate interventions and strategies.
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2.2.4 Evolutionary and Ecological Views of Search
Ecological and evolutionary models, that model animal behaviour and the search
for food and other resources, have been adapted to describe and model searcher
behaviour and are used as a guide for researchers to design IR systems. Here we
briefly introduce two such frameworks, followed with real world examples where
these views break down.
Berrypicking Bates’ Berrypicking model [23] (see Figure 2.3) present the searcher
looking for information as an analogy of someone looking for berries, and the berries
as information. Bates’ suggests that searching is a non-linear sequence of steps as
opposed to a process that results in the perfect set of relevant documents and infor-
mation. She suggests that search should be modeled by the behaviour of searching
for berries in a forest, and includes the notion of information patches as an ana-
logue to the berry patch. The non-linearity of the search is the paths taken between
different information patches (just like one would do while picking berries in the
wild). Eventually the searcher has all the information necessary for their informa-
tion need (or enough berries to eat) and the search will terminate. As Figure 2.3
demonstrates, the path for information (just as the path through a forest) may be
all over the place.
Foraging Information Foraging Theory (IFT) introduced by Pirolli and Card [177]
presents the searcher as a predator and the information as prey. In addition to the
predator prey view, IFT makes important links back to earlier models of rational
decision making [205], models demonstrating that much of our decision making
processes in our quest for information are rational and adaptive to the environment.
The pioneering work by Pirolli and Card also suggests that information environments
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Figure 2.3: Bates’ Berrypicking Model of Search [23] - Bates’ provides the
following description: “The continuity represented by the line of the arrow is the
continuity of a single human being moving through many actions toward a general
goal of a satisfactory completion of research related to an information need. The
changes in direction of the arrow illustrate the changes of an evolving search as the
individual follows up various leads and shifts in thinking. The diagram also shows




can be further optimized for the searchers that use them. Pirolli and Card focus
heavily on the costs of search, particularly time, and introduces the notion of ‘gain’
(information gained) as part of the search process and therefore one key bridge to
the economic view of search and IR (see Section 2.2.5).
In a general sense, when considering both Berrypicking and IFT, both are in-
spired by theories of evolution and ecology and both treat information as prey and
the searcher as the predator [177, 198]. However, both neglect the fact that hunter-
gathering and foraging for food comes with many additional risks [135], including
the possibility of death from toxins in the food or being attacked by predators during
the process of searching for food. Looking again at Bates’ model (see Figure 2.3),
the model suggests that thoughts can (and will be) changed due to the information
picked during the process. When re-framing this model with the addition of toxic
information (or berries if you will), the model has a threat of harm. When taken
with this view, both views have a lack of consideration for external dangers such as
toxic information and predatory behaviour, therefore flaws in models that aim to
describe search behaviour. There are well publicized recent events in Web search
demonstrating where these models might break down.
Examples Two recent real world examples demonstrate the threat of harm both
to individuals and society due to foraging on toxic information and being attacked
by predators. Toxic information, such as that related to a retracted scientific paper
on the links between MMR vaccines and autism, has resulted in measles outbreaks
outbreaks due to loss of herd immunity [218]. Predation occurred in 2016 when
Cambridge Analytica [39] made use of personal data collected to target individuals
with information and advertisements containing dubious information, and poten-
tially impacted society via outcomes of voting.
32
2.2 The Search Process
These examples are just some to consider as critiques of IFT and Berrypicking
and potential avenues for individual and and societal harm, there are additional
possibilities and shortcomings to touch upon briefly. IFT was originally designed
with the assumption that outcomes are certain, and even though uncertainty may be
a desirable outcome of the process of information foraging [34], and thus has limited
consideration for risk [177]. Furthermore, IFT focuses heavily on information scent
[177], which is challenging, as there is plenty of information available that may smell
quite good to the searcher but is in fact information that is analogous to junk food
(e.g. click bait [42]).
No model is perfect, and the shortcomings discussed are likely due to the idealized
views of the search process and search environment used as assumptions within these
models. They are nonetheless important views of the search process that have guided
advancements in modelling search behaviour, most notably the economic view.
2.2.5 Economic View
Recently developed models of search behaviour integrate theories from eco-
nomics, including microeconomic concepts including consumer and production the-
ory, with the overall aim to better predict user behaviour in the IR environment
[11]. Incorporation of the economic view of IR is quite promising, in that it opens
the doors for researchers to evaluate systems and their users from the perspective
of trade-offs of costs and benefits, in addition to traditional relevance based metrics
[11, 14]. Cost is not a new consideration for IR systems (e.g. Pirolli and Card
include this in IFT [177]), but there are limited considerations for it in practice
[13]. Unfortunately, studies around economic models and evaluation metrics thus
far appear to be heavily focused on information gain (as measure of benefit) and the
costs of time (see Azzopardi et al [13] for example). In the decision making process,
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elements of risk and uncertainty are costs as well [135, 143], and thus should also
be considered in the economic view. The gain based measures (e.g. [106]) used to
test economic frequently use graded relevance (e.g. TREC test collections), which
at the end of the day is still relevance and therefore neglects the possibility that a
document graded highly relevant may also contain harmful information. There is
the added challenge that economic models of IR behaviour are sometimes designed
with the assumption that users are rational (e.g. [14]), for which ample evidence
exists is not always the case [115, 233].
One can adapt the examples already provided to demonstrate challenges with the
existing economic views, therefore we turn our attention to considerations for the
cost and gain components for harm prevention which may someday be incorporated
into economic models of search. Costs that might be considered in the frame of these
models when considering harms are personal data collected (e.g. the information
collected about the searcher) as a cost, the monetary costs to access information
(e.g. the price a news website or scientific journal charges for access to an article
in search results). With respect to the gain component, document relevance and
document misinformation are not mutually exclusive. Evaluations that consider
relevance, are just one view to consider in economic modelling and it may be wise
to improve upon graded relevance to somehow take into account that dangerous
information may also be relevant. Health search is one particular are of concerns
where dangerous information may also be relevant to the search [179, 244].
Economic models are undoubtedly useful for evaluation of interventions such as
query suggestions to understand expected impacts to costs of time and gains of
information [13]. As interventions are particularly relevant for addressing harms in
Web search (see Sections 3.2), it may be possible to incorporate such approaches
into these models.
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2.2.6 Concepts
In the views considered, several important concepts have emerged which are
commonly used, including information need, task, search outcome and relevance.
Each of these concepts touch upon one or more categories of consideration.
Relevance is a fundamental concept in IR research and is a major consideration
for the development and evaluation of IR systems. The notion of relevance applies
to queries in IR systems for books in a library and documents on the Web (e.g. via
Google), and may also be extended to other types of IR systems including news
personalization and product recommender systems. When considering definitions,
including those that define a document as relevant if it contains the information the
user was looking for when they submitted a query [51], one may get the sense the con-
cept of relevance is somewhat ambiguous. There are different types and categories
of relevance which make this concept less ambiguous. Types and categorizations
of relevance include, but are not limited to the following: topical relevance (e.g.
for the query ‘baseball’ documents about baseball are topically relevant, whereas
documents about basketball are not), temporal relevance (e.g. documents about
last year’s World Series are temporally more relevant than the 1984 world series for
a query ‘MLB World Series’) and locality (e.g. Chinese restaurants in London are
likely much more relevant than restaurants in Seattle for a search query ‘Chinese
food’ sent from a mobile device in London). Many, if not all, of the categories of
relevance are factors playing into the overall notion to of relevant information for
the users.
The search outcome, as it relates to the decisions made by the user during and
after their search for information, may result in good and / or harmful implications.
This concept of search outcome falls within the scope of performance and outcome
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based evaluation measures [119, 245], which are touched upon in section 2.7.3. The
points made in the previous models of search behaviour suggest that relevance is not
sufficient for evaluation of IR systems with respect to search outcome, as relevance
does not consider what the user actually does with this information, and we note
that Dervin’s model of sense-making suggests different categories of search outcome
during the search process (see upper right of Figure 2.2).
Task in and of itself is threaded throughout all of the views above. There are
many different tasks a user may perform, and the tasks may vary by environment
(e.g. at work vs. at home).
Kim [121] provides an extensive review of tasks, and a thorough taxonomy to
categorize different attributes of task. Broadly, Kim groups these attributes into
Search and Work task. She focuses on 3 types of task : factual, interpretive and
exploratory, which are respectively defined as closed, open-ended but focused, and
completely open-ended. Kim’s research is motivated by the need for better models
of information seeking.
However, Kim does not provide the only taxonomy. Wildemuth and Freund [248]
in their systematic review2 of task broadly break them into complex versus simple,
exploratory versus lookup and and navigational, information or transactional (as
suggested by Broder. [36]), indicating there are multiple ways one might describe a
search task.
Information need (and search intent) is threaded throughout all of the views and
models discussed in the previous sections. Ultimately, it is the need for information,
whether the need is clearly defined or not, that drives a user to perform a search.
2Their review also provides a database of search tasks published in IIR literature before
2017 in the frame of this taxonomy. See Systematic Review of Assigned Search Tasks at
https://ils.unc.edu/searchtasks/index.php (LA: 2020-10-30)
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There are many ways one might categorize information needs of the user, with
the search taxonomy produced by Broder [36] being a quite useful approach to do
so. Broder proposes, and provides some evidence, that queries (and the underlying
information needs) are either navigational (e.g. searching for a particular website
or information that is likely or known to exist), informational (e.g. reading about
a particular medical issue) or transactional types where the intent is to reach a site
for additional interactions (e.g. shopping for books). The Taxonomy introduced by
Broder launched additional research in this area to describe and understand a user’s
search intent.
A more refined description of Broder’s three categories was produced by the
work of Jansen et al. [105], and validated with a analysis of commercial search
logs. In their work, it was found that the large majority of queries are informational
in nature, and much less often navigational or transactional (counter to Broder).
Jansen et al. also treat intent on three different levels, which is perhaps a more
intuitive and specific way to describe searcher intent than Broder’s initial definitions.
There are no direct critiques to make about these concepts , however it is worth
noting that documents are readily available on the Web (see [76]) that leverage these
concepts (such as Broder’s categorization of information need) that provide advice
on the topic of Search Engine Optimization (SEO). Authors of content, especially
content with commercial value, know that it is beneficial to have their results rank
high and therefore make use SEO techniques [168] to increase the likelihood of
monetary conversion (such as display advertising or sale of a product). SEO is
a broad topic in and of itself, but is just one example where publishers of Web
content take effort to adapt to the ever changing Web search environment. Another
example of adaptation was to Google’s original Page Rank algorithm [170], where
authors intentionally added in-links and out-links to their pages to rank more highly
37
2. BACKGROUND
results. Relating these examples back to the earlier discussion on IFT, Pirolli and
Card suggest that IFT is intended to predict and understand how individuals adapt
to information environments and understand how environments can be adapted to
individuals [177]. As such, researchers might consider not just individuals as the
only agents interacting with information environments, but other agents as well
(e.g. authors, organisations, artificial bots).
2.3 Information Retrieval System
As so much of Web search occurs with search systems such as commercial search
engines, it is worth taking a look at the main components of such systems. The
field of Information Retrieval (IR) and the systems produced as outputs of the field
is a quite large and technical subject in and of itself. Search engines (e.g. library
book search, Google) are more traditional flavours of IR systems based upon the
lookup model of search [245], with newer IR systems incorporating social information
[51]. The current research focus is not about detailing the algorithms used in these
systems, however a basic understanding of the main components and concepts is
helpful for the subsequent background regarding potential harms.
Fundamental elements for IR systems include document pre-processing, ranking
and filtering as well as representing information in a retrieval model to determine
relevance. Croft et al. [51] provide a general overview of search engine architecture,
and split search systems into two high-level processes that collectively make up a
search system. There is the indexing process (see Figure 2.4) and the query process
(see Figure 2.5). Splitting the description in this manner is just one way to introduce
the key basics of search systems, basics which are common to many introductory IR
resources (e.g. [17, 51, 144]).
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It is also important to keep in mind that IR systems related to retrieval of
semi-structured (e.g. HTML) and unstructured (e.g. raw text files) data are the
central focus of this introduction, as opposed to systems that retrieve information
from structured data (e.g. relational databases). Also, for this introduction, content
and document are generic terms used to describe the information stored in retrieval
systems (e.g. text, images, video), however many popular resources (e.g. Croft et al.
[51]) focus on the retrieval of text, thus all three terms (content, document and text)
are treated interchangeably. Some examples of other document types are provided,
however our focus is on text.
2.3.1 Indexing Process
Figure 2.4: Overview of the Indexing Process of an IR System. - As presented
by Croft et al. [51]
The primary task of the index process is to ensure query results that are provided
to the user are returned efficiently. As users are accustomed to retrieving information
in short order 3, there are indeed very efficient mechanisms underlying any large
scale IR system. The output of this process is an inverted index, which is a highly
3Google Search typically returns query results in less than half a second on billions of documents
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efficient data structure that allows queries (via a retrieval model) to return candidate
documents quickly [51].
The index is a representation of a set of documents (corpus), which in the case of
modern search systems, is continually updated via a content-acquisition sub-process
commonly known as crawling. Once a document (e.g. an html Web page) is captured
in a crawl, it goes through a transformation sub-process to greatly simplify the
document representation, where in the case of textual documents, techniques from
natural language processing (NLP) are commonly used to cleanse and simplify the
text (e.g. removal of common words). Only at the end of this process (or pipeline,
if you will), are the documents placed into the inverted index, which is accessed via
querying of a retrieval model. The sub-sections that follow provide a bit of detail
about the acquisition, transformation and models used to retrieve documents in the
index.
2.3.1.1 Content Acquisition
Crawling is the process of discovering new, updated and removal of content
across the Web [51, 144], and is a massive task when one considers the amount
of information available on the open Web and the factors that must be taken into
account during the crawl. Some factors to consider are respect of hosts of Web
pages (i.e. a host says I do not want to be included in your crawl) and weighting of
higher quality Web sites (e.g. re-crawl high quality news sites regularly vs. spam
sites much less so) [144]. There are also factors related to coping with scalability of
the problem, such as deciding where to start crawls (often with a seed set) and how
often to ensure that documents retrieved are up to date (known as freshness) [51].
It is useful to note that just as websites can be configured to block crawlers,
crawlers can be configured to not visit certain sites. At the end of the day, a search
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system can only return results for sites that have been crawled and included in the
index. This is analogous to a library in that you have no chance of finding a book if
the library has made the decision to not purchase it, or the seller refuses to let the
library purchase a copy.
2.3.1.2 Content Transformation
Content transformation, is the sub-process to convert crawled documents into a
condensed representation for the document index. A common approach is to pass
textual documents through an NLP pipeline that first tokenises them (i.e. splits
up texts into individual words and punctuation) before normalising the tokens with
steps such as stemming, lemmatisation and removal of stop words [111, 144].
Stemming, using algorithms such as the Porter stemmer [180], removes suffixes
from words (e.g. ‘Likes’, ‘liked’, ‘likely’ and ‘liking’ all become ‘like’).
Similarly, Lemmatisation (e.g. ‘better’ is treated as ‘good’) is also useful for
condensing words, and is a linguistic based process known as morphological analysis
[144].
Stopword removal is the process of stripping low value terms (e.g. words having
little semantic meaning such as ‘be’, ‘not’, ‘or’, ‘to’) [144], of which one must create
additional approaches to circumvent issues with phrases such as “to be or not to be”
[51].
The examples of content transformation presented here are but a few, and the
transformation process and related tasks (such as document classification and cue
extraction) will be revisited in sections and Chapters ahead. Content transformation
and it’s relation to harms on the Web are introduced Section 2.4.1. The evaluation of
document collections is an related and important action introduced in 2.7.1. Extrac-
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tion of information from content (such as cues) is yet another under the umbrella of
content transformation and is central to the harm prevention framework introduced
in Chapter 3.
2.3.1.3 Content Retrieval Model
Determination of potentially relevant documents is commonly achieved through
development of a retrieval model. A simple vector space model is achieved through
term weighting measures such as term frequency and inverse document frequency
(TF-IDF), where relevance could be a measure of cosine similarity between docu-
ments [51]. BM-25 is a probabilistic approach assuming binary independences (e.g.
there is a set of relevant and non-relevant documents) that adds in the term weight-
ing components [144], which is a more recent advance. Usage of representations
output from machine learning models, such as topic and embedding models are
additional variants one should consider [51]. Recent evidence suggests that neural
approaches are quite competitive with a BM-25 model but simultaneously should
not be considered as the end all be all solution [155, 156].
2.3.2 Query Process
Focus now turns to the query process (Figure 2.5). In the most general sense,
the user interaction is the fundamental element of the overall query process and
consists of a query input, query transformation to represent the query in a form
similar to documents in the index and an interface component that displays output
of one more results and captures the user interactions (e.g. clicks on a result).
Ranking, which is the process of determining if document B is more relevant
than document A, requires many inputs which might include features of documents
and query, time of day, search history of user, topicality of document [51, 144] or
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Figure 2.5: Overview of the Query Process of an IR System. - As presented
by Croft et al. [51]
specifically links between documents [170]. Learning to rank algorithms (as covered
in [139]) take different features from the documents as well as logging behaviour
of the users to more effectively rank documents over time, and such algorithms are
fundamental components of modern search systems. It is worth noting that details
of ranking algorithms are often protected secrets of platforms such as Google and
Facebook, though it is widely known that Facebook ranks information for user news
feeds with an internal algorithm known as EdgeRank, little information has been
published about how it works [122].
The evaluation component of the query process, is perhaps most important of all
to any IR system, as proper evaluation allows system designers to test new changes,
identify problems with a system and ultimately improve the user experience [51, 144].
Much can be said about evaluation approaches and there are many different ways one
can evaluate search systems (e.g. precision, recall, mean reciprocal rank (MRR)),
therefore evaluation is given particular focus (see Section 3.2.4).
Finally, there is the user interaction itself, and is a topic that is central to this
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thesis. In fact, the topic has sprung an entire area of research known as interactive
information retrieval (IIR) and is given special attention in Section 2.5. This pro-
cess includes logging of user interactions is performed to serve many purposes (e.g.
personalization, query recommendation, spelling correction), and is a topic covered
later (Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.4).
2.4 Sources of Harm
The potential harms of Web search have many underlying causes, for which we
emphasize the key factors. First, corporate (IR) platform policy can encourage data
scientists to create addictive systems [52] and environments that are non-transparent
to searchers4 [125, 140]. There are also biases existent in both the system [16, 244]
and the user [108, 164, 244], and the reinforcement factor [16, 18, 230].
Information itself is a factor, which comes in two forms. One form is the in-
formation found (e.g. search results, Web pages, videos, social media post), and
the other form is information collected about the searcher (e.g. queries, IP address,
usernames) – both forms offer many benefits to searchers such as exposure to more
relevant information and faster task completion [245], but simultaneously may con-
tain harmful content [244] and cost them their privacy [211, 245]. The centralized
nature of search environments [258, 259], which are now commonplace, were built
upon IS models of search developed and evaluated in quite different environments,
such as the library [245, 259], and is another factor likely playing into concerns
around privacy. The motive of profit [267] certainly encourages searchers to view
information they might not otherwise do [231]. Moreover, the metrics used to evalu-
ate systems (a focus of data scientists and IR researchers [256]) are quite different to
4For example, to understand privacy impacts, searchers must read lengthy privacy policy state-
ments, written in an obfuscated manner.
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those suggested by IS researchers (e.g. [56]). This issue of the communities (e.g. IR,
data science and cognitive science) operating independently, rather than collectively
towards a shared goal, is a possible underlying cause of harms in Web search that
should not be overlooked.
We now hone in on specific sources of harm relevant to the overall discussion.
2.4.1 Content Found on the Web
Web documents and the information contained within are composed of differ-
ent forms of media, such as text, video and images. Important considerations for
the design and evaluation of search environments include the structure and posi-
tion of information as well as the classification, categorization and semantics of the
information and overall document.
Many of the topics and tasks covered here are relevant to the content transfor-
mation process discussed earlier (see Section 2.3). These tasks are introduced here
because doing them poorly can lead to a degraded search experience and harmful
outcomes.
Web documents combine the units of information contained within a document
into a structure (typically using a markup language such as HTML), which can be
exploited to extract positional details and apply weightings for improved interactive
search experiences [127]. Similar techniques may also be applied to other media types
such as video and audio [229]. Ultimately, this information is useful for linking of
information across the Web [154, 229], and allows for improved search in various
forms of media such as social media [152]. It has also been suggested that different
document types and structures imply different cognitive meanings and therefore
should be treated differently [102].
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Semantics, for the current discussion, is the meaning (or sense) of an informa-
tional unit, including the meaning of a phrase, sentence, paragraph and overall Web
document. Matching semantic meaning of the document with the semantic meaning
of the user’s information need (e.g. via a query) is central to Web search and is one
area where semantics is helpful. Just as a user has a semantic representation (albeit
imperfect) in their mind, IR systems also have a semantic representation of the doc-
uments and information contained within. There are many automated approaches
(often times probabilistic) available to create a semantic representation of the in-
formation in a document, such as LDA [31], TF-IDF [210], Doc2Vec [104], BERT
[57], ELMo [175] and entity disambiguation [187] with knowledge graphs such as
DBpedia [154]. The overall goal of such approaches being a reduction or resolution
of ambiguity [111], however this ambiguity is not necessarily resolved (e.g. the role
of bias covered in Section 2.4.5).
So far, we have highlighted how content structure and semantic representations
of the content on the Web are important for Web search. Performing these tasks
reduces ambiguity [111] and ultimately lead the searcher to information more specific
to their information need. On the converse, poor reduction in ambiguity has the
potential to lead the searcher into information that is less relevant and that may
result in a higher risk of harm.
There are also many ways to analyse, categorise / classify and describe infor-
mation found on the Web (often making use of approaches mentioned so far) worth
mentioning here as well, as they are more focused to specific harms.
Discourse analysis, which includes the identification of controversy [59] and is
a task tightly related to identifying disputable claims [64] and textual entailment
(argument detection) [4]. In the same vein, there are ongoing efforts to classify infor-
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mation that is counter-factual [3] or entirely fake or misleading [41, 43]. Somewhat
related to discourse analysis is the classification and extraction of opinions, valence
and / or sentiment of information [137, 171].
Going beyond discourse analysis, one might wish to determine if the information
is offensive or hateful [188, 241, 261], the political slant [243] or the possibility that
the content is propaganda [20]. Virality [74], that is the likelihood the information
will spread, is yet another way to classify information, as is the reading level of
language used [74]. There is also motivation to identify content that is addictive
[256]. Classification cuts across document and media types, for instance one might
need to classify the sentiment of a Tweet [89, 263] or determine how healthy the food
is in an image [61]. Measuring the credibility (or trustworthiness) of the information
is another important factor [94].
2.4.2 Information Collected While Searching
Web search is a two way street with respect to information that is exchanged.
To retrieve the information they are looking for the user must submit a request
(information), such as entering the domain for the home page of their favourite
website in their browser or submitting a query for a set of results on their favourite
search engine. The request includes information that may be collected by various
parties. Understanding what types of information a user sends in their request and
who collects this information is important for the discussion on potential harms.
Beginning with who collects the information, there are first parties, including
the user’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) (e.g. their mobile phone company) and
the information provider to whom they have made the request (e.g. Google search,
Facebook, a mobile weather App, their favourite news website). The information
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provider, is the organization that stores the information being requested by the user.
Organizations include news websites, social media companies and search engines,
just to name a few. Dependent on the design of the information service being
provided, the organization may or may not save information about the request made
by the user. For example, Google records queries and clicks by users verses Duck
Duck Go (a more privacy aware search engine) stores queries in a non-identifiable
manner. Search queries are but one example of online behaviour that is collected
and the AOL search log blunder highlighted the sensitive nature of search logs and
raised anxieties amongst searchers [258], yet the general population perceives this
information as much less sensitive than many other factors (many of which can be
derived from search logs) [142]. There are also third parties for which first party
providers may share some or all of the information in the request made by the
user. Third parties may be state actors, such as the United States National Security
Agency (NSA), where ISPs may share the information being requested by users [9].
There are many different types of raw information in the request sent by the
user. As the main focus of our later studies is Web search, some focus is given to
the information in the query log and Web pages that one might visit.
Cooper [49], in her survey of privacy enhancing techniques for query logs, iden-
tifies the basic components of a query log to include the user’s IP address, the time
they made the request, the query content (e.g. the query terms used), browser and
operating system details, unique cookie ID and any results clicked. Privacy concerns
around the query elements highlighted by Cooper have been raised [204, 245], such as
de-anonymising users with these logs. Mobile phones have become quite popular in
the last 10 years, and more recent methods demonstrate how this de-anonymisation
can be performed, simply through the use of IP addresses in query logs, where the
location of an individual can be closely approximated.
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When a user clicks on the search result, the website (a different information
provider) will set cookie IDs unique to it’s website and will collect much of the same
information as the search engine (excluding the query terms). While navigating
within the website, the website will record all pages visited by the user, which can
be linked to the unique cookie IDs. Technology such as javascript and Jquery allow
for collection of information [227] (such as scroll depth of a page visited). For
users that try to block cookies and recording of IP (e.g. with a VPN), there are
newer methods such as browser fingerprinting [30] which can be used for unique
identification. Location of the user may also be collected, either inferred via the
IP address or directly via the GPS coordinates provided by the user device [225].
Perhaps most important of all, all of the data collected may be shared with third
parties for commercial or legal purposes [49], and therefore replicated in multiple
locations.
For optimal IR system performance it is beneficial to not only collect the di-
rect interactions with the system (e.g. queries, result clicks, rank of result clicked)
but also secondary interactions known as Web trails (e.g. web pages navigated to
beyond the initial search result visited) [245]. Therefore, dependent on the search
system used (e.g. Google search) and interface to view information (e.g. Google
Chrome), the search system may record the direct IR system interactions as well
as the indirect actions that take place within the results visited. This is in addi-
tion to the information that is collected by the websites visited and the 3rd party
intermediaries through the creation of a Web trail.
The user data collected through Web search has many positive benefits [49, 160,
245], including reduced time for task completion for the collective user group (not
just an individual). The data collected is also useful for performing aggregations to
learn the preferences [239] and demographics [110] of individual users, which plays
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an important role to serve commercial purposes [49]. But one must not overlook
that collection and usage of data in this centralized manner comes with risks of
potential harms [245, 258] (see introduction for some examples).
2.4.3 Personalization
The saying is "there is no free lunch"; and the business model of popular modern
search engines such as Google do not contradict this. The main source of income for
commercial search engines is personalized and targeted advertising based on data
collected about an individuals’ online behaviour [235, 267]. Dependent on the search
system, loss of privacy is one cost of it’s use, a cost which is incurred through the
collection of personal data during an individuals’ search process.
In exchange for personal data and exposure to advertising, search engines are
able to provide a more personalized experience [219]. This exchange (and loss of
privacy) by itself is not necessarily a bad thing [97], however there are risks of
personalization to consider.
For a start, demographics can be inferred from your search and online behaviour
[27, 242, 243], leading to the risk of an individual being cornered into a narrow
view of online information which may be entirely incorrect [230]. Prediction of
demographic information based upon social links [124], and evidence exists that the
risks are exacerbated when applied to social media environments [39].
Additionally, search systems are a gateway to webpages, of which many contain
embedded tracking scripts to follow an individual across the web, thus exposing them
to many privacy risks [63, 117, 149, 257] and to online behavioural advertising [226]
for websites, some of which contain unproven and potentially dangerous products
[159]. This data collected via an individuals’ online behaviour has the potential to be
50
2.4 Sources of Harm
used in nefarious ways, including sharing of an individual’s mental health disorders
[181], controlling access to insurance [201] and policing of citizens by state actors
[33].
Interesting behaviours can be exposed when combining document classification
predictions with user data. Sentiment analysis and opinion mining can be used to
determine user and group beliefs towards products and entities [137] as well as the
impacts of outside factors, such as weather, on social media posts [263], amongst
other tasks as well. Sentiment analysis has controversially been used as part of an
experimental IR task on a social media news feed which resulted in users posting
more negative information [126]. Named Entity Recognition and Disambiguation
(e.g. [154]) can be used to build a knowledge graph to better understand user
interests.
Algorithmic methods to protect an individual’s privacy [5, 75, 257] are proposed
solutions that should not be overlooked, however for many proposed approaches
data may still be de-anonymized to determine the traits of individual, such as HIV
infection [75]. While algorithmic approaches are a vital area of research for ensuring
privacy protection during the search process, it is simultaneously important to take
into consideration the users and their interactions [50] with search systems.
2.4.4 Ethics and Personalization
One side effect of user profiling and algorithms are filter bubbles [18, 54, 55, 230],
another being biased results for a profile, where for example gender is the only variant
[123]. Certainly, ethical questions arise when considering the potential individual
and societal impacts [58, 173, 214].
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filter bubble an environment in which content is selected by algorithms according
to a user’s previous behaviours. [18].
User consent to the use of personal data is common practice in the web domain
(e.g. use of cookies button, consent to terms of service), however, users do not nec-
essarily consent to having implicit information used for pre-selected personalization
[268].
pre-selected personalization implicit in nature and concerns situations where
personalization is driven by websites, advertisers, or other actors, often without
the user’s deliberate choice, input, knowledge or consent as defined by [268]
Though the literature suggests that users have transparency and explicit con-
trol over their profile, such as Google Advertising controls mentioned by [138] or
Google Personalized Search [245], these features are not easily discovered. For ex-
ample, finding controls at Google Ads Settings5 is not a straightforward process for
users that are not made aware of them, nor may such controls be guaranteed to
remain (e.g. functionality of Google Personalized Search, as indicated by [245], is
not available any more)6.
2.4.5 Biases, Behaviours and Beliefs
System and user biases and behaviours increase the likelihood that searchers on
the Web will discover information that is inaccurate or entirely incorrect [244, 245],
with the potential for negative search outcomes (e.g. harm to personal health)
5Google Ads Settings at https://adssettings.google.com/ (LA: 2020-10-23)
6It will be very interesting to see the findings of an experimental platform developed at MIT which
provides users with algorithmic control of social media feeds. See Gobo at https://gobo.social/
(LA: 2020-10-28)
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[179, 246]. There is a vicious cycle in the current IIR environment [16] that is a
result of system biases (e.g. algorithms and models) and user biases (e.g. learned
behaviours and cognitive biases).
There is indeed an interplay between the psychology of humans Web searchers
and the Web search systems they use, and therefore these biases, behaviours and
beliefs are considered in unison.
2.4.5.1 Misinformation Specific
One example of this interplay is in regards to exposure to misinformation, noting
that other definitions of misinformation have been proposed, however the definition
provided below is the most accurate for this thesis, where it is also assumed that
“misinformation is created unintentionally” [202], which is not always the case [218].
misinformation science and health misinformation as information that is contrary
to the epistemic consensus of the scientific community regarding a phenomenon
[218].
This interplay between searcher, search system and misinformation is rooted in
multiple factors, including algorithmic biases [3, 58, 164, 230], web page bias (due to
author/editor) [164], multiple user biases [115, 233] including pre-conceived beliefs
[6], trust in search system ranking [108, 164, 179] and source bias (e.g. reading
your news from one website) [101]. Additional research in psychology demonstrates
that different personalities (e.g. individualistic vs. communitarian) will respond
differently to information presented [112], and therefore caution must be used as




Personal privacy threats and potential harms exist due to collection of our per-
sonal data and our online behaviour [27, 97, 230, 243], a potential cost of using
IR systems (e.g. Google) that allow us to gain information quickly [267]. Another
explanation to loss of personal privacy is that individuals place more or less value on
privacy [2, 40], of which an individual’s attitudes towards privacy do not necessarily
match their behaviours to protect privacy [213] (sometimes called the privacy para-
dox ). Such behaviour is also partially explained by an individual’s lack of awareness
of how their data is used [60, 215] and the cost (e.g. time) of setting up privacy
tools and application privacy settings. There are a wide set of views on privacy [2],
but nonetheless, many users, if not most, are paying too much with their personal
data [215].
2.5 Interactive Information Retrieval (IIR)
It is nearly 25 years since Ingwersen expressed the concern for the lack of a
holistic view of system oriented and user oriented research in IR [102], yet more
efforts are needed to achieve this view [50]. Nonetheless, there are growing efforts
to investigate the nexus of user and system, as demonstrated by the 2016 inaugural
Conference on Human Information Interaction and Retrieval (CHIIR). This holistic
view of users and system together is known as interactive information retrieval (IIR)
[119, 191, 245], and is the foundation for the experiments covered in later chapters.
We introduce this holistic view here as well as some of the ethical concerns
related to IIR. Conversational search, a more recent incarnation of Web search, is
a quite hot topic in IIR, that simultaneously has ethical concerns, and therefore
given attention here. There is also a growing body of literature linking the cognitive
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decision making processes to IIR, and therefore also important.
2.5.1 IIR: The Holistic View
There are many approaches to describe the overall search process, for which we
find Ingwersen’s cognitive model of IR interactions [102] (see Figure 2.6) is most
intuitive for understanding and describing the interplay between the IR system, the
individual and the societal environment in which they belong and draw links to
harms and dangers of Web search. It is worth highlighting Saracevic’s stratified
model of IIR [196, 197] also suggests the interactions between system, user and the
environment beyond, however, his model is arguably less easy to identify and extract
the potential harms of Web search.
Figure 2.6: Ingwersen’s Cognitive Model of IR Interaction [102] - A holistic
view of the search process. The user’s cognitive space is placed at the center of the
model, and the user interacts with the Web search system as well as the broader social
environment.
Ingwersen and Järvelin [103] further expand and more clearly define the holistic
view of search by combining the cognitive and system oriented approaches, which
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they refer to as information seeking and retrieval (IS & R). Their review and pro-
posed framework provides useful insights for IIR researchers, some quite important
to the current research. They identify that their are not only information seekers
(users) in the IIR environment, but other important actors as well, including IR sys-
tem designers, authors of documents in the IR system index, selectors (i.e. actors
that decide which information is made available, such as via a publishing process)
and broader communities of individuals. These actors are influenced by their past
and current experiences, suggesting an interplay between cognitive changes of the
actor and the IR system they interact with. Ultimately, the actors influence the
environment, where the environment not only includes the IR system itself, but
also the social and cultural environments in which the actors may also be members.
Baeza-Yates’ recent commentary suggests the interactions between IR systems and
users of the systems [16] are a vicious cycle (see Figure 2.7) being a primary cause
of problems such as information bias, and is direct real world evidence in line with
the holistic (IS & R) view. As such, the cognitive actors and the IR systems they
interact with are not separate entities, and therefore should be treated as a whole.
Combined together, they are pathway to identify potential harms of Web search, to
prioritize research, and ultimately improve the design of the Web search environment
reduce risk of such harms.
It is worth considering the holistic views of IR which integrate cognition (such
as [102] and [103]) in combination with Baeza-Yates’ recent commentary [16] on the
problems and dangers presently associated with commercial IR systems. Combined
together, they are a pathway to identify potential harms of Web search, to prioritize
research, and ultimately improve the design of the Web search environment reduce
risk of such harms.
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Figure 2.7: Baeza-Yates Diagram of the Vicious Cycle of the Search Process
[16] - The diagram provided in the recent commentary takes a holistic view of the
search process. It demonstrates that many of the present harms are the result of biases
present not only in components of the Web search systems, but also in the users.
2.5.2 Ethics of IIR
In her pioneering guide for IIR research [119], Kelly raises identifies two central
questions to IR and IIR research. Research in IR asks: Does this system retrieve
relevant documents?, whereas IIR research asks: Can people use this system to re-
trieve relevant documents? [119]. In a later framework for IIR research, White
provides practical considerations for modelling and evaluating IIR systems in the
frame of different models of user behaviour [245]. Both Kelly and White suggest
ethical considerations for this area of research, and White gives extra consideration
around privacy concerns related to IIR systems, and we suggest that all IR and IIR
researchers should include such considerations in their research.
As an example, in their highly influential research on implicit feedback in IR
systems, Joachims et al. [108] do raise concerns around trust bias in rankings and
bias towards results with higher quality snippets relative to others, but do not frame
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it in an ethical manner.
Outcomes of IIR As suggested by many of the views outlined, such as sense-
making, decision making and the related outcomes are important considerations in
the frame of IIR [244]. Returning to the two central questions identified by Kelly
for IR and IIR research [119], we suggest that an additional question should also
be asked What are the potential outcomes to the users of this system?. Outcome is
very broad word, for which we regard as measurement of consequences both good
and bad. Outcomes encompass existing measures such as relevance of information
and costs such as time, but also many other factors such as decisions made with the
information provided by the IR system (e.g. medical decisions [179, 244]) as well as
societal outcomes due to IR system biases [16]. The potential harmful outcomes of
IR systems are a key motivator for the current body of work.
It is quite plausible that the gap between user and system researchers is a source
of some of the challenges being raised in modern times. Challenges including biases
of algorithms and IR system results, spread of misinformation, as well as concerns
related to data collection and privacy. Therefore, we argue studies of IR systems
and their users should take the global IIR view.
2.5.3 Search Interface and Design
The search user interface (SUI), an umbrella term including search engine results
page (SERP) and conversational search assistants, acts as the medium between the
human and the IR system, and it would be quite difficult for IR to be interactive
without it. One could argue the SUI captures the essence of IIR, and it is therefore
an important element to include in this discussion. There are many design principles
one must take into account for a SUI [91, 249] and it would be difficult to satisfy all
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principles [91]. Many of the core design principles of SUIs are influenced by the field
of human computer interaction (HCI) [91, 249], principles which include consistency
(e.g. describing features in a same manner) and handling errors (e.g. error messages)
[162]. Principles also suggest the interface should be kept simple and intuitive to
address the needs of a broad set of users [91, 162]. The most important principle of
all appears to be the response times the user experiences in a SUI [91, 249].
There are many components of a SUI that designers might take into consider-
ation. Wilson [249] introduces four main groups of features common to the SUI:
inputs (e.g. query bar) to express search intent, controls (e.g. filters) to modify
inputs, information (e.g. URL) about the results and personalisation (e.g. search
history) that make the SUI unique to the user. These groups play different roles
dependent on the searcher and search task (especially complex tasks), where for
instance inputs and controls are important at earlier stages of a search task whereas
personalisation becomes more important in later stages [100].
Challenges have arisen through the years that have motivated theories and inno-
vation to predict user behaviour and enable users opportunity to avoid harm, where
assessing credibility of online information is one example. For instance, individual
differences between searchers as well as differences of online task (e.g. task domain
and task purpose) are predictors for what cues an individual makes use of to assess
credibility [68]. Concerns around credibility are quite important given that one must
consider anyone can publish information online [234], thus providing inspiration for
a broad set of interfaces that enable searchers to more easily assess if the information
is legitimate or potentially dangerous [234]. There are many different interventions
available and considerations to be made to address credibility challenges [116].
User and system biases were already introduced in Section 2.4.5 as a cause of
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harm in search. Here again search interfaces are shown to play an important role
in addressing such problems [234]. Cognitive science have helped researchers un-
derstand biases and address related problems in other domains, and it is certainly
a goal to incorporate cognitive approaches into the interface to better assist the
searcher in overcoming the related problems (e.g. trust bias) [72]. It is also worth
considering motivational affordances (commonly studied in the cognitive sciences)
in interface design as they clearly play a positive role in technology that is designed
to persuade people towards less harmful actions [90]. Additional focus will be given
to the role of cognitive science in search interface design in Chapter 3.
2.5.4 IIR and Conversational Assistants
Conversational dialogue systems have, such as Amazon’s Echo, Microsoft’s Cor-
tana and Apple’s Siri, have experienced growth in popularity in recent years [99, 183],
for which some forecast growth beyond global human population in only a few
years7. It has been found the conversation systems are more interactive than tradi-
tional search systems [228] (e.g. through a search engine such as Google), and it is
possible they will become the future of search [183]
The recently proposed framework for conversational search indicates that trust,
ethics and morality are important factors related to conversational search which this
framework only introduces as a concern but does not address [183]. Other indications
have suggested ethical concerns to conversational assistants, in particular concerns
related to privacy [78, 99]. This matter of privacy concerns links back to the earlier
introduction to information that is collected during search (see Section 2.4.2, where
it has been found that many users of conversational assistants are concerned about
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privacy but simultaneously unaware of the risks such assistants present [130].
2.5.5 Decision Making Processes
Attempts have been made to better understand the decision making process and
rationality components of the searcher in the face of risk and uncertainty during the
search process, such as the impact to one’s health [179, 246] and the heuristics used
in deciding what information is credible [94]. Such approaches suggest directions
for alternative search outcome measures, such as measurement of positive health
outcomes [179]. There are also recent proposals in the field of IR that would allow
individuals to assess quality of information and to make more informed decisions
[74], however such methods may have high costs [92] and thus should be assessed
with the economic view.
The economic view of the decision making process of search and the costs to
reduce risk and uncertainty inherent in the search process is of particular interest.
Risk and uncertainty are extensively studied in the area behavioural economics, and
thus provide promising pathways for low cost measures to minimize the dangers
associated with interactions with modern IR systems and the web of information.
From the behavioural economists viewpoint, research suggests that humans are not
rational in their decisions [115, 233] or alternatively that our decisions are rational
within the bounds of our environment [82, 84]. Such considerations of rationality
(or lack thereof) in our decisions suggest that in some way our minds are biased
[81, 114] and that such biases potentially cause harm to the individual and / or
society as whole [220]. Low cost methods have been developed in recent years,
methods shown to address such biases in our economic behaviour [92, 220], with
the goal of producing decisions that reduce harmful impacts to the individual and




Heuristics for Decision Making in Search Evidence exists that users have a
set of heuristics (also known as “rules of thumb” [79]) to help them decide which
information to visit [207] during Web search, where heuristics are also broadly used
to make decisions in everyday life [79, 81]. Research by Novin et al. ([164]) demon-
strates how biased heuristics, specifically anchoring, framing, priming and avail-
ability heuristics [114], are fundamental to decision making in search8. Their work
investigates heuristics and their relation to algorithmic bias (ranking) and article
bias (bias from author) around a controversial topic [164]. Their methods include
use of a mock search engine, placed in a library setting, to study cognitive biases.
Anchoring effects are found due to ordering of results in search engine results page
(SERP), users skip more challenging content due to the priming effect and lengthier
materials are linked to the availability effect [164]. Similar to Joachims et al. [108],
Novin et al. [164] finds that users are biased towards higher results than lower ones.
Interestingly, [164] argues that the Google approach to finding single answers to
complex queries is problematic and overly simplistic.
2.6 Behavioural and Cognitive Interventions
If it is yet not apparent from the discussion in section 2.5.5, decision making
is fundamental to the search process [191, 245]. Furthermore, as was outlined in
the same section, behavioural and cognitive factors (e.g. cognitive biases and be-
8Biased anchoring and framing heuristics are easily demonstrated through a toy example. Try
it! Open two side by side windows of your favourite search engine, in 1 window type "Why is
Christianity good?" in the other window type "Why is Christianity bad?". The questions are
framed differently (potentially influenced by personal biases), the system provides biased results
based on the query formulation, with rank and ordering of results providing an anchor (users are
biased towards selection of the first result, which can be the anchor for any subsequent information
consumed).
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havioural economics) greatly influence the decision making process. Therefore, it is
worthwhile to consider strategies from behavioural and cognitive sciences that are
developed specifically for minimizing risk and harms.
Three approaches, nudging [184, 220], boosting [93, 125] and techno-cognition
[133], were recently proposed pathways to minimize and address harms in the modern
online world [125, 140].
We focus on the first two approaches, nudging and boosting , as they are quite
different in their methodology, yet very similar in their aim of reducing individual
and societal risks. Additionally, we introduce nutrition labels and fact boxes as
means to communicate potential harms.
2.6.1 Nudging
Nudging [220] is a popular behavioural-public-policy approach, which has gained
notoriety in recent years. Nudges aim to push people towards—what the ‘nudger’
believes to be—more beneficial decisions through the ‘choice architecture’ of the en-
vironment (e.g., default settings) in which people operate. Nudging is theoretically
rooted the field of behavioural economics hypothesizing that individuals have two
systems of the mind to help them make decisions, where “system 1” is the more auto-
matic and economical side compared to the less economical and automatic “system
2” approach [114, 115, 233]. The theory and empirical body of work suggests that
our “system 1” thinking is biased and therefore prone to errors [233], and nudging
is the proposed solution to address these errors [220]. Thaler and Sunstein [220]
provide the following definition of a nudge:
A nudge . . . is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s
behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or signif-
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icantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge,
the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not man-
dates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food
does not.
Nudging requires that the ‘choice architecture’ includes an element of libertar-
ian paternalism [220], that is, the nudge must allow the individual to opt out (e.g.,
choose the non-default option); this is different from a purely paternalistic approach
such as bans, which have no opt-out mechanism by design and intent. Some nudges ,
such as nutrition labels and warning lights, have educational elements [125], but
for the most part, nudges aim to directly change behaviour without targeting peo-
ple’s competences [93]. The political philosophy and claims about human nature
underlying nudging have been criticized recently [80, 167]; see, for example, [184]
for a review of the issues discussed. Self-nudging [184] – people acting as their own
“citizen choice architects” – has been proposed as a way to harness the power of
nudging while largely circumventing its problems.
2.6.2 Boosting
Boosting (see [93]) is another approach to behaviour change based on evidence
from behavioural science. Quoting Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff (p. 974):
The objective of boosts is to improve people’s competence to make their
own choices. The focus of boosting is on interventions that make it easier
for people to exercise their own agency by fostering existing competences
or instilling new ones. Examples include the ability to understand sta-
tistical health information, the ability to make financial decisions on
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the basis of simple accounting rules, and the strategic use of automatic
processes (...)
In the context of web search, boosting aims to improve people’s skills to effectively
and safely search the web. To achieve this, a boosting approach combines both IR
research on how people search and adapt their search strategies to the environment
[94, 131, 207] with general insights on human judgement and decision making online
[125, 140] and offline [83] to design and evaluate boosting interventions. Quite often,
the skills are a simple set of heuristics (or “rules of thumb”) [79], which can be taught
in domains such as literature search [131].
The key difference between a boosting and nudging approach lies in the formers’
assumption that people are not simply “irrational” (and thus need to be nudged
towards better decisions), but that the human cognitive architecture is malleable
and thus new competencies and skills can be instilled [93]—often requiring little
time and effort. However, whether nudging or boosting is the “better” approach for
a particular situation depends both on ethical considerations (e.g., how much value
is placed on people’s autonomy), but also on pragmatic considerations of which
approach will likely be more successful in terms of effectiveness and economic and
non-economic costs. For example, since boosting needs people’s cooperation to be
effective, boosting has the advantage that it—by design—cannot be manipulative.
But this cooperation requirement also implies that boosting will not be successful in
situations where people are unwilling or unable to learn or make use of a boost . See




2.6.3 Nutrition Labels and Fact Boxes
Cognitive science has also provided a large body of evidence on visual approaches
for communication of risk in an understandable way. Nutrition labels are one pop-
ular visual approach for risk communication, and it is shown that traffic light type
approaches produce better outcomes and are more preferred by users [147, 203, 237]
than tabular based approaches9. Originally designed for medical decision making
for doctors and patients, fact boxes are another promising means to provide infor-
mation in a manner that includes the benefits and harms of the available decisions
[150]10. Interestingly, both nutrition labels and fact boxes can act as the medium to
perform a nudge or a boost .
2.6.4 Comparing Nudging and Boosting
There are some key differences one must be aware of when comparing nudging
and boosting , of which all were established above. Here we directly contrast the
most important features that distinguish a boost from a nudge as they are critical
factors for G-RQ-3 .
A nudge is divided into two main sub-types, classical and ‘educative’ [93, 216],
of which both can be used in the context of self nudging [184]. With respect to
this comparison, one distinction is that a classical nudge is non-transparent in their
intent, whereas an ‘educative’ nudge has transparency and provides some insight
into the underlying motive [93, 125]. Another variation, is that an ‘educative’ nudge
may require some motivation on the part of the individual, whereas as the classical
9Such as those produced by the Food and Drug Administration. See example at FDA New Nutrition
Labels at https://www.fda.gov/food/nutrition-education-resources-materials/new-nutrition-facts-
label (LA: 2020-10-30)
10See examples of fact boxes at the Harding Institute for Risk Literacy at
https://hardingcenter.de/en/fact-boxes (LA: 2020-10-14)
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nudge is designed in a way that once the intervention is successfully implemented,
momentum is carried forward as long as the nudge remains in place[93]. Using a
real world example comparing these approaches is perhaps the best way to see this
difference. Take the classical save more tomorrow nudge [220]11 and compare it
with an ‘educative’ nutrition label nudge12. In the case of the save more tomorrow
nudge, no motivation is required and as long as the individual does not opt-out of
the default, the momentum of the nudge will intervene in a manner that individual’s
pension continues to grow (assuming no economic catastrophe). In the case of the
‘educative’ nudge, the person must be motivated to take a look at the nutrition label
(in a sense, they must opt-in), and furthermore must take effort each and every time
they buy (and eat) food in order to maintain momentum [93, 216].
It was already established that a boost is transparent to the individual like an
‘educative’ nudge and both require motivation by the individual [93, 125]. Further-
more, both the boost and ‘educative’ nudge are likely to have a short-term effect
with respect to the intervention for which they are designed [93]. However, the
main differentiating factor is that a boost is designed to transfer a competency for
better decision making, which is validated through empirical research, whereas an
‘educative’ nudge may have empirical validity for better decision making, but does
not have a competency included in the intervention [92, 93, 125].
The point made with respect to the provision of a competency for better decision
making leads to the most consequential difference, being the notion of ‘reversibility’
of boosting and nudging interventions. Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff ([93] p. 981)
define ‘reversibility’ as:
11The save more tomorrow nudge is implemented in the United Kingdom, where the default is that
UK employees will contribute a percentage of their salary to a pension plan.
12‘Educative’ nutrition label nudging is commonly used (and in some cases required) on food
packaging in both the United Kingdom and the United States
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If, ceteris paribus, the policy maker eliminates an efficacious (nonmone-
tary and nonregulatory) behavioral intervention and behavior reverts to
its preintervention state, then the policy is likely to be a nudge. If, ce-
teris paribus, behavior persists when an intervention is eliminated, then
the policy is more likely to be a boost.
This definition is the dominant characteristic that divides the two strategies, as
it says that the behaviour resultant from a successful nudge, be it a classical nudge
[220], an ‘educative’ nudge [216] or a self nudge [184], will revert to the default after
removal, and it can be empirically demonstrated that this will not occur with a boost .
One must keep this point in mind if they wish to test both classes of interventions
in Web search or in any other domain for that matter.
These differences aside, both approaches have merit with respect to promotion
of better decision making and therefore both should be considered [140].
2.7 Evaluation
Evaluation is a fundamental and necessary process for both pure IR system
and fully interactive IR studies. Common approaches include task based (and user
focused) [119], batch based [232] and online based [96] evaluation of systems.
Batch based studies have been around the longest, were first used in the well
known Cranfield studies in the 1950s (see [45]), and used for offline studies to com-
pare IR systems [51, 144]. They used closed evaluation sets, such as the TREC
and CLEF test sets [51], and are evaluated based upon the documents returned




Online evaluation is typically performed on live systems (e.g. Google search),
where a small percentage of users are evaluated with a proposed new (or improved)
system to be compared to the existing system [51].
Our studies, as are many IIR studies, are user focused, and therefore evaluation
methods for these studies are given special attention in Section 2.7.3. User (IIR)
oriented studies regularly make use of evaluation approaches common to system
oriented (batch based) studies and therefore some attention is given to these ap-
proaches too. As evaluation is such a large topic upon itself, focus is primarily given
to approaches utilized in this thesis.
2.7.1 Evaluation Test Sets
In many (if not all) IR system evaluations, a document test set is utilized for
which each document is assigned an atomic unit of measure to be used in the evalu-
ation, where the most commonly used atomic measure is document relevance [144].
Document relevance (a concept first introduced in Section 2.2.6) is defined as the
following:
relevance taken with respect to a user query (for an information need) and a binary
classification of each document returned by the query, the document is either
relevant or not relevant [144].
More recently, the notion of relevance has extended beyond binary classification,
to ordinal ranking of relevance (e.g. 0 not relevant at all to 4 is highly relevant),
and is known as graded relevance, which allows for a more user oriented evaluation
of the system [118].
Though many standard test set collections are available (e.g. TREC, CLEF,
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NTCIR) [144], there are many types of evaluations one might perform which requires
the development of new test sets. In text classification systems, there are many
examples (see some in Section 2.4.1) where new test sets are created to tackle new
problems (such as hate speech and misinformation). This is also true for IR specific
problems, for example annotating for health misinformation (see [179]). At the end
of the day, it is potentially risky to place credence into a system evaluated on a test
set for which the annotations themselves have not been evaluated.
Evaluating Test Set Quality Evaluation of the “gold standard” document tests
sets used for document classification and IR system models is a very critical task to
maximize the likelihood that users receive high quality information in the systems
they use. These “gold standard” datasets are developed with humans performing
annotation tasks dependent on the system and/or model being developed. Many
approaches are available to complete the annotation task including usage of on-
line ratings [172], a combination of non-domain and domain expertise [240, 241]
and crowd sourced annotations with platforms such as Mechanical Turk [157] and
CrowdFlower [38, 255]. In many cases, document classification models trained on
non-expert annotations via crowd sourcing will perform better than those built with
annotations from experts [209].
Multiple measures are available to evaluate reliability of annotations, Kappa
statistics are commonly used [144] (e.g. Cohen’s kappa and Fleiss’ kappa). In depth
review of these and other measures (such as Krippendorf’s alpha) in the scope of
annotations for tasks related to IR and computational linguistics is provided by
[10]. It is worth noting that annotation tasks can be quite subjective and challeng-




2.7.2 Evaluating the Search System
Evaluation metrics for document retrieval systems can be separated into mea-
sures that either do or do not take into account ranking [144]. These measures may
also be classified as those that measure system effectiveness (e.g. does the system
returns relevant documents?) or efficiency (e.g. does the system return results
quickly?) [51]. For studies introduced later in this thesis, we do not investigate
efficiency, and therefore do not discuss related measures.
Furthermore, the guiding research questions do not use effectiveness in the sense
of IR text books (e.g. [51]), but in the sense of effectiveness of reducing harm
(addressed by G-RQ-2 ). With respect to the traditional sense of effectiveness,
this plays into the overall viability of the search system addressed by G-RQ-1 .
To complicate matters further with respect to the evaluation of a search system,
in some user based studies, relevance assessments (e.g. as in a TREC test set)
may not be available for the test sets used, such as in online system evaluation.
To circumnavigate this issue, Kelly [119] suggests using the documents assessed by
users as as an alternative, with the side effect that some evaluation metrics will,
such as recall, will be difficult (or not even possible) to calculate.
With that said, we differentiate commonly used system evaluation measures ap-
propriate to studies in this thesis into those that do not account for rank and those
that do.
13See Facebook Hate Speech Moderation Quiz
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Non-Rank Based System Evaluation The most popular measures that do not
take into account the ranking of the system include are precision and recall [51],
which can both be considered jointly to compute the F-measure (the weighted har-
monic mean of precision and recall) [144]. All three of these metrics are commonly
used in information retrieval as well as other document and text classification prob-
lems [144].
Rank Based System Evaluation Precision @ rank k only evaluates a system
based upon the first k documents returned by an IR system. This in contrast to
precision which takes into account all documents returned by the IR system. Both
measures are used regularly in evaluation [51, 144], and k = 10 is a common choice
[51].
Mean Reciprocal Rank (MRR) takes into account the rank of documents and the
first relevant document returned by a system within that rank, simply by taking the
1 divided by the rank of that document [51]. In this manner, systems are heavily
penalized when the first document is not relevant.
Traditional search evaluation metrics such as precision and recall do not take into
consideration that some documents may be more relevant than others. This issue
motivated efforts by Järvelin and Kekäläinen [106] to develop gain based measures to
assess search systems with this consideration at the forefront. The pioneering evalu-
ation methods include discounted cumulated gain (DCG) and normalized discounted
cumulative gain (nDCG). Their methods can be used in settings with document as-
sessments that are binary or graded (e.g. 4 points for document that is most relevant
and 0 points for a document that is least relevant). Furthermore, the metrics are
quite versatile and allow for adaptation to measures not limited to graded relevance
[106], and therefore should not be overlooked for evaluation of systems aimed at
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reducing harms. DCG and nDCG take into account that documents graded high
are more useful than those with lower gradings and simultaneously account for the
rank [51].
2.7.3 Evaluating Interactions
Extensive surveys by Kelly and White (e.g. [119] and [245]) provide the foun-
dations of methods and evaluation of interactive IR studies. Other important con-
siderations are questionnaire design [119, 165], instrumentation such as eye tracking
[245], recruitment methods [119] and significance testing of results [192]. Eye track-
ing instruments which capture gaze and pupil dilation patterns, are a common tool
for evaluating impacts to user behaviour [245] with a concrete example provided by
[108]. Recruitment of participants can be performed passively [164], actively [179],
covertly [126] or via a combination of these options [245].
There are many flavours of IIR studies. Examples include evaluating the use-
fulness of popular implicit measures [108], evaluation of the re-ranking of results
to better fit a personal profile [219], efforts to understand the user and algorithmic
biases in the domain of controversial information [164] or gaining understanding the
role of user and IR system biases and beliefs which may lead to consumption of
misleading or incorrect health information [244]. Studies incorporating economic
theory (introduced in Section 2.2.5), such as measuring cost trade-offs for query
auto-completion [13], are yet another flavour of IIR research. IIR studies, Kelly sug-
gests [119], fall along a spectrum (see Figure 2.8) of research, from system oriented
approaches with minimal user focus (e.g. TREC evaluation tracks) to user centric
studies with limited views of the IR system (e.g. [94]).
A highly useful resource for the evaluation of IIR studies is by Kelly in 2009
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Figure 2.8: Kelly’s Continuum of IIR Research [119]. - The spectrum is quite
broad and is centred on studies that equally consider both the user and the system (e.g.
TREC interactive studies). Based on research questions and methods used, studies in
the current thesis fall under the highlighted category just to the right of centre.
[119]. Important recommendations from this work include many, for which we high-
light those most relevant to this thesis that have not already been mentioned. First,
a within-group study design should be used for comparison of systems, which has
the benefit of allowing users to give their preferences across the systems. Second,
a between-group study design is acceptable when there is the possibility of con-
taminating result with respect to the research question. To ensure validity of data
collected to test hypotheses, methods for rotation and counterbalancing of tasks and
randomization of participants should be used. Specific to analyses, Kelly suggests
that one use (when possible) parametric statistical tests as they are less sensitive to
type II errors.
Differentiating IIR Evaluation Measures There are several notable typolo-
gies for describing commonly used evaluation measures in IIR studies. White [245]
breaks these into two dimensions, search process-oriented and search outcome ori-
ented, where the former considers the process employed by the searcher (such as
their rationale for picking a result) and the later considers all outcomes (e.g. answer
to a search task question, relevance of documents). Contextual, interaction, perfor-
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mance, and usability are the four main dimensions suggested by Kelly [119], where
performance is for all intents and purposes the same as White’s search outcome
dimension.
The other three dimensions (contextual, interaction and usability) [119] are quite
appropriate for user based evaluation. The interaction dimension, typically requires
log data and includes factors such as number of queries entered and total documents
assessed. Contextual factors include those differentiating users, of which there can
be a multitude of measures, such as age, sex, factors relating to a subjects concern
of importance with respect to the search task, etc., of which studies often interro-
gate participants directly through surveys to collect the necessary data [119]. The
dimension of usability similarly ask subjects directly for input about factors such as
their preferences about the system and their subjective feelings about the usage of
the system and the tasks performed in the system [119].
The search outcome dimension is an important one with respect to measurement
of harms in Web search. There are indications that newer evaluation metrics are
coming on board with respect to this dimension. This claim is demonstrated through
recent IR research in the space of health search. In one case, an IIR study in
the domain of health search considered search outcomes of harmful and helpful
[179, 244] for medical search task, which is a quite different approach to evaluation
of search outcomes specific to relevance. This is again demonstrated by the 2020
TREC Health Misinformation Track14, which looked at misinformation. Indeed,
it appears evaluation is moving beyond relevance towards proxies assumed to be
strongly linked to harmful and harmful outcomes (credibility and correctness of
information in addition to relevance), at least in the space of health search.




2.7.4 The Science of Evaluation
There were many details covered (and not covered) for the evaluation of IR
system and user studies, it is worth stating that many IR system and user studies
performed are not following suggested protocol [73, 192] and furthermore often lack
statistical rigor [192]. A more recent commentary [46] indicates that many of the
problems related to evaluation in IR extend to all areas of computer science, and
that studies often times do not take a scientific approach or alternatively are never
made available due to publication bias. In many cases there needs to be more effort
taken to demonstrate statistical power of studies [192], such as with calculation of
effect size [73]. On the other, reviewers need to keep in mind that some studies are
more exploratory in nature (in particular human interactive studies) and therefore
may not be able to meet the same statistical bar, but are yet important for science
as a whole [46].
As indicated, it is important to follow scientific methods to demonstrate that
one system either does (or does not) outperform another system, and some simple
suggestions are useful to address the concerns raised (but only a starting point).
One recommended approach is to calculate the effectiveness measures for each query
submitted to each system, and then to test for differences with tests such as t-test
(parametric) and rank (non-parametric) tests [51]. For user studies, again the use
of statistical models is suggested, such as t-tests and ANOVA, to test for differences
across groups and systems [119]. And where possible, calculate effect sizes for any




Much has been introduced in the previous chapter and the current background
chapter, for which it is important to bring together the key points.
Research and theory developed in information science (IS) has inspired many
of the algorithms, models and interfaces developed and implemented in modern
information retrieval (IR) systems [245]. Even with this influential link between
the communities, quite recent commentary [50] suggests there is a gap in research
between the two areas and a need for a holistic view of the searcher (the IS focus)
and the search system (the IR focus) as one system together [102, 103]. In fact,
Ingwersen and Järvelin [103] suggest this view must go beyond just the system and
the searcher.
Data science, a profession deemed “the sexiest job” [52], also has agency in the
modern Web search environment. The research community, which includes the data
science profession, has quite an influential role in modern Web search environments,
as members of this community are often tasked with development of models that
are optimized to maximize user satisfaction [245], revenue and profits [52, 267] and
user engagement [52].
Finally, there is the community of searchers that seek and find information on the
Web through a multitude of IR environments such as search engines (e.g. Google),
product websites (e.g. Amazon) and social media news feeds (e.g. Facebook) that
have their own biases and beliefs [16, 244]. Unfortunately, the biases and beliefs
of the searcher and the IR systems they interact with form a feedback loop that
not only changes the system [16, 18, 230] but also changes the beliefs of the user
[16, 230, 244]. Ultimately, this self-reinforcing cycle exposes individual searchers and
77
2. BACKGROUND
broader society to potentially harmful and dangerous outcomes [16, 179, 230, 244]. It
is our view that the potential and already-realized harms caused by this reinforcing
cycle are a side effect of the non-holistic view, a view which must extend beyond the
searcher and the system [103].
Taken together, this motivates the framework for harm prevention in Web search
introduced in the next chapter as well as the guiding research questions (G-RQ-1 ,
G-RQ-2 and G-RQ-3 ) introduced in Chapter 1, questions which target behavioural
and cognitive strategies as part of the solution.
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Chapter 3
A Harm Intervention Framework for
Web Search
3.1 Overview
Our framework is aimed at communities which include researchers in IS, IR, data
science and the behavioural and cognitive sciences as well as the policy makers in
governments and the leadership teams of Web platforms. There is common recogni-
tion by these communities of the ethical concerns and potentially grave implications
of the technology that are now ubiquitous in our everyday lives. Simultaneously,
aside from efforts by IS and IR [24, 50, 103], these communities appear to be work-
ing independently of one another. As such, we see a need for a common framework
for all of these communities to jointly work towards a common goal of ethical re-
sponsibility to the searcher and broader society for which we are a part of. The
components of the framework (Section 3.2) are ones we believe are the most es-
sential for these communities to place focus initially. Components include policy
updates, cognitive interventions, evaluation methods, and considerations for overall
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search system design. Central to our framework are four themes: collaborative effort
by the communities mentioned, greater transparency to the user, greater choice for
the user and an ethics-based approach for search system development.
Science, such as the methods and empirical studies introduced in later chapters,
plays the role of demonstrating viability and effectiveness (G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 )
of interventions, but rarely (if ever) defines the policy that implements interventions
in the real-world. Nonetheless, policy is an important and necessary component,
and therefore will be given some focus.
Concurrently, in the space of Web search, there is great focus on new and im-
proved algorithms and artificial intelligence as the solution to many of the problems
(e.g. misinformation). The author of this thesis agrees with this focus, however
there is seemingly very little in the frame of behavioural and cognitive interventions
in Web search, and yet are interventions which show great success in other contexts.
Hence, why behavioural and cognitive approaches are included as one of the four pil-
lars of this framework, and ultimately is the main focus of the methods and studies
that follow.
This framework serves several purposes. First, it introduces what we suggest are
the essential focal points to address potential harms from Web search. Furthermore,
in line with the holistic view of IIR (see Section 2.5.1, the framework is designed
with this holistic view at the forefront. Additionally, the framework positions harm
prevention interventions from the behavioural and cognitive sciences as an essential
element of Web search systems designed to prevent harm. Finally, it is hoped
the framework initiates discussion within the search communities (e.g. amongst
researchers and technology platform leadership) as to how we might better design




A recent proposal by Smith and Rieh [208] provides important insights for the
development of a framework for Web search systems designed to prevent harms to
individuals and society. Their proposal suggests that many users have informa-
tion literacy and critical thinking skills that are useful to reduce the risks of harms
from Web search. They highlight that current implementation methods of search
systems, such as the Search Engine Results Page (SERP), offer little if any sup-
port to utilize these skills. Furthermore, they point out that users (likely due to
the high cognitive demands of applying information literacy skills) put too much
trust in the results found in the SERP, as has been demonstrated by other research
[108, 244]. It appears some vitally important processes of search introduced by the
IS community are being inhibited by the current design [208], processes including
sense-making and exploratory search, which is unfortunate given the role they play
in learning [245]. Their proposal also suggests that current IR systems are optimized
for close-ended tasks (e.g. fact-based, question-answering), but should instead be
optimized for learning. Ultimately, their proposal being that information in Web
search interfaces should offer cues (e.g. topic, author and their affiliations, affective
semantics including hate and humor) that enable users to utilize their literacy skills
and assist them with critical thinking. However, their framework, as encompassing
as it is, does not consider important matters such as privacy of the searcher [211]
and platform policies optimized for corporate profit [256, 267]. That said, many
elements of their proposal, such as considerations for interface design and informa-
tional cues that engage critical thinking for better decision making, are central to our
proposal. We therefore see our proposed framework as an extension of their work.
The decision-making factor is in fact fundamental to search [191, 245], suggesting
a strong need for cognitive interventions, which are proposed as a bridge between
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many of the other framework components.
The proposed framework is segmented into four main components which are seen
as core to the development of Web search environments to reduce risk of harm to
both the searcher and society.
FC-Policy Policy, which includes methods of law, education and corporate policy,
are suggested.
FC-Cognitive A set of behavioural and cognitive approaches, developed for the
specific purpose of engaging decision making that reduces risk to individuals
and society are introduced.
FC-System Considerations for the system design are provided, for which content
enrichment and interface design are the main focus.
FC-Evaluation Any framework, and any approach for that matter, needs to be
evaluated, for which suggestions are also given.
The considerations provided are not exhaustive, and are intended as a foundation
for a way forward.
3.2.1 Policy
Policy ( FC-Policy ) is a broad topic, which encompasses relevant areas such
as law and education and can be used as a mechanism to prevent harm in Web
search. Policies set by the Web search systems are used as a means to leverage their
commercial, legal and overall organizational interests. For instance, explicit privacy
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policies and data usage policies may be tailored to protect the provider from legal
ramifications (e.g. the GDPR), while simultaneously maximizing their commercial
profits [267]. Alternatively, a provider may shift their policy to meet social norms
and address public outcry from issues such as misinformation [48]. There are also
policy decisions around design choices for the core product that searchers interact
with, such as how to present information in a SERP, search support tools to include
in the product (e.g. query suggestion), and underlying retrieval and ranking models
to implement. A recent study (see [67]) recommends that design policy for Web
systems to be developed with the key principal of human control to opt-out and
have algorithmic control.
Laws can be implemented, locally, nationally, within economic regions and glob-
ally, with examples including California, Canada, European Union and human rights
law respectively. For Web searchers, the GDPR [66], a law which is designed to bet-
ter protect their privacy and allow for greater transparency and control over how
data collected about them is used, is perhaps the most well known law for harm
prevention to date. Laws may also be used to enforce information providers (e.g.
social media and search platforms) to take down and / or filter out content that is
perceived by law makers to be harmful to individuals and or societies. Examples
include the NetzDG Germany [199] that require removal of speech that is hateful
(e.g. Nazi imagery) and censoring of Google search results (e.g. websites mention-
ing the Tienanmen Square massacre) by the Chinese government [224]. Some laws,
such as the communications and decency act in the USA [236], place the onus of
legal liability on the publisher of the content (e.g. author of news article), but not
the provider (e.g. search engine) or user (e.g. searcher). Legal tools achieve harm
prevention through penalty (e.g. fines, imprisonment) for non-adherence to the rules
stated by law, they also have a sense of authoritarianism and dictating what is good
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or bad. As differentiating between good and bad can be problematic [74], we suggest
that law be used as a tool of last resort. Nonetheless, ethical considerations are a
critical factor to IIR systems and research and therefore must be taken into account
[119, 245]. As part of the framework, basic universal human rights [221, 222, 223]
are the recommended lens through which policy is set.
Finally, education approaches and campaigns are a suggested pathway to improve
search capabilities that minimize personal harm. There are some efforts by platforms
to provide education tools and programs in primary and secondary schooling (see
[85]) as well as being broadcast to searchers of any age (see [85, 190]). However, a
searcher is not provided such tools directly in the search engines (i.e. there is no
link provided)1. In our view, education is a promising pathway, as it overlaps with
the cognitive interventions discussed in the section that follows.
3.2.2 Behavioural and Cognitive Interventions
We suggest that behavioural and cognitive interventions ( FC-Cognitive ) are
the most overlooked component of our framework. Much was already introduced
with respect to the possibilities for such interventions (see background Section 2.6),
for which nudging and boosting were given particular focus. The reason for this
focus being that both are successful methods in other domains (such as medicine
and public well being) and furthermore both are very different in their implemen-
tation style and underlying theory driving them. There is furthermore an axis of
transparency to consider when implementing such interventions, where they can be
quite transparent (in the case of the nutrition labels) or quite non-transparent (e.g.
search settings being defaulted to Adult safe search).
1Query recommendations and spelling corrections may be educational if it can be shown that the
user improves their query behaviour or their spelling over time.
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This distinction between transparent and non-transparent interventions leads
to one key difference between nudging and boosting , being that boosts are always
transparent in their goal, whereas this is only sometimes the case for nudges , which
as pointed out earlier is an ethical concern. Another problem with nudging being
that skills are not taught to the individual, and therefore the intervention is no
longer useful once removed. It is not so straightforward though, one cannot just
throw out nudging because of these problems, there are cases where one approach
may be better than the other [93, 140]. This dichotomy of nudging and boosting
makes them quite interesting, and furthermore strongly suggests that both should
be considered in the evaluation of any harm prevention initiative.
3.2.3 Search System Design
Much was already said about the interplay of the system and the user in the
background on IIR (see Section 2.5). Some specifics, related to the search system,
were also introduced (Section 2.3), such as information extraction and retrieval
models. Such factors are important for the advancement and development of Web
search systems, such as commercial search engines, designed to reduce harm.
Many components are necessary to build a functional systems such as search
engine [51] and it is clear that the underlying components of these systems have a
tendency to become biased and steer users towards harmful information [16].
In this third component of the framework ( FC-System ), we focus on content
enrichment and the search interface and provide limited discussion on other com-
ponents, such as data logging and retrieval models as indicators as to where they
might play a role within the framework. Based on commonly used implementation
methods, such as those leveraging query logs as a primary means to model searchers
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and provide support tools (e.g. query recommendations, collaborative search mod-
els) [51, 245], it is conceivable that many of the system biases currently present [16]
would abate over time due to the logging of interactions of a subset of users gaining
advantage through the system elements discussed in sections below. These system
components, combined with a subgroup of users that take the effort to minimize per-
sonal harm with well implemented behavioural and cognitive interventions, would
quite likely provide additional benefits to all users.
3.2.3.1 Content Enrichment and Informational Cues
Processes that enrich and classify information in Web documents are fundamen-
tal to modern search engines and IR systems [51]. As previous research indicates,
there are many different cues to consider [74, 131, 208] during this enrichment process
to be applied to information that may be useful for minimizing risk to searchers, for
which many are important factors for making better decisions in search [94, 131, 207].
For IR researchers and data scientists, the listing of cues provided by Smith
and Rieh (see [208]) as well as methods outlined by Fuhr et al (see [74]) are useful
guides for development of cue extraction methods. Methods are already available
for extracting cues such as the reading level, the virality of the content (i.e. how
likely will the information spread), emotionality (e.g. language that is angry, overly
positive, etc.), prevalence of factual, opinionated and / or controversial information,
trustworthiness of the source (e.g. mechanisms to determine the credibility of a Web
page), technicality (e.g. a score for amount of technical jargon in document) and if
the document is currently topically relevant [74].
Bibliographic cues (e.g. author affiliation) and inferential cues (e.g. citations to
and from document) are also needed for critical thinking and evaluation of informa-
tion [208]. A lack of transparency exists in affiliations of authors and publishers of
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information [208], and therefore there is a clear need for developing methods that
evaluate affiliation(s) of authors and publishers of information (e.g. who is funding
think tank X that publishes web page Y) [133].
Methods to identify content that is hateful [261], misogynistic [21] or containing
vulgar language [53] are also readily available and potentially useful for minimizing
exposure to content that some users may find offensive, which Smith and Rieh [208]
classify as valence cues. Marking content which is sexually explicit (written, verbally
and / or visually) [174], may be useful for developing strategies to minimize harms
to minors as well as users that are susceptible to addiction.
As privacy is of paramount concern too, extracting cues that provide greater
transparency to the searcher into what data is collected and by whom it is collected
and shared are also critical to prevent harms from the collected information. One
such task in this space is the identification of 3rd parties that data will be shared with
when visiting a Web page [134, 257] and another being the classification of privacy
statements on the websites where the content is hosted, a task that could be designed
with existing privacy statement corpora [250]. In a similar vein as author affiliation
cues proposed by [208] and [133], privacy-based ontologies containing information
(e.g. total fines, number of GDPR violations) about 1st-party providers and the
3rd-party affiliations could be developed to present privacy cues.
Many of the cues can be extracted with models produced by machine learning
algorithms. Nevertheless, for data scientists that develop these models, it is critical
to minimize model bias, such as gender bias [32]. Many solutions in the field of IR
are designed with a “find the best” model mindset, as evidenced by the leaderboard
approach for shared tasks (e.g. TREC, SemEval), and are a likely cause of some
model biases and subsequent poor predictions. There is evidence that ensemble
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approaches are more robust and resilient to bias and more likely to outperform a
single model [89, 141, 261], and are one possible alternative. In search spaces with
potentially dangerous outcomes (e.g. health), data scientists should also consider
interpretable models [189].
3.2.3.2 Interface Design
Informational cues, cognitive interventions and policy are all important for harm
reductions [140], but they need a medium for implementation and it is the search
interface (such as a SERP) that is this medium.
Extracting cues that allow for the design of better decision making tools (thus
enabling users to better tap into their critical thinking skills) and designing interfaces
that present such cues and tools in a not-too-disruptive manner are two major
challenges for interface design. Commercial SERPs are typically presented as ranked
lists [208] and, depending on the query, will contain content such as advertisements,
social media posts and news articles [14]. Search support tools are an important IR
system component for improving search [245], some of which are available within the
SERP including query suggestions and auto-completion as well as spelling correction.
Thus, any component that allows the user to minimize the chance of harm, also falls
within the scope of search support.
Space is a premium and one challenge is to ensure that the screen is not over-
loaded [146]. Risk communication tools such as nutrition labels and fact boxes are
highly effective and desirable, but may not fit on small mobile devices, where warning
lights are likely the better option. Link enrichment is another approach [146], where
pop-ups populated with informational cues are included with the results, and is thus
especially appealing as it could be applied to both desktop and mobile search. Link
enrichment also need not apply only to the SERP, and can be applied as searchers
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navigate within [8] or across domains and the Web (Wikipedia desktop offers link
enrichment and is one live example).
Alternatively, the SERP could be designed to rank or filter results as to attenuate
possible harms from, say, privacy concerns or dangerous medical advice. Indeed,
commercial search engines already offer the default of filtering adult content (e.g.
content that is classified as sexually explicit), and takes up little space within the
interface. Altering results in the SERP in this manner is a nudge, so long as the
user is given the capability to opt-out [220]. However, we caution against such
approaches, as it does not tap into the important critical thinking and literacy skills
of searchers [208] and thus likely does not generalize to other contexts without such
a nudge.
The interface is also where policy can be implemented. It is conceivable that law
makers may someday require IR systems to include any number of the approaches
already discussed—an information nutrition label [74] is one such possibility. Or
platforms, such as Google, could voluntarily set policy that provides links to educa-
tional resources in the SERP, simplifying the process for searchers to learn how to
better protect themselves during the search process.
3.2.3.3 Additional System Approaches
There are many additional system based approaches one might consider for harm
reduction in Web search, for which we highlight several examples, but go not further
as our focus is on other elements.
Reducing Information Collected As stated in previous sections, there are ben-
efits and risks to the information collected about individuals online. Approaches to
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scramble the interactive data collected about users and simultaneously consider the
loss of benefits due to this approach appear promising [29]. More recent research,
in the domain of search and recommender systems, suggests a lower number of fea-
tures are necessary for high quality results [28] and is therefore a pathway towards
reduced data collection.
Third party companies regularly collect information about users during their
search for information resulting in many privacy risks [62, 63, 117, 149]. Methods
are available to algorithmically detect 3rd party tracking (e.g. via cookies, embedded
scripts and browser fingerprinting) in Web pages [30, 257]. Additionally, many easy
to install tools also exist to prevent 3rd party tracking (e.g. Ghostery and Privacy
Badger)2, which greatly reduce but do not entirely prevent tracking [69].
De-biasing Language Models For classification tasks related information en-
countered on the Web (Sections 2.4.1 and 3.2.3.1), there are risks of discrimination
due to underlying language biases (e.g. due to locality and demographic differences
by authors) existent in collections used to develop train such models. The emerg-
ing area of research referred to as Computational Sociolinguistics addresses such
issues. The work of Hovy et al. demonstrates the importance of incorporating such
information into document models [98, 109]. Word sense use differences are easily
captured in tweets where geo-location of postings [166] and furthermore when un-
derlying embedding models are built upon text from a large twitter corpus [19, 47].
Other factors, such as time, may also play an important factor [176]. New methods
to test statistical significance of location, demonstrate that location has an influ-
encing role in language [129]. Intuitively, one would ask if location can be inferred
from language used online and recent results show just this [153]. Additional areas
2See https://www.ghostery.com/ and https://www.eff.org/privacybadger
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of computational sociolinguistics are further outlined in [161].
3.2.4 Evaluation
Evaluation ( FC-Evaluation ) of Web search is a large topic in and of itself,
for which much was already covered (see Section 2.7) with respect to traditional
approaches for evaluation of systems and interactive behaviours. Such evaluation
approaches should not be overlooked with respect to this framework and utilized
where appropriate. Attention should also be placed on more recently proposed
metrics, including metrics that take an economic view, along with considerations for
a newer generation of outcome-based measures for harm.
3.2.4.1 Economic-Based Evaluation
Interventions that reduce risk of harm, such as those suggested in the framework,
have costs (e.g. time) for the individual [92, 220] and costs are an important eco-
nomic consideration for IIR environments [12, 15]3. The economic view has inspired
a new set of useful evaluation approaches, which integrate theories from economics
and have the overall aim to better predict user behaviour in the search environment
[11]. Incorporation of the economic view of IIR is potentially useful for evaluating
the framework, as it allows evaluation from the perspective of trade-offs of costs and
benefits [11, 14], such as the trade-off of costs of time for the benefit of reduced risk
of harm as part of the search process. In addition to time, examples of relevant costs
one might consider are the money a searcher is willing to pay for information that
is of high quality, amount of data they are willing to share with 3rd parties and the
effort of searching for information relevant to their task.
3There are costs with respect to designing and operationalising interventions in a search envi-
ronment, such as salaries for software engineers. However, for this discussion, we are strictly
concerned with the economics of the searcher.
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3.2.4.2 Harm Outcome Evaluation
There are many different search outcomes that might occur due interactions with
the Web search environment, related to factors such as health [179, 244], politics
[65] and privacy [1], to name a few. Identifying approaches to measure such out-
comes is important, and in our view overlooked, as indicated by the heavy focus on
relevance centric measures introduced in Section 2.7. Studies investigating health
outcomes [179] and political impacts [65] of search demonstrate how easily one can
be manipulated, but also provide insights as to how one might measure such out-
comes beyond the lab. For instance, in a similar vein to the longitudinal Harvard
nurse study4, we might someday link positive and negative outcomes (e.g. health
outcomes investigated by Pogacar et al. [179]) to longitudinal behaviour including
a broad set of Web searchers.
Sense-making, introduced in section 2.2.3), an area of research within IS that
considers the process of filling in gaps of knowledge, also has a strong focus on the
ultimate outcome of this process [56], outcomes which may have positive or negative
impacts [56, 185].
Such impacts touch upon evaluation of the system effectiveness [51], success
[245], usability [119] and performance [119]. Our framework suggests evaluation
through the lens of harm as a dimension cutting across the traditional IR evaluation
dimensions.
3.2.5 Framework Combined
It is useful to show how these components fit together and Figure 3.1 provides
such a view. As stated previously, we view policy as the foundation to design of
4See Nurses’ Health Study at https://www.nurseshealthstudy.org/ (LA: 2020-30-10)
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Web search environments taking into consideration harm prevention, and hence
why it underpins the three other components. The other three components are
not independent from one another and have overlap. It is within this overlap of
components where Web search environments for reduced harm originate.
Figure 3.1: Framework for Harm Prevention in Web Search - Four components
are included in the framework for harm prevention: policy, system design, system
evaluation and harm interventions from the behavioural and cognitive sciences.
3.3 Examples in Practice
Several empirical studies and commercial systems have some (but not all) of
the elements of the framework. It is worth noting these to provide a lens into how
the framework can be used in practice. To our knowledge, however, no approach
addresses all four components. Behavioural interventions (nudges) and system-
based content enrichment were shown to effectively steer users towards healthier
food choices [61] and away from Websites that more greatly impact personal privacy
[1]. However, all of these lack the policy element as they were evaluated in a lab
setting.
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Some commercial search engines (e.g. DuckDuckGo), have used policy, system
design and cognitive approaches to protect users from adult material, but do not
publish their evaluation approaches.
Specific to behavioural and cognitive interventions, there are additional empirical
findings worth noting. A subset of the cues suggested by Smith and Rieh [208] were
used to augment search results visually to nudge users to more accurately assess
credible information [200]. Browser plug-ins can provide a visual nudge during Web
browsing and exploration, such as the Ghostery5 3rd-party blocking tool, which by
default blocks data sharing with 3rd parties. However, caution should prevail with
3rd-party blocking tools, as recent findings question their effectiveness [69].
In line with a boosting approach, one study evaluated low-cost search tips as
a means to provide skills for better searching [158] and another study improved
novice searchers skills by feedback based their search behaviour compared to expert
searchers [22]; note that neither study was explicitly designed for harm reduction
nor explicitly referred to boosting .
3.4 Summary
This framework is the lens through which the general methods, introduced in
the next chapter, and the five empirical studies that follow (Chapters 5 - 9), were
designed and evaluated. The framework allows much room for experimentation,
with the core focus being on adaptation and evaluation of behavioural and cogni-
tive interventions ( FC-Cognitive ) as evidence of their success in other domains and
limited use in Web search suggest their untapped potential. Attention is also given
to framework components FC-System and FC-Evaluation , as these are integral
5Ghostery at https://www.ghostery.com/ (LA: 2020-10-30)
94
3.4 Summary
to development of Web search environments. Finally, as stated before, though fun-
damental, we do not focus on policy ( FC-Policy ), as we view this component as
beyond the boundaries of scientific research. Scientific research should inform policy,
but not set it.
Looking ahead, we initially introduce the general methods, where many of the
specifics to the harm prevention strategies are introduced, of which nudging and
boosting are the central focus. We also introduce evaluation metrics ( FC-Evaluation )
here, and additionally introduce some of the system design features ( FC-System )
which are used as the medium of implementation for FC-Cognitive .
In the subsequent empirical studies, investigation of nudging and boosting strate-
gies ( FC-Cognitive ) and search system design ( FC-System ) are the main focus for
Chapters 5, 6, 8 and 9. These studies are evaluated with existing and some newly
introduced evaluation metrics (component FC-Evaluation ). Chapter 7 shifts the
primary focus to FC-System for the identification of informational cues (as intro-
duced in system design Section 3.2.3.1), which are used in studies that make use of
both boosting and nudging .
As one might begin to see from this summary, these framework components are
not standalone.
95










Task based evaluation was performed to evaluate four harm prevention strategies
for Web search. Using both FC-Cognitive and FC-System , three experimental
nudges and one experimental boost to prevent harms due to loss of privacy during
the search process are designed. The four strategies are as follows:
S1 Filtering nudge of to remove results with high privacy risk.
S2 Re-ranking nudge to place results with lowest privacy risk at the top and
higher privacy threats deeper in rank.
S3 Stoplight nudge with coloured lights indicating levels of privacy risk.
S4 Fact box boost to teach a skill for reduced privacy risk.
The overall methodology was progressive in nature, that was findings from each
study are used to refine and develop methods for later studies. Online and offline
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lab based studies are the primary focus of our evaluation and methodology.
The methodology outlined in the sections below most heavily apply to the online
studies (Chapter 6) used to test strategies S1 - S3 , however many of these methods
are used (or adapted) to other studies. Offline studies for the same strategies ( S1
- S3 ) were performed as a precursor to the online studies, for which methodology
specific to those studies are provided in Chapter 6.
Development of strategy S4 makes use of test sets and data collected from
the online nudge studies. Though many of the methods below are useful for this
strategy, there are many deviations as well. Methods specific to the development
and evaluation of strategy S4 are detailed in Chapters 7 and 8.
The search systems developed and linked to each of these strategies touch upon
both the interface design (Section 3.2.3.2) and informational cue (Section 3.2.3.1)
specifics of the system framework component.
Related to the evaluation of the strategies FC-Evaluation plays a major part in
the studies as well. Existing measures for evaluation, along with many new measures
are introduced in the general methods along with additional measures in each study.
4.1.1 Hypotheses for General Research Questions
Returning to the introduction of boosting and nudging in Section 2.6, strategies
S1 and S2 are classic nudges . They are classic in the sense that the environment
is modified to reduce risk in a non-transparent manner to achieve their overall goal
(reduced privacy impact during Web search). Strategy S3 is an ‘educative’ nudge
approach, and is ‘educative’ in that the warning lights and the associated definitions
of privacy risk provide some transparency to the individual about the goal of reduced
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privacy impact. The distinction between non-transparent and transparent nudges
is important as it is expected that individual beliefs (and actions) with respect to
the harm prevention goal are ultimately linked to motivation for uptake of such
strategy (e.g. users that care more about privacy, will more greatly make use of
strategy S3 ).
Published findings of nudging in other domains (e.g. placement of healthy food
in a cafeteria to produce healthier eating habits and ultimately improve medical out-
comes) demonstrate that classic nudges are highly effective. Related to G-RQ-2 ,
it was expected that either strategy S1 or S2 will be most effective at reduction
of privacy impacts.
However, there are other important factors to consider, including ethics and user
preferences with respect to each strategy. These considerations are important for
evaluation of G-RQ-1 . Though a strategy may be found to be highly effective
(the aim of G-RQ-2 ), it may be found to be entirely non-viable (for instance if
the strategy was deemed unethical). Ideally, a strategy was both highly effective
and viable. Therefore, it was quite possible that strategies S1 - S3 are non-viable
even though some or all are found to be highly effective.
Boosts were proposed as a response to the challenges associated with nudges . The
first challenge being that classic nudges , such as strategies S1 and S2 , are non-
transparent and therefore unethical. And a second challenge towards transparent
nudges (e.g. strategy S3 ), being they do not teach a skill for the individual to
evaluate risk independently and therefore such a strategy will fail in the instance
that it was removed (for example if a user switches from a search environment
with warning lights to one without). These challenges provide motivation for the
evaluation of G-RQ-3 , where it was expected that individuals will not only learn a
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skill when treated with strategy S4 but furthermore be able to apply the skill after
the treatment was removed. For nudge based strategies (e.g. strategies S1 - S3 )
no skill was taught and therefore individuals will cannot be expected to maintain
reduced harm.
The most effective and viable nudge strategy was chosen for comparison and
evaluation against the most effective boost approach (see Chapter 9). Development
of the boost approach was undertaken in studies outlined in Chapter 7 and 8.
4.1.2 Adapting Methods from Previous Research
Web search encompasses many domains (e.g. medical, entertainment) and types
of tasks (e.g. fact based, exploratory). Our methodology assumes that search in
the medical domain was a highly private matter and furthermore can lead to grave
outcomes if misinformation was encountered, therefore previously published search
tasks from the medical domain were sought out.
Furthermore, as the proposed nudge and boost strategies were entirely novel to
the space of Web search, it was desirable to maintain more control during empirical
studies. Thus, we sought out medical search tasks that were also factual and closed-
ended (as described in Section 2.2.6. We suggest that control was greatly reduced
when using other tasks, such as open-ended tasks or tasks that are exploratory
in nature. Obviously, there remains a great amount of opportunity for empirical
research of these strategies using less controlled tasks (e.g. exploratory) and settings
(e.g. naturalistic), but highly controlled environments are useful for establishing
which of our proposed strategies are most effective and viable.
Methodology developed by Pogacar et. al [179] included a set of 10 medical search
fact-based closed-ended tasks. The search tasks were all questions with definitive
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answers backed by published high quality systematic reviews specific to each ques-
tion (see Cochrane Systematic Reviews in section below), and therefore treated as
ground truth. Their methodology included a study design to test multiple manip-
ulations of the search environment (to understand encounters with misinformation
and it’s impacts on search task outcomes). As our proposed strategies are in essence
manipulations to the search environment, we made every effort to borrow as much
from their methodology as possible.
However, it was important to highlight several key differences between our method-
ology and empirical focus with that of Pogacar et al. First, ours was a lens on
outcomes related to both privacy and misinformation, not just misinformation. Fur-
thermore, their research focuses on manipulations that increase exposure to misin-
formation to better understand user behaviour (e.g. trust bias) and what might to
expect if search engines were to provide better search ranking (e.g. some user beliefs
are so biased that no amount of correct information will produce a healthy search
outcome). Conversely, our methodology investigates strategies that reduce privacy
impacts as well as exposure to misinformation.
Major differences aside, their methodology was a highly relevant and useful start-
ing point for our methodology and empirical design and was therefore mentioned
frequent in the sections below. Specific to the search tasks and search outcomes they
evaluated, we make some cross-comparisons of our findings with theirs in several of
our empirical studies.
4.1.3 Cochrane Systematic Medical Reviews
Given the reliance on Cochrane medical reviews for the formulation of the search
tasks, it is useful to shed some light on the Cochrane organization, what their reviews
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entail and why they can be used as a gold standard for medical search tasks. For a
start, we provide the verbatim summary of their organization from Cochrane About
Us1. We have enhanced the text that is most relevant to the introduction.
“Cochrane is for anyone interested in using high-quality information to
make health decisions . Whether you are a doctor or nurse, patient or
carer, researcher or funder, Cochrane evidence provides a powerful tool
to enhance your healthcare knowledge and decision making .
Cochrane’s members and supporters come from more than 130 coun-
tries, worldwide. Our volunteers and contributors are researchers, health
professionals, patients, carers, and people passionate about improving
health outcomes for everyone, everywhere. Our global independent
network gathers and summarizes the best evidence from research to help
you make informed choices about treatment and we have been doing
this for 25 years.
We do not accept commercial or conflicted funding. This is vital
for us to generate authoritative and reliable information, working freely,
unconstrained by commercial and financial interests.”
Cochrane performs independent systematic medical reviews on a multitude of
health and medical topics (e.g. examining the effectiveness of melatonin for a jet
lag, effectiveness of SSRIs for treating depression). The process of a systematic is
highly involved and time consuming. The review involves researchers (e.g. medical
professionals in the case of Cochrane) retrieving and examining the available body of
literature (i.e. all published studies) on the medical treatment they are evaluating.
Once attained, each publication in the body of literature is reviewed for important
1Cochrane About Us at https://www.cochrane.org/about-us (LA: 2020-10-04)
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factors including quality of methods (e.g. was the study double blind) and statistical
analyses (e.g. statistical power was high quality in study X but not in study Y or
study Z. Once everything is reviewed, a summary of findings is published stating
whether the treatment reviewed is effective, ineffective or that insufficient evidence
is available for the evaluation. A good example of the review process is provided in
the findings for the effectiveness of melatonin for jet lag2.
To be consistent with previous research using search tasks based upon Cochrane
findings (e.g. White et al. [246] and Pogacar et al. [179]), the outputs of Cochrane
reviews were translated as follows for our empirical studies:
• An effective medical treatment for the purposes of search task is defined as
helpful .
• An ineffective medical treatment for the purposes of search task is defined as
does not help.
• If insufficient evidence is found to determine effectiveness of medical treat-
ment, for the purposes of search task is defined as inconclusive.
Returning to the enhanced text in the above quote, there are three important
points to be extracted.
First, better medical decision making is the ultimate goal of the systematic
reviews. As already indicated in Section 2.5.5, decision making is fundamental to
many of our everyday search task, and therefore the goals of Cochrane are nice fit
with this process. Interestingly, the strategies we examine (nudging and boosting)





are designed and implemented regularly improve decision making related to health
and medicine, and therefore a good fit with the work of Cochrane.
Second, Cochrane has a primary aim to improve health outcomes . Throughout
the thesis, search outcome is a common theme for which improved health outcomes
sits within. Linking the search tasks to the Cochrane reviews allows for an objective
assessment of search outcome.
Finally, we turn to the statement regarding commercial and conflicted fund-
ing , which Cochrane does not accept. This statement indicates gives high confi-
dence in their findings, for example that no pharmaceutical company is influencing
Cochrane to suggest a treatment is not, and therefore can be treated as a gold stan-
dard. In fact, Cochrane takes their research a step further, where they will publish in
their findings specific conflicts of interest about publications included in the review
(e.g. publication X was funded by drug company Y). Furthermore, they may reduce
the quality “score” of publications where conflicts have influenced the research (or
entirely disregard the research). We argue this last point is absolutely crucial with
respect to misinformation about medical treatments.
Sadly, recent events within the Cochrane organization raise serious concerns
about the future quality of their reviews [86]. Nonetheless, we believe they are still
high quality at this time and these three points combined make the reviews highly





A total of 10 (+ 2 practice tasks) medical search tasks (see Table 4.1) were
available for presentation to subjects (the same search tasks used by Pogacar et
al. [179]) in an in-lab setting. During each search task, as with Pogacar et al.,
definitions for the health issue, medical treatment and for the decisions that could
be made (helpful , does not help or inconclusive) were provided to subjects. Each
search task was complete at the point when subjects submitted their decision (see
Figure 4.5 for a visual of the search task decision).
Search tasks were based upon findings from systematic reviews published by the
Cochrane medical review panel, with their findings in the rightmost column (see
Table 4.1). All Cochrane findings for the medical questions used in our studies
were helpful or does not help and no questions had inconclusive findings. Thus, if a
participant selected inconclusive as the answer their decision was deemed incorrect .
Participant search task decisions were deemed harmful if they chose the converse of
the Cochrane finding (e.g. Helpful instead of Does not help), and deemed correct if
their decision agreed with Cochrane.
Section 4.2.3 explains how the search tasks were presented to users to ensure a
balanced experimental design.
4.2.2 Search Systems (and SERPs)
Through the lens of FC-System , the search engine and search engine results
page (SERP)3 used in all offline and online studies was a standard search interface
3SERP and search system are used interchangeably in the context of our studies
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Search Task Medical Question Cochrane Finding
Task 1 Do antioxidants help female sub fertility? Unhelpful
Task 2 Do benzodiazepines help alcohol withdrawal? Helpful
Task 3 Do insoles help back pain? Unhelpful
Task 4 Do probiotics help treat eczema? Unhelpful
Task 5 Do sealants prevent dental decay in the permanent teeth? Helpful
Task 6 Does caffeine help asthma? Helpful
Task 7 Does cinnamon help diabetes? Unhelpful
Task 8 Does melatonin help treat and prevent jet lag? Helpful
Task 9 Does surgery help obesity? Helpful
Task 10 Does traction help low back pain? Unhelpful
Practice 1 Do cranberries prevent urinary tract infections? Unhelpful
Practice 2 Does Echinacea help treat and prevent the common cold? Helpful
Table 4.1: All 10 search tasks users encountered in the experiment along with 2
additional practice tasks provided before the main experiment, each were based upon
findings published by Cochrane.
modelled after popular search engines. A sticky panel was used at the top of the
page to allow for search task questions and definitions related to the task to be
visible during the scroll of results. A decision button was accessible at the bottom
of the SERP for participants to click when ready to submit the answer for the search
task.
Raw data collected via interactions with the SERPs included: all queries submit-
ted (for online studies), web page(s) visited, the rank of each result, the pagination
of SERP visits (e.g. page 3 of results) and the time stamp of each event. For each
result visited the web page was opened in a new window within an i-frame and the
time recorded when users returning to the results page (allowing for calculations of
time spent on each website). Specific for analyses with respect to the warning light
approach, a privacy impact warning light colour was assigned to each website for all
SERP variants, however the colour was only visible to the user in the warning light
SERP (see Figure 4.2).
108
4.2 Procedure
A hamburger icon in the upper left of the sticky panel (see Figure 4.1) commonly
seen in websites and search engines (e.g. Bing) to change settings was included in the
SERP. Traditionally, a nudge requires an opt-out mechanism, and the hamburger
icon served as this mechanism, which allowed users the ability to turn on and off
the privacy settings. The default was set to privacy protection turned on. A minor
aim of the current research was a gained understanding of differences between users
that change these settings.
The details of the SERPs (Figures 4.1 - 4.4) used in the online studies, which
provided a search bar, connected to a commercial search API, to freely enter queries
for results from the Web, are included below. We begin with an overview of the con-
trol SERP, which was the basis for the 3 experimental SERPS described thereafter
4. Figures 4.1 - 4.4 are the SERP variants a participant would have experienced
on search task 9 (see full list of search tasks in Table 4.1) and had submitted the
query "obesity surgery". web pages returned by this query would have been the
same for all SERPs, however they were displayed in a different manner dependent
on the strategy and associated SERP used to test the strategy.
A mapping of the harm prevention strategies to the corresponding SERP used
to test the strategy.
• Strategy S1 was evaluated with the SERP in Figure 4.3
• Strategy S2 was evaluated with the SERP in Figure 4.4
• Strategy S3 was evaluated with the SERP in Figure 4.2
• The SERP used to test strategy S4 was developed and evaluated in empirical
studies outlined in Chapters 8 and 9
4Figures are best seen in colour.
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Following the descriptions of the control and experimental SERPs was a descrip-
tion of the search task decision page (Figure 4.5). For all search tasks, users would
have landed on this page. In line with methods by Pogacar et al., two search tasks
took the user directly to the decision page without a SERP and furthermore pro-
vided no additional information to answer the medical question. In this manner, a
baseline performance metric could be determined on the search task outcome.
4.2.2.1 Control SERP / Search Environment
The Control SERP (Figure 4.1) was the basis for the 3 experimental SERPs
described further below (Figures 4.2 - 4.4)5 as well as the SERP introduced in
Chapter 9 to test strategy S4 . Capturing interactions with a control SERP is crucial
for the evaluation of all four harm preventions strategies ( S1 - S4 ), as comparison
across the four strategies alone was not a sufficient evalaution. The control was
necessary to demonstrate if any of the four strategies are a statistically meaningful
improvement over the status quo (e.g. current commercial search engines).
In the SERP, the search task, medical issue and treatment definitions are visible
in the top panel as well as the decision options available in the top right. For the
Control SERP, no manipulations were made to the results ordering as returned from
the commercial search API (i.e. the result rankings from the commercial search API
were kept intact when presented to the user).
We now turn to introduction of the three SERPs used for evaluating the nudge
strategies. As it simplifies understanding of the SERPs used to test the non-
transparent strategies S1 and S2 , we begin with describing the Stoplight SERP
and search system to test the transparent strategy S3 .
5Figures are best seen in colour.
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Figure 4.1: Control Search System (SERP) with No Manipulation of Re-
sults and No Intervention for Harm Prevention. - This SERP was designed to
simulate current commercial search engines (e.g. Google) and was used for the analysis
of the four strategies S1 - S4 .
4.2.2.2 Stoplight SERP / Search Environment
Strategy S3 was evaluated with the SERP in Figure 4.2. Recall that this nudge
strategy is ‘educative’ and therefore gives transparency into the harm it aims to
prevent (in this case privacy). The notion of “transparency” as it relates to the
strategy being evaluated is an important consideration across participants, as the
background (Section 2.6) indicated that one should expect motivation and other
factors to play into the effectiveness of such interventions across the population.
The design of the Stoplight strategy is inspired through findings in nutrition
studies that encourage healthier eating behaviour [147, 203, 237], which show much
better results and satisfaction by users as compared to a nutrition table (such as a
proposed approach for use in IR [74]).
The results for the Stoplight warning SERP are ordered in exactly the same
manner as the Control SERP. Specific to the online experiments, 3rd party tracking
data was only available for a subset of the results returned from the API (see further
discussion about linking 3rd party data to test sets in Section 4.3). For any result
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where a 3rd party privacy tracker could not be linked, a Gray light was assigned. For
the remaining results where trackers were known, quartile values of number of 3rd
party trackers we were calculated. Anything below the median number of trackers
was assigned a Green light, above the median but below the upper quartile assigned
Yellow, with Red assigned to any result in the upper quartile of trackers.
List below are the definitions of the Stoplights visible to users in when using the
SERP.
• Red = High risk to your privacy
• Yellow = Medium risk to your privacy
• Green = Low risk to your privacy
• Gray = Unknown risk to your privacy
The association of colours to the number of trackers was motivated by the skewed
nature of 3rd party tracking data used in the studies, such that a result with a
Green Stoplight roughly contains 0 - 4 trackers, Yellow containing 4 - 8 trackers
and Red linked to 8 - 30 + trackers. The reader should note these values are rough
estimates, which are dependent on factors including the search task at hand, the
query submitted, and availability of 3rd party tracking data for a particular result
(which are not always available, as explained in Section 4.3). Additionally, though
3rd party tracking data was similarly skewed in the offline studies in Chapter 5, the
evaluation test sets used in these studies were static and therefore variations were
consistent for all search tasks and strategy combinations.
Finally, we assume that the Gray light will be interpreted as more risky than
the Green light, for which analysis was included in Chapter 6 with respect to this
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assumption. However to reduce user bias, we placed it below a line that separated
the other warning lights.
See Figure 4.2 for additional details and definitions for the Stoplight SERP.
Figure 4.2: Stoplight Nudge Search System (SERP) with Stoplights (best
viewed in colour) Warning About Levels of Privacy Risks. - The Stoplight
SERP was used for the evaluation of harm prevention strategy S3 .
4.2.2.3 Filtering SERP / Search Environment
Strategy S1 was evaluated with the SERP design provided in Figure 4.3. As
with the Stoplight and Control SERP, original result ordering was maintained (i.e.
the ordering of the commercial search API response). Visually the filtering SERP
appears the same as the control SERP. However, any results containing above the
median number of 3rd party trackers for the result set (i.e. the set of results returned
for the submitted query) were filtered out of the SERP. For comparison to the
Stoplight strategy in Figure 4.2, when imagining the warning lights as visible for




Figure 4.3: Filtering Nudge Search System (SERP) for Reduced Privacy
Risk. - The Filtering SERP was used for the evaluation of harm prevention strategy
S1 .
4.2.2.4 Ranking SERP / Search Environment
The Re-ranking SERP in Figure 4.4 was designed to test strategy S2 . Prior to
results being displayed in the SERP, results are Re-ranked based on the number of
3rd party trackers associated with each result. In this manner, the first result always
had the lowest number of 3rd party trackers . For cases where 2 or more websites
had equal numbers, the same original ordering was kept. To cope with websites
where 3rd party trackers were unknown, such results were placed between results
with the median number of trackers and results just above the median number of
trackers. For a visual reference, imagine all of the Stoplights being made visible in
the ranking SERP, in which Green lights would appear first, followed by the Gray
lights, then Yellow lights and finally Red lights. The placement of results was done in
this manner to maintain consistency with other variants and because it was assumed
that Gray lights would be perceived by individuals as more risky than Green lights,
but not as risky as the Yellow or Red lights.
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Figure 4.4: Re-Ranking Nudge Search System (SERP) for Reduced Privacy
Risk. - The Re-ranking system used for the evaluation of harm prevention strategy
S2 . The first result has the lowest number of privacy trackers of all results returned
for this query. Note that the top result in this SERP, does not match the top result
in the other SERPs, was not the top result in this SERP.
4.2.2.5 Search Task Decision Page
For all search tasks, subjects were asked to make a decision about the medical
question at hand before continuing onto the next search task. See Figure 4.5 to see
how the question was displayed to the participant along with the answers (helpful ,
does not help or inconclusive) available to them. Participants could only select one
answer and they could not return to the page after submission. After their answer
was submitted, they were directed to post-task questions to capture information
such as the confidence in their answer.
For two search tasks, participants were taken directly to this page without a
SERP to produce a baseline performance metric for the search task. For the re-
maining eight search tasks, one of the four SERPs already introduced would have
been used to assist the participant in the process to best answer the question.
Similar SERPs were used in the offline studies (see Chapters 5 and 9), however
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Figure 4.5: Search Task Medical Decision Page. - The medical decision was
presented to all participants during all search tasks (for in lab experiments).
the SERPs in the offline studies did not provide a search bar for users to submit
queries, and instead users were asked to imagine they had entered a query. The
offline studies therefore have the benefit of being more controlled, while the online
studies are step towards a naturalistic setting.
4.2.3 Design for User Studies
Within and Between Group Design Motivated by the knowledge that more
variants can be evaluated with a minimal number of participants [119], a within-
group design was used to collect subject data related to evaluation of strategies S1
- S3 with respect to strategies G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 in Chapters 5 and 6. In this
manner, all participants encountered the 3 experimental SERPs, the Control SERP
and Baseline (i.e. no SERP available for the task) with two search tasks assigned
to each (a total of 10 tasks).
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A between-group design was used to test interactions across self-report measures
with respect to the transparent nudge and boost strategies ( S3 and S4 ). Further-
more, a within-group design was used to compare user behaviour in the treatment
environment (Stoplight strategy) against the Control environment. This design was
used in both offline and online studies covered in Chapters 5, 6 and 9.
A between-group design was used for a pilot study of the transparent boost strat-
egy (strategy S4 ), which was used to compare three different variations of the same
fact box designed to enable users with skills for privacy protection. The design was
used as it was expected that one or more variations would produce a better learn-
ing effect (an important factor related to G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ). This design
was used in empirical studies covered in Chapter 8, for which additional details are
provided.
To answer G-RQ-3 it was also necessary to run a between-group as treating a
single participant with both nudge and boost strategies in the same experiment would
make testing of hypotheses infeasible. Further details of this design are provided in
Chapter 9.
Presentation of Strategies and Search Tasks To ensure a balanced design for
the participants for offline and online lab based nudge studies related to strategies
S1 - S3 , a Graeco-Latin squares design (see details in Appendix A.2) was used
for rotation of the SERP and search task variants, each subject had 2 search task
question types (helpful / not-helpful) assigned to each SERP variant. For example,
a participant encountered a Helpful and Unhelpful task taken from Table 4.1 in the
Stoplight SERP.
In later studies that piloted the boost strategy (Chapter 8) and compared the
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boost and nudge strategies (Chapter 9), a combination of Latin squares and random-
ization was used to ensure a balanced presentation of search tasks and strategies.
Additional details are provided within the Chapters specific to these studies.
Participant Experience Data collection for the interactive user based offline
and online experiments related to nudge strategies S1 - S3 were performed in
a lab and moderated by the same person throughout (the author of this thesis).
Each participant came into the lab and was asked to silence and put away their
electronic devices. After completing a paper consent form, subjects were logged into
the experiment. All experiments were run via the Google Chrome web-browser in
Incognito mode. Chrome settings were configured to ensure that no previous queries
would appear from previous tasks and users. This browser connected to a web-
application server (developed with Python Flask) that was hosted on a university
server. Within the browser they were first taken to a set of instructions (with no
indication that a main component of the experiment was about privacy) and then
asked several questions to ensure their comprehension of the instructions. Only after
successfully answering these questions, would they move into the search tasks, for
which a practice task was provided. After completion of the search tasks, users were
then automatically taken to a post experiment survey run in Qualtrics to capture
demographics and other measures relevant to our study.
At the end of the Qualtrics survey, all users were given a debriefing page to
provide the answers to search tasks as determined by the Cochrane medical review
panel, information was also given regarding the privacy components of the exper-
iment. They were also free to ask the experimenter any questions regarding the
experiment. While subjects were informed the experiment would take 60-75 min-
utes, most finished in under 60 minutes.
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The empirical study in Chapter 8 for piloting the boost Fact box strategy was
instead performed online using a popular Crowdsourcing platform. Details of par-
ticipant experiment are further covered within the study itself.
In the empirical studies comparing the most effective and viable nudging and
boosting strategies (Chapter 9), an offline lab based experiment was performed in a
similar manner to the lab based nudge studies described earlier. Therefore, partic-
ipants had an almost identical experience. Variations to this experience are high-
lighted in Chapter 9.
4.3 Evaluation Test Sets
Evaluation test sets are necessary for the studies related to our research questions.
The test sets evolved as the studies progressed, in that the number of documents
available and annotations associated with those documents grew over time.
The empirical studies made use of the publicly available test set (see [179]) related
to the search tasks used (see search tasks in 4.2.1). However, this test set was not
fit for purpose with respect to our research questions and therefore modifications
and updates were necessary. The first evolution of the test set, necessary for the
in lab offline studies in Chapter 5, occurred prior to any studies being undertaken.
The second (and largest) advancement took place before, during and immediately
after the in lab online study in Chapter 6. Minor alterations were made to the
test sets from this point onwards, as required for studies covered in other studies.
For example, the documents were annotated at a less granular level for studies in
Chapter 7.
The fundamental elements of the test sets thread across all studies were the
annotations related to privacy and misinformation. In the sub-sections that follow,
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the annotation methods for privacy and misinformation for the test set used in
the online study in Chapter 6 are provided, with deviations from these annotation
methods covered as pertinent to individual studies. A separate sub-section describes
the meta data associated with test set.
4.3.1 Web Page Privacy
As already indicated in background Chapter 2, 3rd party trackers are one source
of potential harm encountered during Web search. Therefore, for all studies, 3rd
party trackers were chosen as a relevant proxy for harm related to privacy. Many 3rd
party trackers bridge across different websites, however to maintain highly controlled
experimentation the 3rd-party trackers for each website are treated independently
from each other 6. Two methods were used in our studies to annotate the test set
with 3rd party privacy information, for which can be defined as automated and
manual.
4.3.1.1 Automated Privacy Annotations
Methods are available to determine the number of trackers once a web page
was loaded (e.g. [257]), however no known methods of privacy risk are available
for real-time assessment in the SERP itself. Furthermore, modern search engines
return results in fractions of a second and thus users expect results to be returned
quickly, providing motivation for a privacy risk score being available at runtime of
the experiment. As the known web has billions (if not trillions) of web pages, it was
infeasible to crawl the Web and determine the number of trackers for each website
prior to our experiment. An extensive effort was made to ensure that as many query
6For example, Google DoubleClick was a tracker on many different websites, and was not inde-
pendent if you visit two different websites using this tracker. In the experiments in studies that
follow, each tracking encounter was treated as separate from encounters on different websites.
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results as possible would be linked to 3rd party tracking data, however this was not
possible for all web pages and details of how web pages were linked are provided
herein.
We contacted the authors of WhoTracks.me7 [117] for usage of their tracking
data. Their website provides visualizations and tracking statistics for approximately
5000 of the most popular websites8 visited by users with the Ghostery9 3rd party
tracking plug-in installed in their browser. The authors provided us with additional
tracking data, composed of the top 10,000 most frequently visited global domains
by users that have installed the Ghostery 3rd party tracking browser plug-in. For
the remainder of the thesis, this dataset is referred to as the WhoTracks.me Test
Set.
4.3.1.2 Manual Privacy Annotations
Across all studies (both online and offline), for any web page that could not be
linked to domains in the WhoTracks.me Test Set, the Ghostery privacy tracking tool
was used to determine the number of trackers. The annotation process, a somewhat
time consuming and tedious task, was performed by the author of this thesis. For
each web page requiring tracker data, the URL was manually pasted into a Google
chrome browser. The author would wait for completion of the page load (sometimes
10 seconds dependent on web site), then open the plug-in interface to manually
review and sum the 3rd party trackers collecting data on the web page.
7WhoTracks.me at https://whotracks.me/ (LA: 2020-10-30)
8This data is available for researchers an open repository here: GitHub repository at
https://github.com/cliqz-oss/whotracks.me (LA: 2020-10-30)
9Ghostery at https://www.ghostery.com/ (LA: 2020-10-30)
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4.3.2 Web Page Misinformation
Two post-graduate students, with previous experience annotating documents
(not related to this thesis), were recruited to annotate all websites visited by subjects
during the in lab online experiment. Each annotator was paid £0.25 for each website
annotation. Two rounds of annotations took place. In the first round, each annotator
independently judged each website based on the instructions provided (see Figure
4.6). In the second round, the annotators used the same instructions to jointly
resolve any discrepancies between their first round annotations. Analysis of the
annotations, including agreement measures, are provided in results Section 6.3.1.
Instructions Annotators were provided a spreadsheet containing URLs visited
by participants and the associated search task (i.e. the Cochrane Medical question)
and correct answer. They visited each URL in the list and followed the instructions
provided in Figure 4.6. The annotation task was to choose one of the following
four options about the web page with respect to the search task (definitions and
assumptions of user impacts to search task outcomes are included). Only web pages
associated with the 10 main search tasks (see Table 4.1) were annotated, that was
URLs linked to practice tasks were not included in the annotation process.
• Correct
DEFINITON: Information on web page agrees with Cochrane findings.
ASSUMPTION: User visiting a correct web page has increased likelihood of
correct search outcome.
• Incorrect - Page Unavailable
DEFINITON: Page does not load or error returned for result visited10.
10Multiple web pages returned by the search API were unavailable during the experiment
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ASSUMPTION: No impacts to search outcomes.
• Incorrect - Not enough information
DEFINITON: Information on web page gives mixed signals (both correct and
incorrect information) or no signal (e.g. not enough information, entirely
irrelevant information).
ASSUMPTION: User visiting a web page with this label increases the likeli-
hood to choose the incorrect answer.
• Incorrect - Wrong Information
DEFINITON: web pages containing the opposite information to Cochrane
findings were given this label.
ASSUMPTION: User visiting a web page with this label has greatest increase
to likelihood of producing an incorrect search outcome as well as harmful
search outcome.
In line with the terminology used for participant decisions, web page annotations
were mapped to the same terminology (Correct , Incorrect and Harmful) for analysis
pertaining to the research questions. Any result annotated within the 3 Inconclusive
sub-categories were classed as Incorrect . Harmful was assigned to results annotated
as Incorrect - Wrong Information. Any result annotated as Correct remained
categorized as Correct .
4.3.3 Test Set Metadata
In addition to the privacy and misinformation annotations, additional metadata
was necessary for all in-lab experiments. As the in-lab experiments were task based
and made use of a SERP, metadata collected was based on the SERP requirements
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Figure 4.6: Annotation Instructions as Presented to the Annotators for
Classifying Web Pages as Correct or Incorrect . - The instructions also included
three sub-categories for incorrect results.
to simulate the experience of commercial search engines such as Google. For each
web page in the test set, metadata included the title, snippet, URL to actual web
page, URL snippet for SERP and rank of the web page for the query used to retrieve
the web page.
For the lab based online studies, web pages were loaded in the browser. However,
for the offline studies images of the web page were loaded instead of HTML. Using
the FireShot11 screen grab plug-in images of the entire web page were collected for
each URL in the test set.
4.3.4 Test Set Progression and Summary
Below is a listing of all test sets used in the empirical studies. The Waterloo
Test Set and the WhoTracks.me Test Set were made available by other researchers,
the other four test sets were original contributions as a result of empirical studies
covered in this thesis.
11FireShot at https://getfireshot.com/ (LA: 2020-10-10)
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The following details of the progression of each test sets and the metadata at-
tached. In addition to the details of each test set listed below, final analyses in each
interactive study utilized the interactive log data linked to metadata within each
test set.
I Waterloo Test Set = Published by Pogacar et al. and was the starting point
for test sets used in current studies
II Offline Nudging Test Set = Waterloo Test Set + Manually curated web
pages
III WhoTracks.me Test Set = 3rd Party Tracking Data for top 10,000 most visited
Web domains with Ghostery browser plug-in
IV Online Nudging Test Set = Offline Nudging Test Set + WhoTracks.me Test
Set + Annotations of web pages visited
V Harm Prevention Features Test Set = Online Nudging Test Set + Simplified
annotations AND WhoTracks.me Test Set
VI Offline Boosting/Nudging Test Set = Online Nudging Test Set (8 tasks only
+ only top 10 pages for most common query) AND Metadata + Images
The following details where each test set was used in the empirical studies.
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• Waterloo Test Set = Not used in any studies (but is a foundation for studies)
• Offline Nudging Test Set = Used in offline nudge studies Chapter 5
• WhoTracks.me Test Set = Used in online nudge studies Chapter 6
• Online Nudging Test Set = Used in online nudge studies Chapter 6
• Harm Prevention Features Test Set = Used to identify features for privacy and
misinformation threats in Web search (Chapter 7) and pilot study study for
the development of boost approach (Chapter 8)
• Offline Boosting/Nudging Test Set = Used in offline studies to compare boost
and nudge strategies (Chapter 9)
4.4 Evaluation Measures
Any strategy to prevent harm (e.g. strategies S1 - S4 ) should be evaluated with
respect to the specific harm that is being addressed and measures should also take
account for the possibility of side effects (both negative and positive) in other areas
of Web search. In the subsections that follow, many of the evaluation metrics used
for analyses related to G-RQ-1 - G-RQ-3 in the subsequent empirical studies are
introduced. As evaluation is a core component ( FC-Evaluation ) of the framework
we have introduced, everything introduced here falls within this concept.
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In the empirical chapters that follow the current methods chapter, the measures
introduced here are used at some point, but not necessarily in all studies. Details of
their usage, along with study specific evaluation metrics, are provided within each
study.
4.4.1 Harm Prevention (Search Task Outcome)
4.4.1.1 Privacy Impacts
The privacy metrics listed below, calculated from the log data of participants
and associated 3rd party tracker data, can be viewed as the most fundamental
metric linked to the overall research aim: to understand which (if any) behavioural
and cognitive strategies are promising avenues for harm prevention in everyday
Web search. The measures for privacy below are novel search outcome metrics
for evaluation of IR systems designed to reduce privacy harms, they fall within
FC-Evaluation of the framework and are essential for assessing G-RQ-2 , but are
important for G-RQ-2 and G-RQ-3 as well.
Absolute Number of Trackers Defined as the sum total of 3rd party trackers
for web pages assessed by the user.
Mean (Average) Number of Trackers - Defined as the mean (average) number
of trackers for all web pages assessed by the user.
Maximum Number of Trackers - Defined as the maximum number of trackers
across all web pages.
Normalized Number of Trackers - Defined as the number of trackers for a web
page normalized by the maximum number trackers.
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One final note about these metrics, if a user did not click on a link for a particular
search task, then 0 trackers were recorded for that task.
4.4.1.2 Search Task Decisions
Any of the proposed harm prevention strategies have the potential to negatively
impact the search task outcome, which is a particularly concerning scenario in certain
search domains such as the medical domain considered in our studies. Put another
way, the strategies proposed for evaluation may prevent harms due to loss of privacy,
but as a side effect of the system designed with such a strategy the participant makes
a poor decision or action as a result of the information they encountered. The metrics
listed below specifically consider search task outcomes defined in Section 4.2.1 and
are most crucial to analyses related G-RQ-1 , G-RQ-2 and G-RQ-3 .
Correct Decisions - Number of correct decisions (out of total decisions).
Incorrect Decisions - Number of incorrect decisions (out of total decisions).
Harmful Decisions - Number of harmful decisions (out of total decisions).
Though the goal of these metrics is to ensure that poorer decisions were not
made as a result of any harm prevention strategy, it is entirely possible that better
decisions might also be a side effect of the strategy. For instance, it is plausible that
certain Web sites not only have lower costs to personal privacy, but simultaneously
have higher quality information with respect to the search tasks.
4.4.2 Compliance to Transparent Strategies
Strategies S3 and S4 are both transparent strategies, that is some indication of
harm is communicated to the user. With such a strategy, they can choose to comply
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with the strategy or not. It is plausible that some users will disregard the strategy,
for instance they may still visit results with a Red warning light even though they
are told it is more risky than a result with a Green light. Cross comparison of trans-
parent and non-transparent systems are addressed with these metrics and relevant
to G-RQ-2 , G-RQ-2 and G-RQ-3 . For example, we assign a hidden html tag
with the Stoplight colouration to all results across all search systems introduced in
Section 4.2.2, which allows for development of such metrics (covered in later studies)
for cross comparisons of systems.
As presented in Chapter 2, there is also evidence of a Privacy Paradox, where
individuals who express great concern about harms due to loss of privacy in Web
search do not make use of privacy protection in the instance when it is offered to
them. Such metrics (along with self-report measures in Section 4.4.4.4) are therefore
important to better understand this paradox.
4.4.3 Search System
Even if a strategy implemented by a search system successfully reduces or pre-
vents the harm for which it was designed, the intervention strategy should ideally
will have limited (if any) degradation to the user experience. Nor should the strategy
cause an increase to their exposure to web pages that are more risky (e.g. with in-
correct or harmful information with respect to the search task at hand). Combined
together, this plays into G-RQ-1 which looks at the overall viability of an inter-
vention strategy. We now introduce metrics that will be useful to perform analysis
with respect to G-RQ-1 and allow for comparison of the proposed search system
and their related strategies.
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4.4.3.1 Search System (Search Behaviour)
Adoption of commonly used measures for conducting interactive IR experiments
[120] were fundamental to the analysis related G-RQ-1 of strategies. The ideal
strategy will have a positive impact on these measures for interactive behaviour,
and at the very least have no significant negative impacts, and therefore are deemed
important for answering this question.
Assessments - Total number of results / web pages assessed by a participant.
Queries - Total number of unique queries submitted by a participant.
Queries w/o SERP clicks - Total number of unique queries where participants
did not click on SERP result.
Time to Completion - The amount of time (in seconds) a participant spent
completing a search task. Total Time = T1−T0. Where T0 = Time when user
landed on SERP for new search task and T1 = Time when user hit decision
button to leave SERP.
Rank - Average rank of clicks that a user made within SERP.
4.4.3.2 Search System (Adapting IR Metrics)
Traditional studies make use of the following metrics which were introduced
in the evaluation section, it is therefore useful to make use of such metrics where
possible.
The nature of the online study comparing all three nudge strategies provided a
dataset that allowed for comparison across systems of the quality of information one
might encounter. For these comparisons, we modify several traditional IR system
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metrics appropriate to this evaluations. Metrics include precision, recall and mean
reciprocal rank (MRR). The adaptation of these metrics is with respect to documents
that are correct or harmful , instead of using the traditional approach of a document
that is “relevant”. More specifics are provided in Chapter 6 with respect to the usage
of these metrics.
In the final empirical chapter investigating G-RQ-3 we adapt a popular gain
based metric, normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (nDCG), as one approach
to compare the nudge and boost strategies. In this study, harms and benefits of
different results with respect to privacy are considered. Using nDCG , the metric
is modified for analysis specific to harms and benefits of each system. As with the
online studies, more details are provided with respect to these metrics 9.
4.4.4 Demographics & Self Report Measures
Pre-task and post-task self report measures were gathered during each search
task. Upon completion of the main experiment, all participants completed an in-
depth questionnaire after the main study to capture demographic information, of
which full questionnaires not included in this section are found in Appendix A.1.3.
The evaluation metrics introduced here fall within both the contextual and usabil-
ity dimensions [119], and are seen as quite important for demonstration of system
viability (G-RQ-1 ) across different users perspectives.
4.4.4.1 Demographics
A set of basic demographics were collected in all user based studies, including
participant sex, age, education level, and fluency of language (e.g. native vs fluent
English speaker). This information was used to rule out problems with the sample
(e.g. males behave differently than females). Demographic values are reported for
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participants samples across each study.
4.4.4.2 Perceptions and Preferences
For the studies investigating the nudge strategies, users were asked at in the
debriefing segment of the post-experiment survey (to ensure no biases about other
questions) about their most and least preferred strategy. These responses results in
the following metric.
Preferred Strategy - Total count of participants selecting strategy X as their
most / least preferred intervention.
4.4.4.3 Pre-task Knowledge and Post-task Confidence
The following pre and post task metrics were captured. However, analysis was
only performed on the post-task metrics as the pre-task metrics did not fit with the
current high level research questions. The appendix (Section A.1.1) includes a full
description of the questions and how they are presented to participants.
• Search Task Knowledge - The average score of the two pre-task questions
(Appendix Table 4.4.4.3) to capture user knowledge with respect to the search
task (questions adopted from [179]).
• Search Task Confidence - The average score of the two post-task questions
(Appendix Table 4.4.4.3) to capture user confidence in the search task outcome
(questions adopted from [179]).
4.4.4.4 Actions and Beliefs Towards Harm Prevention Goal (Privacy)
Measures of behaviours to protect privacy and awareness of privacy tools were
captured in the post-experiment demographics survey in addition to questions to
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capture general attitudes about privacy. The following metrics were calculated.
• Privacy Attitudes (General) - The average score for each participant was taken
from set of Likert based scale questions to capture attitudes towards privacy.
Full details of the questions are found in Appendix A.2.
• Privacy Attitudes (Health) - The average score for each participant was taken
from set of Likert based scale questions to capture attitudes towards privacy
of health information. Full details of the questions are found in Appendix A.3.
• Action Score (Binary) - Assigning 1 point to each question response (assigning
1 point to any response between and including "Sometimes" & "Always" and
0 for anything else) in Table A.4, the sum across all 14 questions was taken
(maximum possible was 14 points).
• Action Score (Total) - Using the raw score of each question response ("Never"
was given 0 points) in Table A.4 the sum across all 14 questions was taken
(maximum possible was 70 points).
• Awareness Score - Assigning 1 point to each question response (assigning 1
point to any response between and including "Never" & "Always") in Ta-
ble A.4. The sum across all questions was taken (maximum possible was 14
points).
• Enhancing Browser Score - The average score was taken for frequency of usage
of privacy enhancing browsers (maximum 3). The question asked and options
available in Appendix Table A.5.
• Enhancing Search Engine Score - The average score was taken for frequency of
usage of privacy enhancing search engines (maximum 2). The question asked
and options available in Appendix Table A.6.
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4.4.4.5 Measures Outside of Scope
Economic measures of search utility (time, speed, privacy) were considered, and
are certainly an important factor [11, 40]. However, due to concerns around partic-
ipant fatigue we excluded such measures from our study.
For similar reasons, we did not include a recently developed survey [71] which
captures aversion to uptake of new technology (e.g. new technologies such as the
transparent nudge S3 and boost strategy S4 search systems).
There are many more things to consider, however they go beyond what we can
cover in this thesis.
4.5 Statistical Tests
A range of statistical tests were used in the analyses of research questions, and
all analyses were performed in the R programming language [182]. Choice of test
was predominantly driven by the nature of the dependent variable (e.g. continuous,
binary), study design (e.g. between vs. within) and data collected (e.g. repeated
measures). Unless otherwise specified we use α = .05 as a level of significance.
Where appropriate, Cohen’s d is calculated as a measure of effect size.
Given the nature of the data collected in the studies (e.g. repeated measures of
users and tasks), Linear mixed effects regression (LMER) and Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) were appropriate tests for many of the hypotheses.
Analyses using independent t-tests (for between-group comparisons) and paired
t-tests (for within-group comparisons) were commonly used as well for comparisons
of dependent evaluation metrics across the different systems (e.g. comparing Control
vs. Stoplight). Two-sided t-tests were chosen over one-sided t-tests in the analyses
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as the directionality of the chosen metrics in our studies was not guaranteed. This
choice of the two-sided analysis decreases the chance of rejecting the null hypothesis,
but does provide the advantage of detecting unexpected behaviour important for
future research.
Logistic regression with log odds ratios were used to test for differences in binary
responses, such as the studies run to identify useful features for privacy protection
(in Chapter 7).
Chi-squared tests were used for analyses across several factors, such as tests
comparing user perceptions of the interventions.
Two reliability measures were employed in the empirical studies. Cohen’s κ, a
measure of inter-rater reliability, was used to measure the quality of the misinfor-
mation annotations (introduced in Section 4.3.2). Chronbach’s α was used to test
reliability of the self-report measures introduced in our studies.
4.6 Participants and Recruitment
Convenience sampling, recruiting participants based upon convenience of being
located nearby the experimenters (a common practice for many IIR studies [119]),
was used for recruitment of subjects for all in lab experiments. Three different
channels were used for this process. The first channel was via a list maintained
by the Psychology department; a list containing a pool of 4000 to 5000 students,
university employees and individuals from the surrounding community12. Another
channel was via recruitment messages sent to a university advertising list server and
department messages sent to students in multiple departments including Computer
12This list was predominantly composed of students, and students are given the option to join
this list during registration day at the University. Students are removed from this list after
completion (3-4 years). As such, the list was in constant flux.
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Science, Law and Sociology. Subjects from the preceding groups were paid £10
for their participation. The remaining participants were recruited via a university
website giving course credit in exchange for experiment participation. A master list
was maintained for all experiments to ensure that no participant returned for any
other study. Demographic breakdowns of participant samples is provided within
each empirical study.
For the online and offline nudge experiments, recruitment messages included no
mention of the privacy aspect of the study. they were told about the privacy aspect
only at the end of the post-experiment questionnaire in the experiment debriefing
(see Section 4.2.3). However, for the studies that included boost strategy S4 , a
statement about the privacy aspect was included in the recruitment message. This
choice was made intentionally, for several reasons. First, nudge strategies are opt-
out where as boost strategies are opt-in, and therefore motivation for recruitment in
this manner as it simulates the opt-out and opt-in aspect. Second, boost strategies
require motivation from the individual to learn the skill and we hoped that recruit-
ment of participants in this manner would increase motivation, for which this point
is especially important with respect to G-RQ-3 . One final note is that all par-
ticipants in the final study that compares boost and nudge strategies and addresses
G-RQ-3 , all participants received the same recruitment message and therefore
aware that the study was about privacy protection.
4.7 Ethics
Prior to the data collection phase of the experiment, methods went through an
ethics review process. Upon sign up for the experiment, participants were provided
an information sheet outlining potential risks and how their data would be stored
and analysed. Subjects were informed they could exit the experiment at any point;
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nonetheless, all participants completed the experiment. Before the start of the
experiment, all subjects signed a consent form regarding collection of their data
and how long different types of data would be stored (e.g. personally identifiable
information would be deleted after all experiments related to the research grant
were completed). As the Microsoft Azure Bing Search API (see technical details in
Appendix A.3) and Qualtrics survey software were resources used in some of the
studies; subjects were informed at the start of the experiment about transmission
of their queries and survey responses to these cloud services.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, the general methodology and foundation has been provided for
comparison of four behavioural and cognitive strategies ( S1 - S4 ). Many of the
methods that cut across the empirical chapters that follow are provided here. Within
each specific empirical chapter, deviations from these methods will be included as
well as methods that were not appropriate for the general methodology.
An important point about the studies that follow is that they were highly exper-
imental in nature, that is, no one to our knowledge has attempted to compare mul-
tiple nudge and boost strategies in an IIR setting. As such, it was necessary to per-
form the studies as stages, where the general methods were guided and developed by
learnings from each study in sequence. A listing of some of the high level differences
is provided below, where the predominant focus is on evaluation ( FC-Evaluation )
of novel Web search systems ( FC-System ) incorporating behavioural and cognitive
strategies ( FC-Cognitive ) for harm prevention.
• Chapter 5 is the starting point for development of the general methods. Vari-
ations will be presented, such as a more limited set of metrics used in the
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analyses of G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 .
• Chapter 6 uses almost all elements presented in the general methodology. As
this study was performed with a live search engine, it had a much richer dataset
available for analysis and therefore include the most extensive set of analyses
in all empirical chapters.
• Chapter 7 is an important transition study aimed to identify features useful
for the remaining two empirical chapters. Most of the methods in this study
are quite different from the general methodology, and details specific to this
study are found there. Also, the research questions for this study were aimed
at identifying features linked to 3rd party tracking and misinformation, these
questions and hypotheses are presented within the chapter itself. As already
indicated in 4.3, it makes use of data collected and test sets in the online study.
From the perspective of the framework, this study demonstrates methods one
might use for the development of new informational cues ( FC-System ); cues
which might be used to develop new cognitive strategies ( FC-Cognitive ).
• Chapter 8 uses the findings from Chapter 7 for the piloting of a boost strategy
(a fact box about privacy). Three different variants of the same fact box are
evaluated in a user study. However, the study was performed on a popular
Crowdsourcing platform and not based in a lab (a key difference from the other
3 user studies).
• Chapter 9 makes use of the findings from Chapter 8 to compare the boost
and nudge strategies. The key difference in this study being that G-RQ-3 is
addressed at this stage and thus requires some variation from the general
methodology, which were briefly touched upon in Section 4.2.3.
An overview of the studies is provided in Figure 4.7 to aid the reader in key
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differences across each study.
Figure 4.7: Overview of All Empirical Studies. - Five empirical studies were
completed in the thesis. This figure includes an overview to compare differences of
each study at a high level. N/A denotes not applicable.
The five empirical chapters are now presented in the order they were undertaken





Investigating Nudges in an Offline
Setting
5.1 Overview
Three nudge strategies ( S1 - S3 ) introduced in the previous chapter, strategies
motivated through FC-Cognitive of the framework, were investigated in a con-
trolled offline search environment in a lab setting. In the study presented here,
participants completed 10 search tasks (Table 4.1) and encountered 3 experimental
search systems which mapped to the 3 nudge strategies designed to reduce privacy
impacts to the individual.
Recall the distinction (in background Section 2.6) between non-transparent clas-
sic nudges and transparent ‘educational’ nudges . Furthermore, it was stated that
transparent strategies are more ethically sound than non-transparent strategies.
Therefore, from an ethical standpoint, it is desirable that with respect to G-RQ-1 and
G-RQ-2 that the Stoplight nudge (strategy S3 ) will be the most viable and effec-
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tive of the three strategies considered in this study.
As already presented in the background section on biases and behaviours (Section
2.4.5), one should not expect the most ethical strategy under current consideration
to perform the best. Presumably, one would expect users to strongly adhere to
the transparent strategy if in fact they care about the harm it aims to prevent
(i.e. loss of privacy). However, evidence presented in the background also suggests
this may not be the case (e.g. the “privacy paradox”). Nonetheless, research in
behavioural and cognitive interventions (again in the background) suggests that
individuals motivated to prevent the harm will make use of such interventions.
This in turn leads us to the formulation of several hypotheses.
With respect to the high-level research questions G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 we
formulate the following two hypotheses.
H1a all 3 nudge strategies to significantly outperform the control search environ-
ment with respect to the harm being tested (privacy impact).
H1b Both non-transparent nudge strategies are expected to outperform the trans-
parent nudge strategy with respect to privacy impacts.
Specific to the transparent Stoplight nudge strategy, we again investigate the
high level viability and effectiveness questions (G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ). However,
for this specific strategy the analyses focused on differences in user attitudes and
behaviours with respect to privacy (as indications for motivation), and therefore
evaluated based on the following hypotheses.
H2a For the transparent nudge strategy, the “privacy paradox” will not be present.
That is, participants with strong attitudes about privacy will have privacy
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impacts significantly reduced more so than participants with weaker attitudes.
H2b Similarly, we expect individuals taking privacy protective behaviours in ev-
eryday life to make use of the Stoplight nudge strategy more so than individuals
that take little or no privacy protective action.
In addition to testing the above hypotheses, another aim of studies presented
in the current chapter was the refinement of general methods for their use in later
studies (e.g. the online nudge study in Chapter 6), along with development of new
search outcome based evaluation metrics (as part of FC-Evaluation ) to measure
harm across systems. As no one, to our knowledge, has run a study to compare
multiple nudges (or multiple harm prevention strategies) in a Web search environ-
ment, these studies can also be viewed as pilot studies for the studies covered later.
This is one reason why the methods used in the current studies are more limited
than those used in later studies. Methods used in the current studies also differ
from later studies due to the skills of the thesis author at time of these studies; skills
which were somewhat restricted (e.g. knowledge of statistical methods, no previ-
ous experience with lab studies). Several important differences from the general
methods will be highlighted below.
5.2 Method
The current studies acted as precursor studies to inform overall general methods
(Chapter 4). As such, the methods used in the current studies are a scaled back
form of the general methods. In the sections below, exceptions and deviations from
the general methods are provided, such as survey questions provided to the users
and evaluation metrics used in analyses of research questions.
An offline study was performed in a lab setting. As described in the general
143
5. INVESTIGATING NUDGES IN AN OFFLINE SETTING
methods, participants (n = 91 in total) were recruited and were presented a set of
search tasks and nudge strategies S1 - S3 using a within-group design for testing
hypotheses H1a and H1b . A between-group group design was used in addition
to the within-group to test differences specific to H2a and H2b , which focuses on
strategy S3 (the transparent Stoplight intervention).
5.2.1 Procedure
A key difference in procedures employed for the current studies relate to the
SERP used to test the strategies.
Search Engine Results Page (SERP) In the current offline studies, which
informed modifications to SERPs in later studies, users could not submit queries
and therefore no query bar was available in the SERPs for the present studies. This
variation, along with several other notable differences, is visible when comparing
the Stoplight SERP (Figure 5.1) used in the current offline nudge studies with the
Stoplight SERP in the general methods (Figure 4.2 used in the online nudge studies).
Recalling that 3rd party tracking data was associated with all web pages in the
Offline Nudging Test Set used in this study, the Gray lights were not include in
the Stoplight SERP used in the offline nudge study. A tooltip which displayed
the definitions of Stoplights (with mild variations in language) upon mouse over
by the user (instead of a sticky panel in the online SERP) was another difference.
Additionally, in the pre-testing stages of the offline system, two participants reported
that it was unclear they could click on the results, therefore a small snippet was
added that said “You can click on links below”.
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Figure 5.1: SERP with Stoplight (best viewed in colour) Strategy Used
in Current (offline) Nudge Study. - A mouseover tooltip was provided with
definitions of the lights (as opposed to sticky panel in online study). No query bar is
available.
5.2.2 Evaluation Test Sets
As stated in the general methods (Chapter 4), the starting point for the Water-
loo Test Set was used the starting point for development of the Offline Nudging
Test Set used current study. There are some important points worth highlighting in
relation to the Offline Nudging Test Set we developed.
In the Waterloo Test Set 55 documents were no longer available. These doc-
uments were excluded from the study as 3rd party tracking data for would not
be retrievable. This reduction in documents produced some challenges. For ex-
ample, only 8 of the 16 documents associated with task 9 (Table 4.1) remained
for our research. Given the desire to have at least 10 results visible for all nudge
interventions, this challenge was particularly noticeable in regards to the filtering
intervention, where for instance only 4 documents would appear to the user for task
9 (recall filtering removes the upper median of trackers). Furthermore, for a consis-
tent test set across tasks, it was desirable to have baseline results closely match the
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findings that approximately 80% of search results for the Cochrane medical search
tasks contain correct information [246]. These challenges were more than sufficient
motivation for expansion of the test set.
For the expansion of the corpus, we used Bing, Yahoo and Google, in line with
the authors of Waterloo Test Set (see [179]). We also used a VPN set to the
Toronto area of Canada (location near original authors) and ran searches using
incognito browsing to minimize any potential of personalization of results. We
contacted the authors to determine search terms they used and followed their in-
structions. For each search task (Table 4.1) the instructions were to query “Does
search task treatment help search task medical issue?” We recorded the rank of each
correct result found in the top 30 results. Due to time constraints, anything beyond
rank 30 was recorded as 31, as were incorrect results. These rankings were assigned
to all documents in the original and expanded corpus, we then created a weighted
ranking based on the market share of each of the 3 search engines in July 20181.
Additionally, inconsistencies were discovered in the snippets provided in theWa-
terloo Test Set. Though reported that all snippets were length of 2 sentences,
many snippets were longer and for Task 9 and Task 10 no snippets were available.
To address all issues, we used the first two sentences of the first paragraph for web
pages linked to Task 9 and Task 10. For all other tasks, we ran the Python NLTK
sentence splitter over the snippets provided to ensure only 2 sentences were visible
for each result.
Using the annotation methods for privacy and misinformation already outlined
in general methods, all web pages were annotated for privacy using the manual
approach. For misinformation annotations, the author of this thesis and his PhD




supervisor independently annotated all web pages added to the corpus and then
resolved disagreements (only 4) through joint discussions. However, misinformation
annotations were only performed at for being correct or incorrect as related to the
search task.
Our updated corpus had 19-24 documents for the 10 search tasks Table 4.1) and
we did not add documents for the practice tasks. Altogether, 95 documents were
added (93 correct and 2 incorrect) to the test set, for a grand total of 296 annotated
web pages.
Ranking Search Results In the process of retrieving documents from the three
search engines, we noticed that slight variations occurred in the ranking of docu-
ments (e.g. document at rank 3 moves to rank 4 after returning to SERP from
landing page on a result visited). Such behaviour occurred in all search engines and
was most notable in Bing. We felt this somewhat random behaviour was motivation
to add some randomness to our offline environment as it would more closely mimic
online environments.
To produce this randomness during the experiment we take the weighted ranking
as input to an inverse cumulative distribution function (CDF) to formulate a final
rank for the documents related to each task. Use of the inverse CDF in this manner
places a much higher probability of a web page found at Google rank 3 to appear
for a participant than a web page found at Google rank 27. The inverse CDF was
calculated using the Scipy library [238] available in Python. Furthermore, a seed
setting was assigned to each participant, so that the randomness only occurred across
participants (i.e. the ranking would not change within a specific search task for a
specific user). We used the findings that 80.69% of results for medical queries are
correct in the top 10 results [246] as a guideline to tune the ranking of the results.
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In line with result rankings outlined in the general methods, the rankings from
the inverse CDF calculation were maintained for the control and two of the strategies
( S1 and S3 ). For Re-ranking strategy S2 , all results were re-ranked based upon
the number of 3rd party trackers (least to greatest).
5.2.3 Evaluation Metrics
A subset of the metrics introduced in the general methods (Section 4.4) were
used as dependent variables for testing the hypotheses in the current studies.
5.2.3.1 Measures Used to Compare Nudge Strategies ( H1a and H1b )
As the primary goal of the nudge strategies was a reduction in privacy impact, the
main search outcome metric considered is the Mean Number of Trackers. Another
important aspect of search outcome is the actual decisions made during the search
task, for which Correct Decisions and Harmful Decisions were used.
To test negative behavioural differences to the user as a result of the strategy,
we use the Time to Completion metric in our analysis.
Critical to G-RQ-1 , at the end of the post experiment questionnaire, all par-
ticipants were asked about their preferred nudge strategy. A simple analysis is
performed using the Preferred Strategy metric.
5.2.3.2 Measures for ( H2a and H2b )
Harm Prevention (Search Outcome Measures) For the analyses of the search
outcome of privacy impact as it relates to specific user attitudes and behaviors (H2a
and H2b ), the Mean Number of Trackers was not a fair comparison as some tasks
had different overall privacy risks associated with them. For instance, one task would
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have a lower median number of trackers across all web pages associated with that
particular task compared to another task. The thresholds for Stoplight colouration
(see Section 4.2.2.2) were based upon the median and upper quartile values. This
was problematic, given the within-group design used for data collection, in that
participant X would see task 1 and 2 with the Stoplight nudge, while user Y would
see task 4 and 9 with Stoplight nudge (recall that 2 tasks were assigned to each
strategy). For example, in the instance that both participant X and Y took privacy
protective action in the Stoplight SERP (e.g. only visit results with Green lights),
the Mean Number of Trackers could still be different. As such, for the analysis, the
Normalized Number of Trackers a described in the general methods was used as a
dependent variable for the analyses.
Self Report Measures Self report measures were a critical component for testing
of the hypotheses related to interactions with the Stoplight nudge. Though many
different questionnaires are available with respect to privacy, no single questionnaire
was fit for purpose for our research questions. As such, using the survey in [132] as a
starting point, a new questionnaire was developed. As part of the process, methods
provided by [70] and suggestions by authors of [107] were utilized for during the
development of the questionnaire.
The following five metrics from the seven introduced in the general methods
(Section 4.4.4.4) were used in the analyses.
• Privacy Attitudes (General) abbreviated as Attd-General in current study
• Privacy Attitudes (Health) abbreviated as Attd-Health in current study
• Action Score (Total) abbreviated as Bhv-General in current study
• Enhancing Browser Score abbreviated as Bhv-Browser in current study
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• Enhancing Search Engine Score abbreviated as Bhv-Search in current study
One important note regarding Bhv-General. The current study used items 1 -
10 in Table A.4 and a simple summation was used for the options selected by the
user (minimum score of 0 and maximum score of 10 possible).
5.2.4 Statistical Tests
Statistical tests used for analyses in the current studies are divergent from sta-
tistical tests outlined in the overall methodology (Section 4.5).
For analyses related to H1a and H1b , logistic regression was used for analysis
of Search Task Outcomes variables (correct and harmful). As with lab based
studies covered in later the chapters, all models were controlled for repeated entries
of participants and search tasks, however analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used
for privacy and time impacts instead of GLM and LMER approaches. The choice
of ANOVA was due to the overall progressive nature of the thesis and the author
being unaware of the newer methods at the time of the study.
For analyses related H2a and H2b , linear regression and t-tests were utilized
as introduced in Section 4.5.
5.2.5 Participants
A total of N = 91 subjects participated in the offline nudge study. Of the
sample (N = 91), 89 were students, of which 77 of those were undergraduates. The
average age of participants was 23.2 years and 63 identified as Female. English
was reported as the native language for 27 students. STEM departments provided
53 participants, with 17 participants having a background in computer science. 42
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participants reported using a privacy-protective browser at least once a month, while
only 10 reported usage of a privacy-enhancing search engine.
A technical error with the Graeco-Latin Square design resulted in n = 51 partic-
ipants receiving imbalanced exposure to the Re-ranking and Filtering SERPs. To
address the data imbalances, a subset of n = 40 participants was used in the analysis
for H1a and H1b . The study sample included 39 students (all undergraduates)
and 1 non-student participated, of which 29 were female and 11 were male. The
average reported age was 21.3 years. The average time for experiment completion
was 40 minutes. 14 reported English as the primary language at home, noting the
majority of students were non-native English speakers.
The full participant sample (N = 91) was used for analyses related H2a and
H2b .
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Comparing 3 Nudge Strategies
To test the hypotheses, the effects of the harm prevention systems on the four
dependent variables (Mean Number of Trackers, Correct Decisions, Harmful Deci-
sions and Time to Completion) were tested. A Control SERP and baseline search
task were also included in the analyses. Preferences of the strategies were also
considered (Preferred Strategy).
The participants interacted with a controlled SERP (either a baseline or privacy
Nudge variant) or a control question with no search results available to assist with
their decision.
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With respect to the impacts of the 3 nudge strategies on reductions of encounters
with privacy trackers, Table 5.1 shows significant effects for both the Re-ranking
and Filtering approaches as compared with the baseline. However, there were no
significant differences when comparing the Stoplight approach with baseline in our
sample (n = 40).
Independent Mean # 3rd Party Lower Upper
Variables Trackers Encountered 95% 95%
Control SERP 6.11 5.25 6.97
Filtering SERP 2.27 1.41 3.13
Ranking SERP 1.93 1.07 2.79
Stoplight SERP 6.64 5.78 7.50
Table 5.1: Confidence intervals were calculated with one-way ANOVA. Interfaces
have a significant effect on the average number of 3rd party trackers encountered
during a search task, F (3, 316) = 32.30, p < .0001. When comparing the individual
privacy nudge strategies with the Control SERP, non-overlapping confidence intervals
for the Ranking and Filtering approaches confirm p < .05.
Related to the search outcome metrics for user decisions, Table 5.2 provides the
percentage of correct and harmful decisions for 40 participants. A direct comparison
of the user decisions to [179] shows the control performs worse for our participants.
Comparisons of the user decisions for the 3 nudge strategies against the Control
SERP indicate that harmful decisions are reduced for all approaches, however the
effects on decision making are not found to be significant for any nudge strategy
compared to the Control.
Analyses related to the time taken for each task as a measure of possible cognitive
impacts [120] were also performed with one-way Anova as a possible indicator for
negative implications with the experimental strategies. The mean time in seconds
to complete a search task for the 4 SERPs with the sample (Control = 117 sec.,
Filtering = 99 sec., Re-ranking = 99 sec. and Stoplight = 108 sec.) and any of the
152
5.3 Results
Independent Variables Correct Harmful
Control SERP 49% 18%
Filtering SERP 50% 14%
Ranking SERP 49% 16%
Stoplight SERP 54% 15%
Baseline Task 29% 26%
Table 5.2: Impacts on decisions. While minor variations exist when comparing the
decisions of Control SERP with decisions of the three privacy SERPs, none of the
differences indicate statistical significance. For the Baseline Task (i.e. no search results
available), task outcomes perform the worst overall (as expected), a finding in line with
previous research (see [179]).
variation was found to be non-significant.
Data indicate not a single participant made use of the opt-out mechanism (a
necessary element of nudging) introduced in the general methods. That is, no par-
ticipant made use of the switch available in the hamburger icon (see Figure 5.1). In
other words, the default privacy protection strategy was left on by all participants.
Finally, data was collected for the participant preferences across the three strate-
gies. Table 5.3 provides the results of the most and least preferred strategies. From
the data, no strategy stands out as most or least preferred.
Intervention Most Preferred Least Preferred
Filtering SERP 17 15
Ranking SERP 7 12
Stoplight SERP 16 13
Table 5.3: Raw counts of the user preferences (n = 40) are included for the most and
least preferred nudge strategies for harm prevention.
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5.3.2 User Variations with a Transparent Strategy
Data collected from all participants (N = 91) in the offline nudge study were
used to test hypotheses H2a and H2b .
First and foremost, when comparing interactive data across all participants
(N = 91) with the Stoplight nudge strategy and the interactions from the Con-
trol SERP, no significant differences were found with respect to the search outcome
measures (Mean Number of Trackers, Correct Decisions and Harmful Decisions).
These findings are in line with results on the smaller sub-sample used to test H1a
and H1b , which are contrary to expectations for this strategy .
Turning to results related to H2a and H2b and the five self-report metrics
(Attd-General, Attd-Health, Bhv-General, Bhv-Browser and Bhv-Search). As the
questions used to formulate the in the metrics were new, we tested the reliability
of these questions. The two attitude groups demonstrated excellent internal consis-
tency, with Cronbach’s α = .76 for the 7 general attitudes questions and Cronbach’s
α = .89 for the health questions. We considered combining the all privacy be-
haviour questions as one measure, but given the unsatisfactory reliability of the
scale (Cronbach’s α = .53), we kept the 3 measures (Bhv-General, Bhv-Browser and
Bhv-Search) separate.
Our findings related to the metrics used (Attd-General, Attd-Health and Bhv-
Browser) are provided in Table 5.4. The two remaining metrics were not included
in the table as no significant differences were found. The privacy attitude measures
(Attd-General and Attd-Health), while reliable appear to have limited predictive
validity related to the Stoplight strategy. No evidence was found to suggest it is
a useful measure to predict how individuals will behave when presented with a
Stoplight privacy protection strategy. However, there are significant links between
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the two attitude measures and browser usage.
Bhv-Browser b F df SE p
Attd-General 0.30 10.96 89 0.09 ∗∗.001
Attd-Health 0.14 8.98 89 0.05 ∗∗.004
Normalized Number of Trackers
Bhv-BrowserM1 −0.29 5.57 180 0.03 ∗.020
Bhv-BrowserM2
Bhv-Browser −0.23 −2.64 360 0.09 ∗∗.009
SERP 0.03 1.34 360 0.02 .182
Bhv-Browser × SERP 0.12 0.70 360 0.17 .490
Table 5.4: Results of 4 predictive models with significant effects are included in the
table. In bold are dependent variables of linear regression models, with the lines below
separating each model. The first two results are for self-reported attitudes [Attd-
General and Attd-Health], each on the self reported behaviour metric [Bhv-Browser].
[Bhv-Browser] is regressed on the [Normalized Number of Trackers] in the SERP for
across search tasks. M1 denotes model on data from the Stoplight SERP only (with
no moderation). Model M2 is moderated by the SERP type (Control or Stoplight),
all other models had one input variable. ∗∗ and ∗ are used for p < .01 and p < .05
respectively.
Conversely, self-reported privacy behaviours are show some predictive power as
to how users will behave in the Stoplight strategy, where small effects when con-
sidering reported usage of browsers that enhance privacy were found (again in Ta-
ble 5.4). In the analysis, a distinct split between subjects (those who reported
usage of privacy-enhancing browsers, and those who do not) was noted. Using
this split, we performed post-hoc analysis with a Welch’s two-sided independent
t-test comparing % of max trackers encountered in the Stoplight SERP for partic-
ipants that use privacy-enhancing browsers (n = 42,M = 0.22, SD = 0.19) with
those that do not (n = 49,M = 0.28, SD = 0.24) and find these differences to
be significant t(179.79) = 2.11, p = .036, d = .31. The same split is used for
within-group analysis to compare interactions against the Control SERP. For the
group not using privacy-enhancing browsers, no differences were found for com-
parison of the Stoplight SERP (M = 0.30, SD = 0.15) with the baseline SERP
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(M = .31, SD = 0.22), t(47) = −0.46, p = .646, d = −0.07. For the group re-
porting usage of privacy-enhancing browsers there is a trend towards reduction in
privacy encounters with the Stoplight SERP (M = 0.23, SD = 0.17) compared to
the Control SERP (M = 0.31, SD = 0.18), t(36) = 1.91, p = .064, d = 0.31.
As already stated, similar analyses were performed for the Bhv-General and
Bhv-Search metrics. For both Bhv-General and Bhv-Search, there were tendencies
towards an interaction, but again no findings were statistically significant. We note
that a limited number of participants (< 10 reported any usage of privacy-protective
"search" engines and < 20 for any usage of "general" internet privacy protection
methods) reported ANY behaviours contributing to these constructs.
5.4 Discussion
A total of four hypotheses (H1a - H2b were considered in the analyses of the
three nudge strategies for harm prevention in Web search. It is useful to discuss
findings related to each of these hypotheses and the overall questions related to the
viability and effectiveness of the approaches.
5.4.1 Findings Related to Study Specific Hypotheses
Though significant findings were found across all nudge strategies, results in-
dicate the differences compared to the Control were only significant with respect
to the Filtering and Re-ranking systems (strategies S1 and S2 ). Based on this
finding, hypothesis H1a was not confirmed. However, given both Re-ranking and
Filtering nudge strategies were non-transparent and their systems outperformed the
transparent Stoplight nudging system hypothesis H1b was confirmed.
One can only speculate as to why overall the Stoplight system did not perform
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significantly better overall compared to the Control. Nonetheless, the study was
designed with the expectation the a subset of users will in fact make use of the in-
tervention being provided by the Stoplight nudge. In the case of the current study,
the subset of users was based upon attitudes towards privacy (H2a ) and privacy
protective behaviours (H2b ). With respect to H2a , the findings are in line with
existing literature on the "privacy paradox" (e.g. [163]), and the hypothesis is there-
fore not confirmed. Related to self-reported behaviours, with respect to the usage of
a more privacy protective browser hypothesis H2b is confirmed. There were non-
significant signals found for the other measures for privacy protective behaviour,
however it is noted that very few participants take action in their normal lives to
protect privacy.
Finally, based on the results, we conclude that the self-reported browser type
is a useful pre-screening metric to identify participants more likely to be concerned
about privacy, which is an important finding from the analysis.
5.4.2 Findings in the Context of Research Questions
It is important to consider the findings in the context of the broader research
questions (G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ). Table summarises the key findings from the
offline study. Given the overall aim of these strategies was privacy prevention, it is
clear that all 3 strategies are effective at reducing impacts from 3rd party trackers .
However, as highlighted in the findings, the Stoplight strategy is only partially
effective and therefore the least effective. Related to G-RQ-2 , this suggests that
all 3 strategies are effective, just that strategies S1 and S2 are more so.
Additionally, the findings suggest there are no impacts on the overall decision
making capabilities for any of the strategies. In other words, users of systems with
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Strategy Privacy Impact Task Decision Task Time
(Harm) (Harm) (Search Behaviour)
Filtering S1 Reduced No Impact No Impact
Ranking S2 Reduced No Impact No Impact
Stoplight S3 Reduced for a subset No Impact No Impact
Table 5.5: A summary of key findings critical for determining the effectiveness and
viability ( G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ) of each strategy. (Italicized) is the metric grouping
from general methods, for example (Harm) is tied to Section 4.4.1
these strategies can have reduced privacy impacts (a positive search outcome) and
simultaneously have no negative impacts on their medical decisions (a positive search
outcome which ultimately may lead to a positive health outcome).
Furthermore, the search behaviour (as measured by task time) was not negatively
impacted. As utility of a Web search environment (e.g. time to find information)
and the possibility that good medical outcomes are more important than personal
protection of privacy, a viable system should not negatively have any negative im-
pacts with respect to these factors.
A remaining, but important factor with respect to user preferences was consid-
ered as well. While the data suggests that Re-ranking is not the most preferred
approach by users, there are no clear winners and losers with respect to the most
and least preferred approach (Table 5.3), which is an important factor in the context
of viability (G-RQ-1 ).
Putting everything together including the findings in Table and G-RQ-1 , it
appears that all three strategies are viable. However these findings were determined





Recall the current study was highly experimental and simultaneously the first lab
based study for the author of this thesis, there were many learnings which allowed
for improvements to the overall general methods.
For example, the behavioural questions related to privacy actions used in the
current study did not consider the possibility that users may have never even heard
of the action (e.g. use a VPN), the frequency of use, only allowed for yes / no
responses and overlooked behaviours such as usage of privacy statements. As a
result, the questionnaire was updated to include 4 additional items and used a 6
point Likert scale (see Table A.4. This is one example where improvements were
made to the general methods, which ultimately allowed for richer analysis in later
studies, in particular with the online study.
Another example relates to the Graeco-Latin square method for interleaving
search tasks and strategies in a balanced manner. The current study demonstrated
the challenges of Graeco-Latin square design. A minor glitch incorrectly mapped two
of the strategies for n = 51 participants. This glitch was thankfully discovered part
way through. However it forced analyses related to hypotheses H1a and H1b to
take place on a much smaller sample n = 40. For the future, when using Graeco-
Latin square, one should triple check the expected presentation for participants
(double-checking was not sufficient).
5.5 Summary
The preceding studies considered three nudge based interventions for harm pre-
vention in Web search. All interventions (strategies S1 - S3 ), evaluated with an
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offline search system in a lab setting, appear to be effective at reducing poten-
tial harms related privacy impacts form 3rd party trackers . The Stoplight nudge
(strategy S3 ) is only effective for a specific type of user (users that take privacy
protective actions in their daily lives). The remaining two strategies (Filtering and
Re-ranking) designed for reduced privacy impacts are highly effective at achieving
there goal. Therefore, we are confident that at least two of the strategies, if not
all three are effective approaches for harm prevention in Web search, an important
finding related to G-RQ-2 .
In addition to the nudge strategies evaluated, which touch upon framework com-
ponents ( FC-Cognitive and FC-System ), several new evaluation metrics ( FC-Evaluation )
were introduced and important for comparison of the systems.
The offline study was highly controlled (e.g. a static corpus of documents pre-
sented in a SERP where users could not submit queries) and simulated a real-world
search environment. Therefore, the findings supporting the viability (G-RQ-1 ) of
the strategies is limited. This shortcoming of the current study is one motivation for
the study presented in the next Chapter 6, which considers nudge strategies S1 -
S3 in an interactive setting that is connected to the live Web.
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Investigating Nudges in an Online
Setting
6.1 Overview
The previous chapter introduced and investigated three nudge strategies ( S1 -
S3 ) as pathways to reduce harms related to loss of privacy as a result data shared
with 3rd parties during Web search. One drawback of these studies was a highly
controlled design that made use of a static test set. To better assess the robustness
of these strategies it is useful to run experiments in a more naturalistic environment.
Recall from our previous chapter that many of the learnings in that study were
used to formulate the overall general methodology. As such, much of the general
methodology (Chapter 4) applies to the current study. There are some specifics to
this study highlighted in the forthcoming methods section.
The main foci of the previous study was evaluating the viability and effectiveness
(G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ) of the nudge strategies. Furthermore, the hypotheses in
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the previous study tested for variations between the three nudge strategies and the
control as well as the contrast between the transparent Stoplight strategy S3 and
the non-transparent Filtering and Re-ranking strategies ( S1 and S2 ). Additional
hypotheses considered user variations related to the transparent strategy. All of
these factors are under consideration for this study as well. And like the previous
study, the current study is designed with the cognitive and system components
( FC-Cognitive and FC-System ) at its core.
One benefit of the naturalistic online study is allowance for much more exten-
sive analysis thanks to a much richer dataset. The dataset (outlined in more detail
below) includes more detailed annotations with respect to the search task along
with a broader set of search behaviour metrics. Given this, we were able to evalu-
ate the systems ( FC-Evaluation ) from additional and more insightful angles when
compared to the earlier study. Combined together, this allows the formulation for
additional hypotheses to those used in the the offline study.
With respect to the high-level research questions G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 the
following two hypotheses were tested in the offline study and are tested again
in the current online study.
H1a All 3 nudge strategies will significantly outperform the Control search
environment with respect to the harm being tested (privacy impact).
H1b Both non-transparent nudge strategies are expected to outperform the
transparent nudge strategy with respect to privacy impacts.
In the offline study, the factor of time was one measure considered which
was not significantly impacted. The online study captures data to consider




H1c All three nudge strategies are expected to have no significant degrada-
tion with respect to commonly used search behaviour measures.
The offline study was a controlled corpus with data skewed towards correct
information for the search task, therefore an unreliable for comparison of sys-
tems with respect to information quality. However, the more naturalistic online
study will expose users to information that is highly dynamic.
H1d With respect to information quality, all three experimental systems are
expected to perform on par with the control system.
Specific to the transparent Stoplight nudge strategy, we repeat the tests on
attitudes and behaviours related to privacy as addressed in the offline study.
H2a For the transparent nudge strategy, the “privacy paradox” will not be
present. That is, participants with strong attitudes about privacy will
have privacy impacts significantly reduced more so than participants with
weaker attitudes.
H2b Similarly, we expect individuals taking privacy protective behaviours
in everyday life to make use of the Stoplight nudge strategy more so than
individuals that take little or no privacy protective action.
Additionally, the offline nudge study showed limited reductions in privacy im-
pacts for the transparent Stoplight strategy. However, one should not overlook
the nutrition literature (introduced in Chapter 2 demonstrating that Stoplight
approaches are effective in general. Therefore, one must ask “Does search be-
haviour suggest users prefer results with colouration deemed to be more safe
(e.g. Green is more safe than Red?”, motivating the following hypothesis.
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H2c When compared to the non-transparent Control system, the transpar-
ent Stoplight approach will result in more users visiting results with
colours deemed safe compared to colours deemed less safe.
Finally, specific to the transparent Stoplight strategy, challenges with linking
real time search results were introduced in the general methods section. It was
stated that results where no privacy data was available, a Gray light would be
used to indicate unavailable privacy risk.
H2d It is expected that users will be (more / less) averse to web pages
assigned an uncertain risk compared to web pages with a (low/high) risk.
We now turn to the methods used to test hypotheses H1a - H2d , followed by
an extensive analysis.
6.2 Method
Many of the methods used in the current online study were introduced in Chapter
4 outlining overall general methods. In the following sections, we summarise the
general methods in the context of the current online study. Additionally, there are
details specific to this study that are introduced (e.g. evaluation metrics unique to
this study).
6.2.1 Procedure
In general, the search tasks, search systems and study design are in alignment
with those introduced in Chapter 4. All 10 Cochrane search tasks (Table 4.1) were
used in the study, along with all three nudge strategies ( S1 - S3 ) which are intro-
duced as three distinct search systems along with a control search system (Figures
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4.2.2.1 - 4.2.2.4). Overall a within-group design utilizing a Graeco-Latin square bal-
anced design presented participants the strategies and search tasks. Specific to the
transparent Stoplight system, a between-group design was used for the analysis.
The main procedural difference for the current online studies compared to offline
studies in other chapters is the usage of live search data. This difference is to
more closely align with a naturalistic search task. In the current study, the SERPs
included a query bar (Figures 4.2.2.1 - 4.2.2.4) which was connected to a commercial
search API (see Appendix A.3 for technical details of the API ). The addition of the
query bar and results from a live search environment is one key difference between
the current online study and our more limited offline studies. As was done in the
offline studies, results were linked to 3rd party trackers (as a measure of privacy
impact). Details of how the queries were processed as well as how results were
linked to the 3rd party trackers are detailed in Appendix A.3. Methods used to
collect 3rd party tracking data for web pages visited in the experiment follow the
general methods in Section 4.3.1 with specifics to the current study in Section 6.2.2.
6.2.2 Evaluation Test Sets
Revisiting the general methods, the output of the current study was the Online
Nudging Test Set which was used in the analyses covered in the forthcoming results
Section 6.3.
The annotation methods related to misinformation (outlined in Section 4.3.2)
were performed after all participants completed the experiment, and there are no
deviations from these methods.
Similarly, there were no deviations with respect to the privacy annotation method-
ology (Section 4.3.1). However, a recap of this method with a running example (pre,
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during and post experiment) along with summary statistics are provided, as this data
is fundamental to the overall harm prevention strategies under investigation.
Pre-experiment The pre-experiment privacy annotations are referred to as
Privacy Tracker Set A. This set includes 3rd party trackers from the Offline
Nudging Test Set and the WhoTracks.me Test Set.
During Experiment At experiment runtime, multiple results were returned
that could not be linked to Privacy Tracker Set A. This set of results is defined
as Privacy Tracker Set B. For web pages in Privacy Tracker Set B, results
were displayed in a different manner (see Section 4.2.2) from those in Privacy
Tracker Set A. For example, results in Privacy Tracker Set B appeared with
Gray lights in the Stoplight SERP in Figure 4.2.
Post-experiment After completing data collection for all subjects, a list of
domains was compiled that were in Privacy Tracker Set B. Tracking data
was linked using the same manual approach introduced in methods Section
4.3.1 using the Ghostery web browser plug-in. For our analysis, both Privacy
Tracker Sets A and Privacy Tracker Set B were combined together along with
the misinformation annotations.
Summary of 3rd Party Tracking Linkage In the experiment, 523 unique web
pages were visited by participants, for which tracking data was linked to various
sources. In instances where available, 3rd party tracking data in the WhoTracks.me
Test Set was linked to 29.3% of the web pages. In instances where a link was not
found in the WhoTracks.me Test Set, the 3rd party tracker data in the Offline Nudg-
ing Test Set was used (linked to 31.2% of web pages). For web pages (39.5%) in
which no links could be made to either dataset mentioned, 3rd party tracking data
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was collected after all subjects completed the experiment. In summary, 60.5% of
Web Pages were in Privacy Tracker Set A and 39.5% of Web Pages were in Privacy
Tracker Set B.
6.2.3 Evaluation Metrics
An extensive set of metrics were used in the analyses provided in the results
section for the current. Most of the metrics were already detailed in the general
methods section. Here we highlight which of these metrics are brought into this
study and how they are used in the later analyses. There are some additional metrics
introduced that were not appropriate in the general methods, which are detailed in
sub-sections that follow. One shortcoming of the offline study was the limited focus
on system viability (G-RQ-1 ), which can be given much more scrutiny in the online
study given the richness of data in the Online Nudging Test Set. Therefore, unless
noted otherwise, all metrics are used for better understanding of system viability.
6.2.3.1 Harm Prevention (Search Task Outcome)
Privacy metrics (Absolute Number of Trackers, Mean Number of Trackers and
Normalized Number of Trackers) as a measure of the harm which the strategies aim
to prevent, were used as dependent variables. These metrics cut across high level
research questions (G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ) and study specific hypotheses (H1a
- H2d ) and therefore appear throughout most of the results.
Search outcome metrics specific to the search task decisions (Correct Deci-
sions, Incorrect Decisions and Harmful Decisions) to ensure information encountered
(H1d ) does negatively impact search task decisions.
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6.2.3.2 Compliance to Transparent Strategy
For the transparent nudge strategy, warning lights were assigned to levels of
privacy risk and the colouration was determined by the number of trackers for each
web page (see methodology in Section 4.2.2.2).
Though measures of privacy impacts (Section 6.2.3.1) may not be significantly
reduced for this strategy (e.g. due to the method of linking 3rd party tracking data
to results) it is still possible that some users make attempts to comply with the
transparent strategy which are not apparent in the harm prevention metrics.
As such, we introduce two metrics that allow for analyses from a categorical
perspective of adherence to the strategy and a secondary signal for the harm being
prevented. These metrics are useful for H2a - H2d as well as better understanding
viability and effectiveness (G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ).
Assessments of Clicks by Colour - Defined as the total number of clicks on
each warning light colour
Mean Assessments by Colour - Defined as the total number of clicks on a
specific warning light colour divided by the total number of clicks (e.g. user
A visited 5 web pages, 3 of which were assigned Green lights and 2 assigned
Gray. Thus Green = .60, Gray = .40,Yellow = .00 and Red = .00).
6.2.3.3 Self Report Measures
Privacy Attitudes and Actions We repeat the examination of self-report atti-
tudes and behaviours with respect to privacy. Full details of the surveys used in this
study are as presented in the general methods Section 4.4.4. The metrics (Action
Score (Binary), Action Score (Total), Awareness Score, Enhancing Browser Score
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and Privacy Attitudes (General)) are selected from the full list (Section4.4.4.4) and
used predominantly for G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 and hypotheses (H2a and H2b )
related to the transparent Stoplight nudge strategy.
Some readers will note the metrics used in offline studies related to health atti-
tudes and everyday search engine usage were excluded from the current study. For
the health attitudes, we did not collect user responses for this metric in the current
study (to shorten the post-experiment survey). For questions related search engine
use, as with the previous study, usage of privacy enhancing search engines was so
low (i.e. n = 4 of N = 90 participants reported use of any privacy enhancing search
engine) that analysis was not possible with the participant sample size.
Perceptions Recall the Stoplight strategy in the current study has an element of
uncertainty. To better understand user perceptions around uncertainty (H2d ), we
introduce the following measure.
Perception of Warning Light - Total count of participants for warning light
colourX perceived as "most privacy risk" and "least privacy risk", for example
35 subjects perceive X = Green and 10 perceive X = Gray as "least privacy
risk".
The metric was calculated with responses collected in the post experiment survey.
The participants were asked “Which Stoplight indicates the most amount privacy risk
if you click on the associated link” and “Which Stoplight indicates the least amount
privacy risk if you click on the associated link?”. To limit the burden on participants,
the questions did not attempt to understand the relationship between the Gray light
and Yellow light, but rather to confirm the Gray light was not perceived as least or
most risky.
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Preferences Finally, as with the offline nudge study, we use the Preferred Strat-
egy metric (see Section 4.4.4.2 to understand preferences of the participants.
6.2.3.4 Search System (Search Behaviour)
Unlike the offline nudge study where search behaviour impacts were limited to
time impacts, the current study makes use of the full set of behavioural metrics
introduced in the general methods Section 4.4.3.1 (Assessments, Queries, Queries
w/o SERP clicks, Rank and Time to Completion). We also include in the search be-
haviour group is the self-reported Search Task Confidence metric; though subjective
compared to the other objective measures, this metric is an indicator of perceived
impact to search behaviour. All behavioural metrics are relevant to hypothesis
H1c .
6.2.4 System Evaluation (Adapting IR Metrics)
Motivation for usage of IR system metrics (when appropriate) was provided in the
general methods Sections 4.4.3 and Section 4.4.3.2, as these are seen as useful (and
potentially the most valuable approach) for understanding the viability (G-RQ-1 )
of strategies. Thought introduced in the general methods as part of evaluation (for
which these are most certainly part of), the details of the adapted IR metrics used
in the current study are extensive enough to be given a section upon itself.
For the analyses we employ traditional IR metrics (Mean Reciprocal Rank (MRR)
and Precision) for our analyses. Furthermore, motivated by more recently developed
evaluation approaches which take a probabilistic view of the system, we create a cus-
tom Cumulative Click Probability metric. As IR system evaluations predominantly
consider relevance or graded relevance of information retrieved, it was necessary to
make adaptations. Recall our evaluation test set (Online Nudging Test Set) does
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not use relevance assessments, however it does contain annotations related to mis-
information. It is these annotations ((Correct , Incorrect and Harmful introduced in
the annotation procedures in general methods Section 4.3.2) which are used for the
metrics we introduce below. Therefore the adaptation being these metrics consider
the misinformation aspect of each document retrieved (as opposed to the commonly
used relevance of a document).
It must not be overlooked that MRR is a somewhat controversial metric [73, 193],
but nonetheless is useful [193] and is certainly an appropriate metric for the evalua-
tion test set (Online Nudging Test Set) used in current analyses. The main challenge
to usage of less controversial metrics (e.g. nDCG) being that misinformation anno-
tations were only performed on results visited by participants (we did not annotate
results that users skipped over).
One might ask why metrics such as recall, another traditional IR metric, and
other metrics that take into account false negatives (e.g. correct documents that
a participant skipped over) were not included in our analyses. Again, this has to
do with the live environment used in our study where an unfortunate challenge
prevented annotations on results returned by the commercial API that participants
skipped over. The challenge being that API end user agreements had limitations
on length of time that the results could be held, therefore we could not permit
annotators to review these results that were not visited.
With that said, we now introduce how the three metrics were calculated.
6.2.4.1 Mean reciprocal rank (MRR)
For MRR, the approach suggested by [96] is used as the basis for adaptation in
our analysis.
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MRR usually considers the rank of the first ‘relevant’ document for a set of
given queries [96]. However, for our analysis, we consider the rank of the first correct ,
incorrect and harmful documents across a set of user queries. In this manner, we can
produce MRR metrics for all 3 document types, where higher MRR is desirable for
correct documents and lower MRR is desired for incorrect and harmful documents.
For the current study, MRR is based on the user queries and their clicks. All
queries are treated as unique, that is duplicate queries (the same query submitted
by different users) are treated separately. We also treat the rank of the first click
by each user of a duplicate query as unique.
Considering the first click across all user queries for each search task, the MRR
is calculated for each result type (Correct , Incorrect and Harmful), with the three
following three metrics used in analyses.
MRR Correct - Mean Reciprocal Rank for Correct documents
MRR Incorrect - Mean Reciprocal Rank for Incorrect documents
MRR Harmful - Mean Reciprocal Rank for Harmful documents
Example As an example of how MRR was calculated in our evaluation, consider
user A and user B who both issued the query ‘obesity surgery’ for the same search
task X. User A clicks on a correct document at rank 2 and user B clicks on a correct
document at rank 4. In this toy example, MRR = 1/2 ∗ (1/2 + 1/4) = 3/8. User
B then entered a different query ‘obesity reduction surgery’ for search task X, and
click on the first document at rank 1 which is also a correct document. The final
MRR for correct documents for all 3 queries submitted by users A and B for search
task X becomes MRR = 1/3 ∗ (1/2 + 1/4 + 1) = 7/12. MRR is calculated in the
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same manner for all 10 search tasks and for each document type (correct , incorrect
and harmful).
Our analysis also considers MRR at two different levels with respect to queries
and clicks and make the distinguishment of includes vs. excludes queries with no
clicks. The above example is how MRR will be calculated for test set data excludes
queries with no clicks.
Continuing with the example above, we demonstrate how MRR which includes
queries with no clicks is calculated. Using this example, an additional user (user C)
is included in the analysis. User C submitted ‘surgery helps obesity’ for search task
X, but did not click on any documents. For analysis that considers queries without
clicks, MRR is updated toMRR = 1/4∗ (1/2+1/4+1+0) = 7/16. Analysis in this
manner took into account query abandonments, which is not necessarily bad [96].
6.2.4.2 Precision
Our data collection method allowed us to calculate precision metrics based on the
websites visited by users and the annotations of those websites. Unlike traditional IR
system evaluations where a true positive is defined as a relevant document, analysis
herein defines the true positive as a click on a correct document and also considers
clicks on non-harmful documents, where non-harmful documents are defined as
any document that was not annotated as harmful , translating to the following two
metrics.
Precision Correct - defined as the total number of clicks on a correct web page
divided by (number of correct web page clicks + number of incorrect web page
clicks).
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Precision Not Harmful - defined as the total number of clicks on a correct web
page divided by (number of correct web page clicks + number of harmful web
page clicks).
For both metrics, analyses include calculations at rank K = (1, 2, 10, 20, 50). 50
is chosen as the maximum due to the maximum possible returned by the commercial
search API.
6.2.4.3 Cumulative Click Probability
Motivated by more recently developed metrics which take probability into ac-
count, which unfortunately could not be adapted to our test set based on reasons
stated above.
As such, we introduce a custom metric as a probabilistic signal for the likelihood
of encounters with results containing misinformation (performed at rank k).
To perform such an evaluation, cumulative probability sums were calculated for
each system at each rank for each annotation type (correct , incorrect and harmful).
Calculating cumulative click probabilities - Cumulative probabilities were
calculated in the following manner.
Let K be the max rank of clicks to consider in the analysis and k be any rank
between 1 and K.
Let s be a search system amongst a set of S search systems to evaluate.
Let C be the set of all clicks that occurred in S for k = 1 to K, and cclass be








1. For each k = 1 to K, s in S[control, filtering, re − ranking, stoplight] and
class in classes[correct, incorrect, harmful]
2. Calculate cprobclass@k
3. Calculate cumprobclass@i at i = k
Calculation in practice First, the number of clicks that occurred between k =
1 and k = K, where K = 10 for each interface is determined. Second, for each k, the
probability of a click occurring of each web page classification (Correct , Incorrect
and Harmful) is calculated. Finally, the probabilities from k = 1 to k = K are
accumulated. This process produces a cumulative probability of a click occurring
for a each SERP result classification (Correct , Incorrect and Harmful) by rank k.
This approach results in the following three metrics and is calculated for the 3
nudge based systems and the Control system,s.
Cumulative Click Probability Correct - Cumulative Click Probability of a click
on Correct document at rank k
Cumulative Click Probability Incorrect - Cumulative Click Probability of a
click on Incorrect documents at rank k
Cumulative Click Probability Harmful - Cumulative Click Probability of a
click on Harmful documents at rank k
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6.2.5 Statistical Tests
There are some important statistical approaches to introduce here not already
covered in general methods Section 4.5.
There were multiple instances where test assumptions were not satisfied (e.g.
non-normality of data) with the data collected in the current study and therefore
the Kruskal-Wallace test (a non-parametric test) were used in addition to LMER.
Violation of parametric tests increases the likelihood of a type I error, and non-
parametric tests have an increased likelihood of a type II error and the possibility
for such errors were one justification for including results from both tests. Additional
challenges arise with Kruskal-Wallace due to tests being performed across all exper-
imental variants (i.e. any significant findings provide no further insight as to which
approach was best). This motivates the combination of reporting Kruskal-Wallace
and LMER models. LMER is treated as a type of post-hoc analyses to allow for
cross-comparisons between the experimental strategies and the Control. In sum-
mary, for many of the analyses, Kruskal-Wallace was used to test overall effects and
linear mixed effects models (with LMER in R) were used to test comparisons of
strategies S1 - S3 against the Control.
Using a conservative approach (Bonferroni adjustment), αadjusted = (α = .05)/3 =
.017 was used for these post-hoc analyses to test significance of individual strategies
against the Control system (e.g. Filtering nudge vs. Control system, Stoplight nudge
vs. Control system). This value is based on 3 experimental systems (strategies S1 -
S3 ) being evaluated against a control system.
Other tests were also leveraged in our analyses worth highlighting.
In line with authors who developed and analysed the Waterloo Test Set [179]
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to test impacts on search task medical decisions, we also make use of Generalized
linear mixed (GLM) effects with likelihood ratio tests. GLM is a robust approach
to test for difference with categorical dependent variables (e.g. search tasks being
correct , incorrect or harmful). Though LMER could also have been used, we chose
the other method as it may be useful for future research that compares our findings
with theirs.
Multiple linear regression was used to test for system differences with regards
to the cumulative probability of a click on type of information. Multiple regression
was chosen to test for potential interactions between the rank and the strategy.
Correlation analyses was also performed in some analyses. Spearman rank cor-
relation was used to test for links between the transparent Stoplight strategy and
self-reported metrics related to privacy attitudes and actions. Chi-squared (χ2) was
used to test for difference with count variables (e.g. user perceptions of warning
lights).
6.2.6 Participants
Approximately 84% of the subjects were recruited from the Psychology depart-
ment participant pool. Another 16% were recruited via list servers and department
emails at the University.
For the current study, a participant sample (N = 90) was used. Thirty-six
participants were female, fifty-three were male, and one reported as other. Mean
age (with standard deviations) was 27.8 (8.2). The university (based in an English
speaking country) considers itself to be quite international and the data support that
claim, with 49.4% reporting Caucasian ethnicity and 38.9% reporting English as the
primary language spoken in their home. Of all participants, 4.4% were non-members
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of the university (i.e. not students or staff), 88.9% were students of which n = 44
were undergraduates and n = 36 were post-graduates. A total of 18 participants
were studying Computer Science at the university.
6.3 Results
All N = 90 participants completed the main experiment, that is all tasks were
completed for each participant and no data was missing from the interactive compo-
nent. With the Graeco-Latin balanced design in the study, 9 rotations in total were
completed (10 participants per rotation). Therefore each experimental (and Con-
trol) search systems was visited 180 times in total (with 90 helpful and 90 uhelpful
search tasks associated to each system).
Analyses for all research questions are provided in the sections below. Anno-
tations of web pages visited in the experiment were foundational to many of the
analyses, therefore an analytical overview of the annotations is provided first.
6.3.1 Annotations for Misinformation
A total of 529 web pages were annotated by two annotators using the methods in
Section 4.3.2. Each annotator independently assessed all 529 result search task pairs.
Reliability of the annotations was measured using Cohen’s κ. Across all web pages
and the 4 classifications used, annotator 1 had weak reliability κ = 0.59, (p < .001)
with annotator 2. The annotators then jointly resolved any discrepancies with the
4 classification types (see general methods Section 4.3.2 for additional details of the
annotations). The 4 classifications were then mapped to the categories (Correct ,
Incorrect and Harmful) used in the analyses of research questions. Table 6.1 provides
an overview of the total counts with each categorical mapping. Note also, these
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annotations were analysed at a less granular level (Correct and Incorrect only) in
empirical Chapter 7, with findings that suggest the annotations are of very high
quality.
Annotation Categories for Analysis Total
Correct Correct 286
Incorrect - Page Unavailable Incorrect 16
Incorrect - Not enough information Incorrect 171
Incorrect - Wrong Information Incorrect + Harmful 56
Table 6.1: Break down (Total by Type) of result misinformation assessments for
results in the current study
6.3.2 System Impacts on Privacy and Decisions
Metrics (see 6.2.3.1) used for the analysis of privacy impacts were aggregated by
the search system (Control + 3 Nudge systems) and search task for each user. For
example, the average number of trackers a user encountered is aggregated at the
task level. The same aggregation method was used for analysis of the search task
outcome of the user’s search task medical decision (Correct , Incorrect or Harmful).
The user could only make one decision per task, therefore aggregation had no impact
to this dependent variable.
Results are first provided for the harm (privacy) impacts to being prevented,
followed by overall impacts to search task decisions.
6.3.2.1 Harm Prevention (Privacy)
Both Kruskal-Wallace and LMER were used to test the predictions of user pri-
vacy impacts. Across all privacy metrics considered, significant overall effects were
found due to the SERP when using Kruskal-Wallace. LMER results indicate that
the Stoplight strategy is only marginally effective at reducing privacy impacts across
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the subject pool, however Filtering and Re-ranking appear to be quite robust in re-
ducing impacts to privacy. Results are detailed in Table 6.2, which are used for
discussions with respect to hypotheses H1a and H1b .
Control Filter Rank Stoplight Kruskal-Wallace (df = 3)
DV M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) χ2 p
Trackers [% of Max Possible] 0.32 (0.22) 0.22 (0.14)*** 0.15 (0.08)*** 0.30 (0.21) 100.92 < .0001
Trackers [Average] 6.78 (4.79) 4.61 (3.23)*** 3.19 (1.80)*** 6.08 (4.28)− 92.866 < .0001
Trackers [Total] 18.64 (17.67) 14.29 (14.55)*** 9.79 (8.42)*** 17.15 (15.25) 32.321 < .0001
Table 6.2: Privacy - Included in the table are analyses of privacy metrics introduced
in Section 6.2.3.1. LMER results comparing experimental SERPs to the control SERP
are indicated by − = p < .05, ∗ = p < .05 (with Bonferroni correction), ∗∗ = p < .001,
∗∗∗ = p < .0001. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) are also included.
6.3.2.2 Search Task Outcome (Medical Decision)
Analysis of impacts to user search decisions was performed in the same manner
as Pogacar et al. (see [179]) which allows for a more simplified cross-comparison
with their findings. A GLM (with mixed and fixed effects) was used to test impacts
to the search task medical decision outcomes (each outcome measure was binary) for
the subjects. A likelihood ratio test (with χ2 test) was used for significance testing.
Results of the analysis of impacts to user decisions are provided in Table 6.3,
which include comparisons of the nudge strategy based systems with the Control
system. A summary of means and standard errors of the user decisions are provided
in Table 6.5. The overall model indicates no overall significant impacts to user
decisions, however the model results clearly indicate tendencies for differences with
respect to Harmful decisions.
Results in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 provide evidence related to hypotheses H1c and
H1d .
The differences with respect to harmful decisions was motivation for post-hoc
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IV DV (Decision) Pr(> χ2)
SERP Correct .4566
SERP Harmful .0828
Table 6.3: Decisions - Likelihood Ratio Tests from GLM (mixed effects) on the
impacts of experimental SERPs on user medical decisions. Overall the experimental
SERPs have no significant negative impacts compared to the control.
analyses with findings (Table 6.4) that indicate Harmful decisions are significantly
reduced for the Stoplight strategy ( S3 ) compared to the Control system. There
are similar (though non-significant) tendencies for the other two strategies.
Variable Estimate Std Error Pr(>|z|)
Stoplight (SERP) -.743 .308 .0159*
Filtering (SERP) -.380 .289 .1886
Re-Ranking (SERP) -.576 .298 .0535
Table 6.4: Decisions (Harmful) - Summary of GLM (mixed effects model) of the
fixed effects of each nudge system compared to the Control system. In all cases, the
negative estimates indicate a reduction in harmful decisions compared to the Control,











No SERP (Baseline) 180 67 33 .37 +/- .04 .18 +/- .03
Control 180 94 37 .52 +/- .04 .21 +/- .03
Stoplight 180 103 21 .57 +/- .04 .12 +/- .02
Filter 180 90 28 .50 +/- .04 .16 +/- .03
Rank 180 96 24 .53 +/- .04 .13 +/- .03
Table 6.5: Decisions - In line with previous methods of reporting for task decisions
for the 10 search tasks (see [179]), totals, means and standard errors are provided for
the correct and harmful decisions made by subjects for each SERP. Total counts of
decisions are included (incorrect decisions are excluded as they can be calculated from
values in table).
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6.3.3 Search Behaviour
Prior to performing the analysis to determine potential impacts to search be-
haviour, post-experimental tests for reliability of the two questions to capture post-
task confidence (introduced in general methods Section 4.4.4.3) was performed, for
which Cronbach’s α = .91 was found, demonstrating strong internal consistency.
These questions were used to formulate the Search Task Confidence metric.
For the analyses of user search behaviour, metrics analyzed were aggregated by
the search system and search task for each user. Analyses was then completed with
Kruskal-Wallace and LMER models.
Results of general behavioural (Table 6.6) impacts based upon the six dependent
search behaviour metrics (outlined in Section 6.2.3 are given first. Separate analyses
(Table 6.7) are then provided with respect to the Assessments metric to assess
potential concerns related misinformation exposure. All results provided below are
critical for hypothesis H1c and to some extent H1d .
6.3.3.1 General Impacts
Analysis with Kruskal-Wallace indicates no impacts due to the SERP on user
search behaviour. Linear mixed effects models indicate trends towards increased
total assessments for the Re-ranking strategy S2 compared to the Control system.
Means and standard deviations for each behavioural metric across all search systems
are included in Table 6.6 in addition to statistical findings.
6.3.3.2 Assessments and Misinformation
Analysis with Kruskal-Wallace and LMER models were used to test interactions
with information quality with respect to the three Nudge systems and Control sys-
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Control Filter Rank Stoplight Kruskal-Wallace (df = 3)
DV M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) χ2 p
Assessments [Total] 2.52 (1.98) 2.64 (2.02) 2.80 (1.94)− 2.66 (1.86) 2.9224 .4037
Queries [Total] 1.62 (1.48) 1.49 (0.87) 1.58 (1.04) 1.63 (1.41) 1.3324 .7215
Queries w/o SERP Click 0.09 (0.29) 0.12 (0.32) 0.08 (0.27) 0.09 (0.29) 1.7584 .6240
Rank [Average] 3.57 (3.39) 3.52 (3.23) 3.90 (3.55) 3.92 (3.49) 5.2180 .1565
Time [Seconds] 160 (136) 141 (102) 159 (133) 158 (127) 2.3657 .5001
Search Task Confidence 5.58 (1.26) 5.53 (1.30) 5.66 (1.20) 5.65 (1.19) 0.8210 .8444
Table 6.6: System impacts on measures for search behaviour. MeansM and standard
deviations (SD) are provided for each search system. Linear mixed effects results
comparing experimental SERPs to control SERP are indicated by − = p < .05, ∗ =
p < .05 (with Bonferroni correction), ∗∗ = p < .001, ∗∗∗ = p < .0001.
tem. The dependent variable in this case is the information quality of the result
assessed by the participant (i.e. was the information in the website visited by the
user correct , incorrect or harmful as it relates to the search task).
Results are detailed in Table 6.7. Analysis with Kruskal-Wallace indicates no
significant overall effects. However, when considering results from the LMER mixed
effects models, indications are the Re-ranking and Filtering nudge strategies may in
fact steer users toward documents that are incorrect . On the contrary, the models
provide weak signals that the Stoplight nudge increases exposure to correct results
when compared to the Control system.
Control Filter Rank Stoplight Kruskal-Wallace (df = 3)
DV M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) χ2 p
Assessments [Correct] 1.66 (1.39) 1.59 (1.27) 1.72 (1.38) 1.86 (1.38)− 4.1351 .2472
Assessments [Incorrect] 0.86 (1.27) 1.06 (1.38)− 1.08 (1.36)* 0.80 (1.07) 5.8284 .1203
Assessments [Harmful] 0.16 (0.42) 0.26 (0.70)* 0.18 (0.48) 0.14 (0.43) 2.3428 .5044
Table 6.7: Assessments by information type for each search system. Included in the
table are the mean and standard deviations of user assessments by result type (correct ,
incorrect or harmful). Linear mixed effects results comparing experimental SERPs to
control SERP are indicated by − = p < .10, ∗ = p < .05.
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6.3.4 Search System Evaluation
In the following sub-sections, all search systems the Control search system and
three Nudge based search systems designed for prevention of harm from privacy
impacts are evaluated from the view of the credibility (i.e. quality) of informa-
tion provided to participants during the experiment. Evaluation of the systems are
performed with the IR system evaluation metrics introduced in Section 6.2.4. The
evaluation is performed for the purpose of testing hypothesis H1d and responding
to overall research questions (in particular G-RQ-1 ).
6.3.4.1 Comparisons with MRR
Results of the comparison of systems with MRR are provided in Table 6.8. Means
and standard errors were calculated across the 10 search tasks and search system
pairs, which provides an aggregate summary of quality of information one might
expect with each search system with MRR as the evaluation metric.
Linear mixed effects models (search task being the mixed effect) were created
(with LMER packager in R). Though no significant differences were found, the Re-




SERP Correct Incorrect Harmful
MRR includes queries with no clicks
Control .34 +/- .08 .15 +/- .04 .02 +/- .01
Stoplight .34 +/- .06 .13 +/- .03 .02 +/- .01
Filter .34 +/- .07 .13 +/- .03 .02 +/- .02
Rank .25 +/- .06 .13 +/- .03 .02 +/- .01
MRR excludes queries with no clicks
Control .68 +/- .05 .62 +/- .10 .21 +/- .13
Stoplight .60 +/- .05 .65 +/- .12 .23 +/- .12
Filter .70 +/- .05 .62 +/- .10 .17 +/- .12
Rank .56 +/- .07 .67 +/- .05 .23 +/- .12
Table 6.8: IR Metric (MRR) - Means and standard errors of MRR across all 10
search tasks based upon correct , incorrect and harmful assessments with each system.
Analysis considers two views, inclusion and exclusion of queries with no clicks (i.e.
user abandonments). For correct MRR, higher numbers are better. For incorrect and
harmful MRR, lower numbers are better.
6.3.4.2 Comparisons with Precision
Evaluations were performed across all systems with the precision metrics Pre-
cision Correct and Precision Not Harmful (see Section 6.2.4.2). Results in Table
6.9 for precision (rank@k, k = 50), where k = 50 is chosen due to the maximum
possible results. Similar to the MRR analyses, means and standard errors were based
upon precision metrics across the 10 search tasks for each search system (3 Nudge
systems + Control system). Mixed effects models (with LMER) were also produced
to test for significant differences between the systems. Though no differences were
significant, with respect to both precision metrics in the Control system, the Filter
and Re-ranking (strategies S1 and S2 ) under perform and the Stoplight strategy
S3 slightly over-performs.
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Control 10 .68 +/- .07 .91 +/- .04
Stoplight 10 .71 +/- .05 .93 +/- .03
Filter 10 .62 +/- .06 .87 +/- .06
Re-ranking 10 .62 +/- .05 .90 +/- .03
Table 6.9: Precision of Correct and Not Harmful assessments for each search system.
Similar to MRR, precision was calculated for each task, and then means and standard
errors were calculated. Higher means indicate better system performance.
Table 6.10 includes precision @ rank k (k = 1, 2, 10, 20 and 50), with metrics
aggregated at the global level across all search tasks. Calculating precision in this
manner prevents testing for statistical significance, however it does provide some
signals as to which interventions may be problematic when compared to the Control
system (highlighted further in the discussion).
Finally, the precision metrics allow for calculations of the false discovery rates
(FDR) of incorrect and harmful assessments for each system. To do so, take the
precision values provided in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 and subtract one from the value.
FDR = 1− Precision
186
6.3 Results














Stoplight 128 79 49 7 .62 .92
Control (Bing) 133 81 52 9 .61 .90
Rank 128 61 67 8 .48 .88
Filter 143 91 52 8 .64 .92
2
Stoplight 204 132 72 9 .65 .94
Control (Bing) 215 139 76 12 .65 .92
Rank 214 120 94 14 .56 .90
Filter 224 143 81 14 .64 .91
10
Stoplight 431 299 132 21 .69 .93
Control (Bing) 424 276 148 26 .65 .91
Rank 475 291 184 32 .61 .90
Filter 436 256 180 43 .59 .86
20
Stoplight 468 327 141 24 .70 .93
Control (Bing) 446 293 153 27 .66 .92
Rank 495 304 191 33 .61 .90
Filter 465 278 187 46 .60 .86
50
Stoplight 478 334 144 25 .70 .93
Control (Bing) 454 299 155 28 .66 .91
Rank 504 309 195 33 .61 .90
Filter 476 286 190 47 .60 .86
Table 6.10: Precision @ k of Correct and Not Harmful assessments for each search
system calculated at k = 1, 2, 10, 20 and 50 (K = 50). Calculations are performed
globally across all search tasks (therefore no means and standard errors could be cal-
culated). Total clicks are also included at each level of k.
6.3.4.3 Comparisons with Cumulative Probability
Using the Cumulative Click Probability metric introduced in Section 6.2.4.3 sta-
tistical tests (multiple linear regression including the interactive effects of rank and
the search system) were performed to compare the systems. As 95% of all user clicks
collected in the experiment occurred between k = 1 and k = 10, data became quite
sparse beyond this rank and resulted in violation of statistical tests for k = 20 and
k = 50, therefore k = 10 was used in the analyses. Results in Table 6.11 indicate
significant differences for all information types (Correct , Incorrect and Harmful).
These significant differences motivated post-hoc analyses (with Bonferroni cor-
rection) for each information type for comparison of nudge strategies against the
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Control system. Presented in order by Correct , Incorrect and Harmful information,
results Tables (6.12 - 6.14) are paired with corresponding visualisations (Figures 6.1
- 6.3) of the cumulative probability of click at rank k.




Table 6.11: Click Probabilities: Overall R2 and p values for multiple linear regression
models to test the effects of rank and search system against the dependent variable
(cumulative probability of click on information type).
Results: Cumulative Probability of Click on Correct Information Results
Table 6.12 and Figure 6.1 indicate no significant differences (nor any interactive
effects with rank @ k) between the harm prevention systems and the Control system
with respect to the probability of clicking on correct information. Nonetheless, there
are indications that the quality of correct information in both the Filtering and Re-
ranking strategies becomes less likely compared to the Control as rank becomes
deeper.
Variable Estimate Std Error Pr(>|t|)
Result Rank .044 .005 <.0001***
Stoplight (SERP) .023 .021 .2632
Filtering (SERP) -.032 .021 .1257
Re-Ranking (SERP) -.042 .021 .0479−
Result Rank : Stoplight (SERP) .007 .007 .3081
Result Rank : Filtering (SERP) -.006 .007 .3892
Result Rank : Re-ranking (SERP) .006 .007 .3962
Table 6.12: Model for predicting the cumulative probability of a click on correct
information between ranks k = 1 to k = 10 for each experimental system against the
control SERP. − = p < .05, ∗ = p < .05 (with Bonferroni correction), ∗∗ = p < .001,
∗∗∗ = p < .0001
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Figure 6.1: Comparison of cumulative probability of clicks on correct information
compared to rank k, for k <= 10.
Results: Cumulative Probability of Click on Incorrect Information Re-
sults Table 6.13 and Figure 6.2 indicate the Re-ranking and Filtering strategies a
significant increase in probability of clicking on incorrect information compared to
the Control system. Though above the threshold for significance, the Stoplight ap-
proach reduces the number of clicks on incorrect web pages, suggesting the Stoplight
nudge (strategy S3 ) may be better than the Control with respect to returning re-
sults with higher quality information. No interactive effects were found between the
systems and rank @ k.
Variable Estimate Std Error Pr(>|t|)
Result Rank .025 .003 <.0001***
Stoplight (SERP) -.027 .011 .0204−
Filtering (SERP) .045 .011 .0003***
Re-Ranking (SERP) .032 .011 .0073*
Result Rank : Stoplight (SERP) -.004 .004 .2694
Result Rank : Filtering (SERP) .005 .004 .1830
Result Rank : Re-ranking (SERP) .001 .004 .7126
Table 6.13: Model for predicting the cumulative probability of a click on incorrect
information between ranks k = 1 to k = 10 for each experimental system against the
control SERP. − = p < .05, ∗ = p < .05 (with Bonferroni correction), ∗∗ = p < .001,
∗∗∗ = p < .0001
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of cumulative probability of clicks on incorrect information
compared to rank k, for k <= 10.
Results: Cumulative Probability of Click on Harmful Information Re-
sults Table 6.14 and Figure 6.3 indicate the Stoplight nudge results in a significant
reduction in the probability of clicking on a harmful website, which suggests that
the Stoplight approach is better than any other system (including Control) for in-
formation quality. The Filtering nudge is found to have a significant increase in the
probability of clicking on harmful information compared to the Control. Significant
interactive effects were found between the Filtering system and rank @ k suggesting
the probability of encountering harmful information increases significantly as one
assesses documents deeper in rank.
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Variable Estimate Std Error Pr(>|t|)
Result Rank .005 .001 <.0001***
Stoplight (SERP) -.011 .003 .0002***
Filtering (SERP) .026 .003 <.0001***
Re-Ranking (SERP) .002 .003 0.3938
Result Rank : Stoplight (SERP) -.001 .001 .4054
Result Rank : Filtering (SERP) .004 .001 <.0001***
Result Rank : Re-ranking (SERP) .000 .001 .9176
Table 6.14: Model for predicting the cumulative probability of a click on harmful
information between ranks k = 1 to k = 10 for each experimental system against the
control SERP. − = p < .05, ∗ = p < .05 (with Bonferroni correction), ∗∗ = p < .001,
∗∗∗ = p < .0001
Figure 6.3: Comparison of cumulative probability of clicks on harmful information
compared to rank k, for k <= 10.
6.3.5 Strategy Preference
As with the offline study, data was collected for the participant preferences across
the three strategies. Table 6.15 provides the results of the most and least preferred
strategies, which uses χ2 analysis to test for significant differences and important
for G-RQ-1 .
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Intervention Most Preferred Least Preferred
Filtering SERP 15 54
Ranking SERP 10 22
Stoplight SERP 65 14
Table 6.15: Raw counts of the user preferences (N = 90) are included for the most
and least preferred nudge strategies for harm prevention and χ2 analysis is performed
to test for significant differences resulting in χ2(3, N = 90) = 59.47, p < .0001
6.3.6 Transparent Strategy Specific
The results so far have been related to the hypotheses (H1a - H1d ) aimed at
comparisons of all 3 nudge strategies. We now turn to the final set of results which
are related to hypotheses (H2a - H2d ) and mainly specific to the transparent
Stoplight strategy S3 .
Results for hypotheses H2a and H2b are covered last, and begin with results
related to the behavioural interactions related to the Stoplight colours (H2c ).
6.3.6.1 Compliance with Stoplights
The Stoplight search system mad visible a warning about privacy risks. However,
regardless of the search system (nudge strategy or Control), a hidden html tag for
the light colouration was assigned to each result and recorded whenever a user visited
the web page. This allowed for cross-comparisons of behaviour of the transparent
Stoplight strategy with the Control as well as comparisons for the Re-ranking and
Filtering strategies with the Control.
As stated in H2c , one should expect users to visit results with Green lights sig-
nificantly more so than the Control system. Furthermore, behaviour should indicate
a significant reduction in visits to results with Red, Yellow and Gray lights compared
192
6.3 Results
to the Control as these were expected to be perceived as more risky (see analyses
on perceptions in Section 6.3.6.2. Given the design of the two other nudge systems
(see general methods Section 4.2.2), the same behaviour should also be expected for
the Green light (related to H1a ).
Using LMER and Kruskal-Wallace to test for differences, results included in
Table 6.16 indicate that the Stoplight strategy significantly increases encounters with
results tied to Green lights when compared to the Control, the same holds true for
the Re-ranking nudge, with strong tendencies for the Filtering nudge. Analyses also
indicate the Stoplight nudge significantly reduces encounters with Gray lights (those
with privacy risks that are unknown). With respect to Re-ranking, the findings are
significant across all colours, suggesting it outperforms the Control system at all
times with respect to colouration. Interestingly, the Filtering approach significantly
increases exposure to results with the html tag for Gray lights (Filtering removed
any result above median number of 3rd party trackers and therefore filtering results
tagged with Red and Yellow).
Control Filter Rank Stoplight Kruskal-Wallace (df = 3)
DV M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) χ2 p
Assessments [Green Light] 1.11 (1.30) 1.39 (1.23)− 2.56 (1.74)*** 1.51 (1.40)*** 96.069 < .0001
Assessments [Gray Light] 0.74 (1.02) 1.16 (1.35)*** 0.17 (0.57)*** 0.50 (0.97)* 105.74 < .0001
Assessments [Yellow Light] 0.32 (0.56) - 0.06 (0.23)*** 0.34 (0.58) 55.264 < .0001
Assessments [Red Light] 0.36 (0.66) - 0.01 (0.11)*** 0.30 (0.55) 104.38 < .0001
Table 6.16: Stoplights - Included in the table are M = mean number of clicks
and standard deviations (SD) for each SERP. Significant Linear mixed effects (with
LMER) results comparing nudge systems to the Control are indicated by − = p < .05,
∗ = p < .05 (with Bonferroni correction), ∗∗ = p < .001, ∗∗∗ = p < .0001.
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6.3.6.2 Perceptions of Uncertainty
A prediction of the experiment (H2d ) was that users would perceive the Gray
lights as more risky than the Green light and less risky than the Red light due to
the underlying uncertainty with respect to privacy risk. During the experiment, a
tooltip (Figure 4.2) informed users of the level of risk associated and that the Gray
light (defined as an ‘unknown’ risk level).
To test the hypothesis (H2d ), a contingency table (Table 6.17) including all four
light values (Green, Yellow, Red and Gray) and the two aforementioned questions
was built (see Section 6.2.3.3). Values were aggregated on the number of subjects
selecting the colour response for each question (N.B. 1 participant did not provide
a response). With this table, χ2 analysis was performed across all light colours and
the two risk factors. Results strongly indicate that users perceive the Red light as
most risky and the Green light as least risky.
Green Yellow Red Gray
Most Risk 4 1 81 3
Least Risk 78 2 3 6
Table 6.17: A contingency table containing the number of user responses for each
risk level and the perception of the light colour. χ2 analysis was performed to test for
differences. χ2(3, n = 89) = 140.54, p < .0001 n = 89, noting that one participant did
not respond to the perception questions.
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6.3.6.3 Privacy Attitudes, Awareness and Actions
A comparison of the metrics for privacy attitudes, actions and awareness was
made against user interactive privacy metrics to test hypotheses H2a and H2b .
The expectation was individuals reporting strong attitudes about privacy protection,
taking strong actions to protect privacy and / or having strong awareness of privacy
protection methods would utilize the warning light approach more strongly than
individuals reporting weaker attitudes, actions and awareness. Self-report measures,
as outlined in Sections 4.4.4.4 and 6.2.3.3, were used as independent variables in
linear models to predict privacy measures (i.e. Absolute Number of Trackers, Mean
Number of Trackers and Normalized Number of Trackers). In all cases, no significant
links were found between the self-report measures and dependent privacy variables,
therefore no results table is provided.
However, unlike the offline study, as an additional indicator of compliance (in-
troduced in Section 4.4.2) with the transparent strategy, we performed additional
analyses related to the behavioural interactions with the Stoplights. Analysis with
Spearman rank correlation (Table 6.18) was used to test for differences related to
compliance of the strategy based upon Stoplight colouration.
For the analyses, we aggregated the total number of clicks (denoted as Sum in
Table 6.18) on results with Green lights in the Stoplight system for each participant
in the experiment. Recall each SERP had two tasks assigned to it (Graeco-Latin
Square design), which allowed us to calculate the average number of clicks on Green
lights (Avg in Table 6.18). The analysis indicates that users taking actions to
protect privacy in their daily lives tend to make use of the Stoplights (specifically
visiting more web pages with Green lights) significantly more so than other users.
There are also signals the same is true for users reporting stronger attitudes towards
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privacy and more frequent usage of privacy protective browsers. Similar analyses
were performed for the other colours, but no significant differences were found.
Variable Sum (cor) Sum (p) Avg (cor) Avg (p)
Action Score (Binary Sum) .23 .0266* .21 .0454*
Action Score (Total) .26 .0137* .25 .0166*
Awareness Score .12 .2495 .02 .8253
Enhancing Browser Score .23 .0272* .08 .4619
Privacy Attitudes (General) .23 .0282* .17 .1162
Table 6.18: Correlation (Spearman) analyses comparing user clicks on Green lights
(sums[Sum] and averages[Avg]) in the Stoplight system with self reported metrics for
actions, awareness and attitudes related to privacy. Correlation values (cor) and p-




The online study had the overall aim of demonstrating robustness of the three
harm prevention strategies ( S1 - S3 ) in a Web search environment that was more
naturalistic than the earlier offline study (Chapter 5). Given the experimental en-
vironment was fully interactive (e.g. users could submit queries to a live index), a
much broader and more in depth analysis compared to the offline study was com-
pleted, and additional hypotheses were tested (8 in total). Additionally, a higher
level attention was placed on the transparent Stoplight nudge in the current study
to better understand what scenarios such an approach might work or fail. The main
findings of the study are presented below as they relate to the research questions
(G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ) and hypotheses.
6.4.1 Findings Related to Study Specific Hypotheses
A total of eight hypotheses were investigated the in current study, the first four
(H1b - H1d ) cut across all 3 nudge strategies and are given attention first. The
remaining four hypotheses (H2a - H2d ) specific to the transparent Stoplight
strategy are then given focus.
6.4.1.1 Across Strategies
Though significant findings were found across all nudge strategies with respect to
the harm being prevented (due to loss of privacy) for the sample (N = 90), post-hoc
analyses indicate the Stoplight approach provides only weak signals of reduction in
privacy impacts compared to the other two nudge strategies. Based on this finding,
both H1a and H1b are confirmed. However, given the weak findings, caution
must be used with the Stoplight strategy if one wishes to strongly reduce privacy
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impacts.
The same hypotheses were relevant to the analyses related to the compliance
with Stoplight colour compared to the Control (see Section 6.3.6.1 where it is clear
that all three strategies steer users to results identified as less risk with respect to
privacy. However in this case, only H1a was confirmed. There is no evidence
supporting H1b in this case as the transparent Stoplight strategy performs on par
with the Filter strategy. This finding provides evidence that the Stoplight strategy
is only weak with respect to the overall privacy measure, but not what it is trying
to achieve (steering users towards less risky results i.e. those with Green lights).
Turning to H1c and H1d , a very in depth analysis was performed, first with
respect to impacts to search behaviour (Section 6.3.3), followed by evaluations of
the search systems (Section 6.3.4).
Most indications (results Table 6.6) for the general measures for impacts to search
behaviour indicate that H1c is confirmed, that is all strategies perform on par with
the Control. However, there are tendencies for the Re-ranking strategy to increase
assessments of results, which is an indication that in general users are having more
difficulty finding the information necessary to complete the search task. Though
non-significant, the finding is an important consideration related to the viability
G-RQ-1 of the Re-ranking strategy.
The remaining analyses for H1c or H1d leveraged the annotations of results
visited by the participants.
Analyses for the total assessments specific to each information type (Correct ,
Incorrect and Harmful) as a more detailed measure for impacts to search behaviour
does not provide support for H1c or H1d . Though assessments of results with
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correct information performs on par (or better for the Stoplight nudge), strategy
S2 (Re-ranking) significantly increases assessments of incorrect information and
strategy S1 (Filtering) significantly increases exposure to Harmful information.
Additional analyses were performed with system based IR metrics (MRR, Pre-
cision, Cumulative Probability) in Section 6.3.4 to provide a different lens on the
proposed strategies. There results are partially mixed, but in general we find indi-
cations that the Stoplight strategy ( S3 ) performs better than the Control system
and the Re-ranking and Filtering approaches perform worse than the Control. These
findings are surprising and certainly do not provide support for H1d .
The findings with respect to H1c or H1d highlight the matter that trade-
offs are a potential cost of some interventions, most notably the Filtering and Re-
ranking strategies. That is, they are highly effective at preventing the harm for
which they were designed, but potentially non-viable due to factors such as increased
exposure of low-quality and potentially dangerous information related to the search
task. This matter of non-viability and information quality is most-notable with
the Filtering approach as this approach significantly increases exposure to Harmful
and potentially dangerous information. Nonetheless, in our sample, there are no
indications that these negative impacts with respect to misinformation resulted in
negative impacts to the medical decision, thus positive search outcomes were still
found with respect to harms due to loss of privacy and medical decision making.
6.4.1.2 Transparent Stoplight Strategy
As results indicate, the transparent Stoplight nudge was most preferred by a
large majority of participants. Furthermore, this approach is transparent in it’s
goal (privacy protection) and therefore more ethically sound than the other two
interventions. These points taken together make this approach a highly desirable
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nudging strategy for harm prevention. As such, one would expect the bulk of the
users to take advantage of this strategy when compared to the Control, given the
importance placed on personal privacy (e.g. responses to survey questions), however
findings for the Stoplight nudge were not so cut and dry when compared to other
findings.
Restating the previous findings, overall privacy impacts using the measures re-
lated to 3rd party trackers demonstrates this approach is only marginally effective in
the entire sample. However, as was performed with the offline studies, one must con-
sider the possibility that certain individuals with greater concerns (and those taking
actions) with respect to privacy on the Web and their uptake of privacy protections
provided by the Stoplight strategy. From a reproducibility standpoint of testing the
hypotheses (H1a and H1b ) used in both the offline studies and current study, it
is clear these measures do not support these hypotheses in the current study. Nev-
ertheless, additional analysis were performed in the current study (Table 6.18) that
does provide significant evidence supporting the hypotheses (in particular H2b ).
These findings indicate that overall our sample is potentially too small to detect the
reduction in privacy impacts (using the chosen measures) for individuals that have
a bona fide belief in privacy protection (as measured through their attitudes and in
particular their actions in daily life).
However, additional analysis shows that users genuinely taking action in their
daily lives to protect privacy (and to some extent having stronger attitudes towards
privacy) are more compliant with the goal of the strategy. That is there is a tendency
for them to visit results deemed least risky (Green lights in the Stoplight nudge are




Transitioning the focus to H2c and H2d ), inspection shows the transparent
Stoplight nudge does significantly impact behaviour compared to the Control with
respect to the colouration of lights (supporting H2c ) and that users perceptions
of the Gray light are seen as more risky than the Gray light and less risky than
the Red light (confirming H2d ). The significance of these findings being that it
appears to cause a positive side effect (quite unexpected) that users are also pushed
information that is higher quality with respect to the search task.
In summary, it is an interesting juxtaposition the Stoplight nudge is effective in
pushing users towards less risky results, but does not significantly reduce privacy
impacts related to 3rd party trackers . There are multiple factors to consider that may
explain these findings. First, there are many users that care about privacy and some
that don’t, therefore one would expect to see significant differences with 3rd party
tracking impacts using a larger sample of participants, and therefore our sample is
likely too small. Second, the other two interventions were much more drastic, and
required users to take extra effort to be less privacy protective (e.g. they could have
turned off the privacy settings, as introduced in Section 4.2.2), however no users
turned off the settings.). Finally, there is the important factor of the actual number
of 3rd party trackers tied to each result, for which the Stoplight may not provide
enough granularity. Recalling the Green light was linked to the lower median of 3rd
party trackers, the lower median still covers a broad range of values (approximately
between 0 - 8 dependent on the search task and query results), values for which
were not visible to the participants. Contrast this with the Re-ranking system in
which the first result was always linked to the lowest number of 3rd party trackers .
Using this comparison, one can understand how the number of 3rd party trackers
would be less for Re-ranking, while the Stoplights do not produce such an effect.
Taken together, this suggests that the Stoplight is not enough, and inclusion of the
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absolute number of 3rd party trackers be visually displayed as possible direction for
future studies.
6.4.2 Findings in the Context of Research Questions
It is important to consider the findings in the context of the broader research
questions (G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ). Table 6.19 summarises the key findings from
the current online study. Given the overall aim of these strategies was privacy
prevention, it is clear that all 3 strategies are effective at reducing impacts from
3rd party trackers . However, as highlighted in the findings, the Stoplight strategy
is only partially effective and therefore the least effective. Related to G-RQ-2 ,
this suggests that all 3 strategies are effective, just that strategies S1 and S2
are more so. However, there are very mixed findings with respect to the viability
of strategies S1 and S2 (especially S1 ) which puts their viability into question.




Evaluation Filtering S1 Ranking S2 Stoplight S3
Harm Privacy Reduced*** Reduced*** Reduced-
Task Decision On Par On Par Improved*
Behaviour General Impacts On Par Worse- On Par
Information Quality Worse* Worse* Improved-
IR System MRR Mixed Mixed On Par
Precision Worse Worse Better
Probabilistic Worse*** Worse* Improved***
Preferences Strategy Least*** Between Most***
Stoplights Compliance n/a n/a Yes***
Perceptions n/a n/a Colour Risks***
Privacy Actions/Attitudes n/a n/a Yes*
Table 6.19: A summary of key findings useful for evaluating the effectiveness and
viability ( G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ) of each strategy. − = p < .05, ∗ = p < .05 (with
Bonferroni correction), ∗∗ = p < .001, ∗∗∗ = p < .0001 indicate the strongest findings
within each factor.
6.4.2.1 Effectiveness of Strategies G-RQ-2
From the position of proponents of Nudging , the strategies were all designed suc-
cessfully. Re-ranking and Filtering were most effective at reducing privacy impacts,
and the ‘Educational’ Stoplight nudge also provides some significant findings sug-
gesting it will be effective at least for a part of the population. Furthermore, these
systems were all true nudges in the sense the default was set to privacy protection
and provided a low cost opt-out mechanism (the privacy settings switch introduced
in Section 4.2.2). Proponents of nudging suggest that the opt-out mechanism will
only be used by someone with a rational case for doing so and therefore should rarely
ever be used [220].
There is little more to say on the topic of effectiveness of the nudge strategies,
they certainly work, and in the case of nudge S1 and S2 . Nonetheless, it does
not address the problems surrounding the ethics of the approach, which is perhaps
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hinted at through user responses on the preferred option (strategy S3 ) which is
certainly the most ethical of the 3 approaches.
6.4.2.2 Viability of Strategies G-RQ-1
User preferences aside, which clearly demonstrate the Stoplight approach is most
viable, the findings for H1c or H1d (summarised by the Behaviour [Information
Quality] and IR System groups in Table 6.19) greatly put into question the viability
of the Re-ranking and Filtering nudge strategies. Most notably this problem appears
with the Filtering approach. However, the Stoplight approach appears to improve
exposure to high quality information. It is worth considering plausible explanations
for these findings and ultimately why we think the Filtering approach should not be
used for harm prevention related to 3rd party trackers .
The Filtering approach steers users towards results with unknown privacy risk
(see Table 6.16), which is potentially a result of the data used for privacy linking.
Recalling the WhoTracks.me Test Set contains the most popular 10,000 domains
and was used for many of the results, and suggests that more popular websites have
higher quality information. However, the same analysis (see Table 6.16) demon-
strates the Re-ranking approach steers users towards results with a known (and
lowest) privacy impact and away from results with both known and unknown pri-
vacy risks. Additionally, one can see that the Stoplight nudge also steers users
towards results with a known and lowest privacy impact. Put together with the
methods to rank results before being displayed to the user (see Section 4.2.2, sug-
gests the highest quality information are the results in the first 10 results of the
original ranking (from the commercial API) in combination with results where pri-
vacy risks are already known (often the most popular websites). Given that 90 - 95%
of all clicks (dependent on the search system) occurred within the first 10 results, it
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is therefore not unreasonable that the Stoplight strategy (which keeps the original
query ranking) steers users toward results with higher quality information.
Based upon these findings, we conclude that the Filtering strategy is a non-viable
approach for harm prevention related to privacy, that caution must be used with
the Re-ranking strategy, and that the Stoplight approach is definitely viable.
6.5 Summary
An online study was completed to compare three systems implementing nudge
strategies ( S1 - S3 ). This study is an in depth extension of the earlier offline study
(Chapter 5) and provides a much richer picture of the overall viability (G-RQ-1 )
and effectiveness (G-RQ-2 ) of these approaches to simultaneously reduce privacy
impacts during Web search and have limited or no negative impacts to other aspects
of Web search. In the online study, a live (real-time) search API was used. Con-
necting to the API provided a more naturalistic setting and richer experience with
respect to choices of results. There was a trade-off of some ontrol for the current
study compared to the previous offline study, the methods used allowed for analysis
that previous studies could not perform. The following key points were discovered
through testing of hypotheses with the methods in an online environment.
• The Filtering strategy S1 is highly effective with respect to privacy protection
compared to a Control system. Furthermore, this approach is least preferred
(strongly so) by the participant sample when compared to the other two ap-
proaches. These findings allow us to conclude that this approach is non-viable
as it too greatly increases exposure to misinformation and is not a desirable
choice for most.
• The Re-ranking nudge based system (strategy S2 ) is similarly highly effec-
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tive with respect to reductions in privacy impacts compared to the Control.
Like the Filtering strategy, there are also some negative impacts with respect
to system performance as it relates to quality of information in the results
visited by users. However, these negative impacts are much less noticeable
compared to the Filtering result. Furthermore, the Re-ranking strategy does
not negatively impact search outcome. We conclude this strategy is effective
viable, but is also a strategy that should be used with caution due to our
concerns raised around quality of information.
• Strategy S3 is a transparent nudge that employs warning lights linked to the
privacy harm the system aims to prevent. There is much weaker evidence to
support the effectiveness of this strategy compared to the other two strategies.
On the contrary, this system by far is the most viable, as it performs on par
with (and in some cases even better than) the Control system with respect to
important factors such as information quality of results assessed. It is also an
approach that is more ethical than the other two strategies. In conclusion, we
assess this approach as weakly effective and highly viable, and suggest that
caution should be used if the aim is to nudge an entire population towards
reduced privacy impacts.
With respect to the framework, several novel approaches were used in the eval-
uation ( FC-Evaluation ). For instance, in our study, we adapted precision @ k, a
commonly used IR evaluation metric to assess systems based on relevance of doc-
uments, for evaluation based on annotations indicative of misinformation. We also
demonstrated how one can still evaluate ‘educative’ strategies when the search out-
come harm metrics (in this case privacy), where in this study flags hidden in the
html of all systems (linked to Stoplight colour) allowed for comparison of interactive
behaviour indicative of adherence across all strategies. These evaluation methods
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and metrics will hopefully be a basis for development of new methods and metrics
to evaluate Web search systems designed to reduce harm.
These findings conclude our analyses and discussion specific to the three nudge
strategies ( S1 - S3 ) introduced in the general methods. The remainder of this
thesis shifts focus towards the fourth strategy (strategy S4 tests boosting), which
is based upon an entirely different philosophy to promote harm prevention and risk
reduction. Whereas nudging promotes harm prevention through often times non-
transparent methods (e.g. Filtering and Re-ranking) or ‘Educational’ transparent
methods (e.g. Stoplights), boosting is designed to be entirely transparent and ed-
ucational approaches. The removal of the quotes around educational boosts (vs.
‘Educational’ nudges) is not by accident, as boosts are designed to teach people a
skill to reduce harm, whereas ‘Educational’ nudges do not teach a skill (putting into
question their educational value).
In the context of Web search, and search systems, the current real challenge
is identifying what skills might be taught as a means to reduce harms such as
privacy. This provides the motivation for the empirical Chapter that follows and
the subsequent Chapters aimed to compare nudging and boosting (G-RQ-3 ).
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Chapter 7
Useful Cues for Harm Prevention
7.1 Overview
The four other empirical studies in this thesis give focus on the development of
search systems ( FC-System ) that incorporate cognitive harm strategies ( FC-Cognitive )
and further introduce evaluation methods ( FC-Evaluation ) to assess impacts and
quality of the Web search system. However, this study focuses on the methodology
and development of informational cues, introduced in 3.2.3.1 if FC-System , with
the aim to use them in new system and cognitive based harm interventions. Specific
to this thesis, identification of informational cues that have the potential for use
across nudging and boosting , is an additional aim as it would permit a quantitative
analysis related to high level research question (G-RQ-3 ).
Recall that boosting strategies are designed to empower individuals with skills
necessary to reduce risk to themselves. Furthermore the skills should be applicable
to an existing environment and therefore the environment should not need to be
changed. That is, the individual learns a skill to better cope with risks in an existing
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environment and ultimately prevent and reduce harm. Boosting is therefore a stark
contrast to nudging , which manipulates the environment to produce the desired
outcome.
Returning to the research question aiming to compare these approaches (G-RQ-3 )
there are two key challenges open related to answering this question in the domain
of Web search. The first challenge is to identify factors in the existing environment
that can be translated to a skill that can be provided to individuals. The other chal-
lenge being the development of a boost that effectively (G-RQ-2 ) communicates
the skill in a viable manner (G-RQ-1 ).
The current Chapter presents the study that addresses the first challenge. The
findings from this study lay the foundation to address the second challenge (ad-
dressed in Chapter 8), which identifies the most effective and viable boosting strat-
egy. With both challenges addressed, the research question (G-RQ-3 ) can then
be addressed.
For consistency across all studies, this study also looks at harms related to privacy
and misinformation. Additionally, the SERP and search system is in the spotlight,
as the environment may enable users with a competency to protect privacy and / or
reduce encounters with information. As such, the primary goal of the current study
is determining what (if any) environmental cues within a SERP might be useful in
helping users to reduce privacy impacts and / or exposure to misinformation.
In the sections that follow we provide background of the SERP and search en-
vironment, motivation for the informational cues considered and the formulation of
hypotheses to be tested. After which methods are introduced, along with results of
the experiments, and a subsequent discussion on the findings.
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7.2 Background, Motivation and Hypotheses
It is a desirable goal to identify features that are ‘easy-to-use’ for the user as
these are expected to be the most useful for comparison of nudging and boosting
strategies (important for G-RQ-2 ). For the purposes of the current study, ‘easy-
to-use’ features are defined as items that already exist in popular search engine
environments (e.g. Google) and have the potential to be evaluated quickly by a
user.
7.2.1 Motivation and Choice of Features
Learning-to-rank algorithms make use of web page surface features, which pro-
vide some insight for ‘easy-to-use’ features. Referring to learning-to-rank features
provided by Liu in [139], the main feature families are based upon the web page
URL, title, body, document as a whole and anchor text. These families are then
represented in different manners such as language models and term counts. These
feature families provide useful guidance for identification of ‘easy-to-use’ features.
Within modern SERPs (see examples in Figure 7.1), the main families are search
result URL, title, snippet and rank. Referring to Figure 7.1, the top result (Arduino
- HelloWorld) is at rank 1 and the title is coloured blue, URL is green and snippet
text is black. Examples of ‘easy-to-use’ a user could evaluate with minimal effort
include:
Readability of the URL URLs may contain unusual words auto-generated by
spam websites.
Language of the title Does the title match the language of the query?
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(a) Bing
(b) Qwant
Figure 7.1: Top results for the query "Hello World" in two commercial search en-
gines (queries were sent from a computer in Germany in September 2019). These
examples demonstrate how current SERPs assist users to identify websites that use
https protocol (useful for data and privacy protection). Bing displays "https" in the
address, unless encryption is not available in which case "http" is hidden. Qwant
displays "www." for non-https websites. URL, title, and snippets are available for
both examples, and both contain a ranked set of search results. The readability of the
snippet for the Bing result at rank 2 is questionable.
Readability of the snippet Lower readability of a search result as an indication
that the web page contains incorrect information.
Depth (rank) of result Encouraging users to consider a broader rank of results
(e.g not just results at rank 1 and 2) may expose them to more correct information.
Some evidence shows that user interventions for a deeper rank are a helpful method
to expose users to more correct (higher quality) information [164]
While rank would be ‘easy-to-use’, encouraging users towards a deeper rank
won’t necessarily prove fruitful in ensuring privacy protection nor correct informa-
tion as the economic costs in search [12, 15], such as time, will prevent many users
from going beyond the first few results. Another, and quite problematic reason, is
that ranking of results are in constant flux due to the automated nature of ranking
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algorithms, e.g. [139], thus it would be risky (and perhaps dangerous) to suggest to
users to make use of such a feature. Thus, we do not consider ranking in our current
study.
Due to the subjective nature of evaluating the language of the search result
snippets and titles, these 2 families of features are likely to be less ‘easy-to-use’ and
therefore not considered in the current study.
Thus, the focus of the research is with features in the URL family. However,
users are not guaranteed to have a full URL visible for each result as many search
engines truncate the visible URL in the search result. Unless the user were to spend
extra time mousing over the hyperlink for each result, the user cannot fully assess
the URL (e.g. total number of slashes, length of URL, readability of URL). Given
time is an economic cost of the search process [12, 15, 177], it is unlikely users
would mouse over the hyperlink. Nonetheless, there are three potentially ‘easy-to-
use’ features common to modern SERPs in the displayed URL: a cue for HTTPS
(see Figure 7.1), the top level domain (TLD) of the website and the website domain.
Referring back to the first result in Figure 7.1, the result is an HTTPS web page,
the TLD is ‘.cc’ and the website domain is ‘arduino.cc’.
Website domain The website domain may be an important cue for correctness of
information (and potentially for privacy too), however there are millions of domains,
making it difficult to find a useful rule of thumb (for this reason web domains are
not tested in our research). The ever-growing number of online locations available
in a user’s quest for information is one motivation for web domain bias [101] (i.e.
sticking with websites the user knows).
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Cue for HTTPS While it is known HTTPS websites are more secure than sites
with HTTP due to encryption capabilities1, very little research exists for other uses
of this feature. While "HTTPS" presence in the URL is a useful predictor of phishing
scams (e.g. [7]), to our knowledge this is a yet to be investigated with respect to
other privacy impacts or misinformation. HTTP alone should not be ruled out, as
websites using HTTP may contain web pages not requiring individuals to login, with
content that is correct and relevant to the search task.
Top level domain (TLD) Using TLD for correctness of information arguably
makes sense when considering some of the associations for websites in medical search.
The Mayo Clinic, Wikipedia and Cochrane Review websites are all ‘.org’. The
National Institute of Health (NIH) and Centers for Disease Control are both ‘.gov’,
where many high quality research findings are published. However, while it may
seem obvious, no analysis has taken place to confirm that ‘.org’ and ‘.gov’ might be
used as a simple heuristic for finding correct information.
TLDs are also potentially useful as an indicator for privacy impacts such as 3rd
party tracking. As demonstrating example, consider the search results returned
when running the query "cinnamon helps blood sugar" in Google coupled with
data from a 3rd party tracking tool to determine the number of trackers2. In this
example, compare the first 2 commercial medical websites webmd.com (rank 1 with
19 trackers) and medicalnewstoday.com (rank 2 with 21 trackers) with the first 2 non-
profit medical websites mayoclinic.org (rank 4 with 2 trackers) and ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
(rank 7 with 2 trackers).
Little literature exists investigating the seemingly simple TLD feature for pos-
1For instance, individuals should not login to a website with HTTP only as their data is susceptible
to interception by an external party due to lack of encryption.
2The Ghostery browser plug-in was used for this example.
214
7.2 Background, Motivation and Hypotheses
sible links to privacy impacts and correctness of information. One study included
analysis of TLD links to privacy statements [87], finding that many ‘.org’ and ‘.com’
websites do not contain privacy statements. Another study considered TLD in mod-
els to predict web page spam [217], a study in the space of web page misinformation
classification, for which TLD was a useful baseline feature. A third, and perhaps
most relevant study, looked at binary occurrence of web page elements (such as
javascript) frequently placed by 3rd parties [134], finding that ‘.com’ websites have
the highest Boolean occurrence of such components. Combined together these stud-
ies are the most notable investigations into TLDs for privacy protection and reduced
exposure to misinformation. To our knowledge, no one has considered TLD within
the SERP itself as a possible means for better privacy protection and finding correct
information.
7.2.2 Research Question and Hypotheses
Referring back to the examples in Figure 7.1, the TLD is available in both
examples, as well as Google. HTTPS is a visible feature in Bing and Google, which
are by far the most popular global search engines outside of China. Thus, the
primary research question for this study is as follows.
• FEATURE-RQ “For search tasks, are HTTPS and TLD surface features
indicative of A) personal privacy impacts B) quality of information and C) a
predictor for both A and B?” .
FEATURE-RQ is used to formulate four hypotheses (H1 - H4 ).
Typically .com websites are linked to commercial organizations and .org and .gov
websites are linked to non-commercial organizations [212]3. The .net TLD is often
3The .org TLD was originally intended for non-profits only, however this is no longer a requirement.
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used and frequently associated with commercial companies as well [95]. 3rd party
trackers are used for targeted advertising (a source of revenue) [149, 257], and many
commercial websites (e.g. Google) have a strong profit motive to collect a searcher’s
personal data [267]. Based upon this:
H1 Websites of commercial organizations (those with .com and .net) are more
likely than the websites of non-commercial organizations (.org and .gov) to
make use of 3rd party tracking, given the potential for increased revenue
source.
As it is known that HTTPS is more secure than HTTP:
H2 Greater privacy impacts (as measured by existence of 3rd party tracking) will
be found for HTTP than HTTPS.
Previous research indicates high quality scientific articles are more strongly as-
sociated with correct information [164]. Additionally, anecdotal observations of an-
notations on the test sets used in our previous studies (Waterloo Test Set, Offline
Nudging Test Set and Online Nudging Test Set) for the medical search tasks suggest
that many scientific articles are associated with .org and .gov TLDs.
H3 Thus, .org and .gov TLDs will be the TLDs most strongly associated with
correct information for a given search task.
Given that .org and .gov TLDs are likely non-commercial TLDs:
H4 This feature is a predictor of both privacy and correctness of information
simultaneously.




To test our hypotheses, we analyse web pages visited during interactions in a
SERP for a set of search tasks as well as a broader set of websites popular across
the Internet. We considered usage of a synthetic set of queries and results for our
analysis, however we opted for analysing web pages visited during interactions in the
earlier online study (Chapter 6) as the data was in our view was more naturalistic.
7.3.1 Evaluation Test Sets
The evaluation test sets used for the current study are the Online Nudging
Test Set and WhoTracks.me Test Set, which are datasets output from the online lab
based study (see Chapter 6 and general methods Section 4.3.4). The misinformation
annotations for the current study are at a less granular level than those outlined in
the general methods (Section 4.3.2). In the current study, annotations were for only
two types of information Correct or Incorrect , as related to the search task for the
given web page.
The definition of Correct maps directly to the definition in Section 4.3.2, where
the definition of Incorrect is any of the other 3 possible annotation classifications in
Section 4.3.2. This two class approach of annotations was used to be in line with
annotations in Waterloo Test Set and allowed for a more straightforward analysis
with respect to the quality of the annotations. The annotators classified each web
page / search task pair (3 of the 523 unique web pages were linked to multiple tasks,
for a total of 526 web page / search task pairs). In line with the general annotation
methods, each annotator independently assessed all 526 pairs, then both annotators
discussed any disagreements to converge on a final annotation of the web page /
search task pair.
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7.3.2 Evaluation Metrics
Four measures were used as dependent variables (DV). One metric is used to rep-
resent correctness of the search result (and associated web page), and three metrics
are used for privacy.
7.3.2.1 Web Page Misinformation
Search Results - Correct is defined as the total number of correct search results.
A search result was correct if it contained information that agreed with the correct
answer for the search task. A search result was marked incorrect if it had information
that was conflicting or wrong. As our experiment was an online study with access
to the live web, all websites were annotated after the experiment (see Section ?? for
annotation methodology).
7.3.2.2 Website Privacy
To be in alignment with privacy measures from the previous studies, the number
of 3rd party trackers linked to search results are used as an indicator for privacy risk.
Additionally, two categorical variables are derived based upon the quartile values
of 3rd party privacy trackers in results visited by users, providing a total of three
privacy measures used in the analysis.
Number of Trackers The total number of trackers associated with a search result.
Highest privacy Based on the number of privacy trackers for all websites visited
in the experiment. We define websites with the Highest privacy as those with the




Good privacy Calculated in a similar manner as Highest privacy, search results
with Good privacy are defined as those with the number of 3rd party trackers in the
lower median of trackers. This classification is applied to the same dataset used for
the Highest privacy category as well, thus a website in the lowest quartile can be
classified as Highest privacy and Good privacy, however a website with number of
trackers between the median and lowest quartile would only be classified as Good
privacy.
7.3.3 Statistical Tests
The independent variables (IV) in Table 7.1 were used for all analyses. Indepen-
dent t-tests were used to test the effects of IVs on the number of 3rd party trackers,
with Cohen’s d used as a measure of effect size. Logistic regression was used to test
the effects of IVs as a predictor of categorical dependent variables (DV) outlined in
Table 7.2.
SERP Surface Feature (IV) Definition
Non-Profit TLD is .org or .gov
Commercial TLD is .com or .net
Other All other TLDs (e.g. .uk, .de)
HTTPS HTTPS in Web page URL
Table 7.1: Independent Variables (IV) - We test four different input variables, three
based on the Top Level Domain (TLD) of the website domain and one on the avail-
ability of HTTPS encryption. We make the assumption that all .org and .gov websites
are linked to not-for-profit organizations and that all .com and .net websites are linked
to organizations having profit motives. Any remaining TLDs are placed in a catch-all
Other category. For a full breakdown of websites and domains encountered for the
TLDs, see Table 7.3.
.
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User Search Goal (DV) Definition
Highest Privacy # of 3rd Party Trackers in
Lowest Quartile
Good Privacy # of 3rd Party Trackers in
Lower Median
Correct Information Web page Information Cor-
rect for Search Task
Correct and Highest Privacy Web page Correct and
Trackers in Lowest Quartile
Correct and Good Privacy Web page Correct and
Trackers in Lower Median
Table 7.2: Dependent Variables (DV) which are categorical in nature and are assumed
to be desirable user goals in a search task. That is, for some (if not all) users, it is
desirable to maintain the highest privacy possible and / or find correct information
when performing a search task online. These variables are used in the analysis covered
in Section 7.4.3.
7.4 Results
We performed analyses to determine the effects of the surface features (Table
7.1) on the total number of 3rd party trackers, and the effects on the categorical
dependent variables in Table 7.2. Section 7.4.2 provides results relevant to hypothe-
ses H1 and H2 , Section 7.4.3 provides results relevant to all hypotheses H1 -
H4 . As some of the analysis is underpinned by annotations of the web pages, we
begin with an evaluation of the annotations produced for correctness of information
within the web pages.
7.4.1 Web Page Annotations
Of the entire annotation set of 526 web page / search task pairs, 46 annotations
overlapped with previously annotations in the Waterloo Test Set and the Offline
Nudging Test Set (introduced in general methods Section 4.3). Cohen’s κ is used
220
7.4 Results
as a reliability measures of annotations along with the interpretations provided by
[151]. Annotator 1 had moderate reliability of κ = 0.78, (p < .001), with previous
annotations in the Waterloo Test Set and the Offline Nudging Test Set. Anno-
tator 2 had moderate reliability of κ = 0.67, (p < .001) , with the same previous
annotations. Annotator 1 had weak reliability of κ = 0.50, (p < .001) with annotator
2. After discussing disagreements and producing final consensus, both annotators
had perfect reliability of κ = 1.00, (p < .001) with the 46 annotations in the Wa-
terloo Test Set and the Offline Nudging Test Set, demonstrating the effectiveness
of our annotation approach.
Of the 483 remaining annotations (web page / search task pairs) not included in
theWaterloo Test Set and the Offline Nudging Test Set, annotator 1 had moderate
reliability of κ = 0.67, (p < .001) with annotator 2; for which both annotators jointly
resolved any conflicts after completing their independent assessments. In total, 526
web page / search task pairs were annotated4.
7.4.2 Effects on Number of Trackers
Welch’s two-sided independent t-test was used to determine the effects on the
total number of 3rd party trackers encountered for each surface feature (H1 and
H2 ). We also calculate Cohen’s d as a measure of effect size. For the sake of
comparison, analysis at the domain level of web pages visited was also performed
(523 distinct web pages were visited in the experiment, of which there were 265
distinct web domains). Also included in the analyses are t-tests for the 10,000 most
popular web sites provided by WhoTracks.me (used to create the WhoTracks.me
Test Set).
4Annotations are available via links provided in https://www.hrbdt.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/README.pdf.
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7.4.2.1 Non-Profit TLDs
Non-profit TLDs (i.e. web pages and domains ending in .org or .gov) are found
to be a very strong predictor of the number of 3rd party trackers encountered com-
pared with remaining TLDs. This finding is true for the web pages collected in our
experiment as well as domain level and 10,000 domains WhoTracks.me Test Set.
For the web pages visited in our experiment, we find the total number of 3rd party
trackers linked to web pages with Non-profit TLDs (n = 146,M = 3.09, SD = 2.68)
are significantly different compared to web pages without Non-profit TLDs (n =
377,M = 7.16, SD = 5.21), with a large positive effect t(481.68) = −11.68, p =<
.0001, d = 0.98. Using only the web domains for the web pages visited in our
experiment, domains with Non-profit TLDs (n = 49,M = 4.49, SD = 3.28) are also
linked to a lower number of 3rd party trackers compared to domains without Non-
profit TLDs (n = 216,M = 6.63, SD = 5.13), and again find significant differences
with a positive effect t(108.36) = −3.67, p = .0004, d = 0.5. Similarly, the analysis
of the 10,000 WhoTracks.me Test Set domains with Non-profit TLDs (n = 409,M =
5.43, SD = 4.47) compared to domains without Non-profit TLDs (n = 9591,M =
8.73, SD = 5.68); a significant positive effect is found t(466.02) = −14.43, p <
.0001, d = 0.64.
7.4.2.2 Commercial TLDs
Commercial TLDs, those ending with .com or .net, are also found to be predictive
indicators of privacy impacts. Contrary to Non-profit TLDs, Commercial TLDs
produce a negative effect on privacy. That is, visiting a website ending in .com or
.net results in a higher number of 3rd party trackers being encountered over visits
to TLDs not defined as Commercial.
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For web pages visited during the experiment, web pages with TLDs that are
Commercial TLDs (n = 255,M = 7.72, SD = 5.18) contain significantly more
trackers compared to remaining web page TLDs (n = 268,M = 4.40, SD = 4.21);
with a negative effect t(489.54) = 8.01, p < .0001, d = −0.70. Domains with Com-
mercial TLDs (n = 149,M = 4.49, SD = 3.28) also have more trackers compared
to domains without Commercial TLDs (n = 116,M = 5.37, SD = 4.54), and found
to have a significant negative effect t(258.05) = 2.59, p = .0102, d = −0.32. The
top 10,000 domains provided in the WhoTracks.me Test Set have a small nega-
tive effect for number of trackers connected to domains with Commercial TLDs
(n = 5299,M = 8.92, SD = 5.90) versus domains that are not Commercial TLDs
(n = 4701,M = 8.22, SD = 5.37) with t(9992.01) = 6.21, p < .0001, d = −0.12.
7.4.2.3 Other TLDs
Analysis using Other TLDs (see definition in Table 7.1) was performed in the
same manner as Non-Profit and Commercial TLDs. Of web pages visited in the
experiment, 122 of 523 were classed as Other and for the domains in the experiment,
67 of 265 were of this class as well (see full breakdown of all TLDs in Table 7.3) .
For the WhoTracks.me Test Set domains, 4,292 of the 10,000 were defined as Other ;
with over 200 additional unique TLDs in the WhoTracks.me Test Set it was not
possible to include these in Table 7.3. In all cases, no significant differences were
found.
7.4.2.4 HTTPS
Analysis of the HTTPS surface feature indicates web pages with HTTPS have a
significantly higher number of trackers (n = 493,M = 6.15, SD = 5.00) compared to
web pages without HTTPS (n = 30,M = 3.83, SD = 4.36), with a negative effect
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TLD Type TLD Web Pages Domains
Non-Profit gov 68 11org 78 38










Table 7.3: Breakdown (by TLD Type and TLD) of total unique web pages (523)
and total unique domains (265) visited by participants in our experiment. There is
a particularly high number of .uk TLDs, likely due to localization in the Bing API
settings.
t(33.8) = 2.8, p = .0083, d = −0.49. Similar findings occur at the domain level,
for domains with HTTPS (n = 238,M = 6.55, SD = 4.92) compared to domains
without HTTPS (n = 27,M = 3.48, SD = 3.91) resulting in a significant negative
effect t(36.05) = 3.76, p = .0006, d = −0.69. Finally, analysis of HTTPS presence
with the 10,000 websites in the WhoTracks.me Test Set could not be performed as
the information was not available. It is notable the number of web pages with and
without HTTPS is highly imbalanced, due to the low numbers of websites that still
use HTTP only and the manner in which HTTP and HTTPS are handled in the
SERP (see Figure 7.1).
7.4.3 Effects on User Search Goals
Logistic regression was used for the analyses of the five categorical user search
goals (H1 - H4 ) outlined in Table 7.2, with full details included in Table 7.4.




Feature) DV (Search Goal) Coef. S.E. Wald (Z) PR (> |Z|) OR
Non-Profit Highest Privacy 2.2328 0.2254 9.90 < .0001 +9.33
Commercial Highest Privacy −1.3982 0.2226 −6.28 < .0001 −0.25
Other Highest Privacy −0.9971 0.2828 −3.53 .0004 −0.37
Non-Profit Good Privacy 1.9144 0.2351 8.14 < .0001 +6.78
Commercial Good Privacy −1.6917 0.1903 −8.89 < .0001 −0.18
Other Good Privacy 0.3192 0.2068 1.54 .1227 1.38
Non-Profit Correct Information 0.7195 0.2029 3.55 .0004 +2.05
Commercial Correct Information 0.0256 0.1751 0.15 .8838 1.03
Other Correct Information −0.8216 0.2104 −3.91 < .0001 −0.44
Non-Profit Correct and Highest Privacy 2.0935 0.2808 7.45 < .0001 +8.11
Commercial Correct and Highest Privacy −1.5228 0.3127 −4.87 < .0001 −0.22
Other Correct and Highest Privacy −0.9913 0.3904 −2.54 .0111 −0.37
Non-Profit Correct and Good Privacy 1.6617 0.2146 7.74 < .0001 +5.27
Commercial Correct and Good Privacy −1.2374 0.2160 −5.73 < .0001 −0.29
Other Correct and Good Privacy −0.4001 0.2468 −1.62 .1050 0.67
HTTPS Highest Privacy −1.1122 0.3798 −2.93 .0034 −0.33
HTTPS Good Privacy −1.4472 0.4652 −3.11 .0019 −0.24
HTTPS Correct Information 0.757 0.3895 1.94 .0519 +2.13
HTTPS Correct and Highest Privacy 0.3576 0.6224 0.57 .5656 1.43
HTTPS Correct and Good Privacy −0.3420 0.4005 −0.85 .3932 0.71
Table 7.4: Logistic Regression - TLD Type (IV) on User Search Goal (DV). We
consider the three TLD types (Commercial, Non-Profit and Other) and HTTPS as
defined in Table 7.1 as input variables. Five user search goals (outlined in Table 7.2)
act as the dependent variable for each model. Odds ratios are provided as a signal for
effects of the IV on the DV. A significantly positive odds ratio (OR) is indicated by +,
where as − indicates a significantly negative odds ratio to achieve the desired goal. As
an example to interpret the results, consider the Highest Privacy goal, where the odds
ratio is found to be significantly positive for Non-Profit TLDs and significantly negative
for both Commercial and Other TLDs; therefore, if Highest Privacy is the goal in your
search task, you should visit Non-Profit websites and should avoid Commercial and
Other websites.
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IV (Surface
Feature) DV (Search Goal) IV(+) DV(+) IV(+) DV(−) IV(−) DV(+) IV(−) DV(−) Total
Non-Profit Highest Privacy 86 60 51 326 523
Commercial Highest Privacy 34 221 103 165 523
Other Highest Privacy 17 105 120 281 523
Non-Profit Good Privacy 118 28 145 232 523
Commercial Good Privacy 76 179 187 81 523
Other Good Privacy 69 53 194 207 523
Non-Profit Correct Information 98 49 187 192 526
Commercial Correct Information 139 116 146 125 526
Other Correct Information 48 76 237 165 526
Non-Profit Correct and Highest Privacy 49 98 22 357 526
Commercial Correct and Highest Privacy 14 241 57 214 526
Other Correct and Highest Privacy 8 116 63 339 526
Non-Profit Correct and Good Privacy 76 71 64 315 526
Commercial Correct and Good Privacy 38 217 102 169 526
Other Correct and Good Privacy 26 98 114 288 526
HTTPS Highest Privacy 122 371 15 15 523
HTTPS Good Privacy 239 254 24 6 523
HTTPS Correct Information 274 222 11 19 526
HTTPS Correct and Highest Privacy 68 428 3 27 526
HTTPS Correct and Good Privacy 130 366 10 20 526
Table 7.5: Contingency Tables - Values here provide a breakdown of each IV and
DV. The total number of web pages is 523 for the first 2 search goals (highest and
good privacy). Due to 3 web pages being associated with multiple search tasks, 526
total web pages are associated with the 3 remaining search goals (Correct Information,
Correct and Highest Privacy & Correct and Good Privacy). The (+) is used to indicate
true and the (−) is used to indicate false. For example, for 86 of 523 web pages, it is
true that the IV is Non-Profit and DV is Highest Privacy.
226
7.4 Results
For all five user search goals, it is found that Non-Profit TLDs are the most likely
search results to provide highest privacy and correct information. Thus, for users
with the goal of maintaining Highest Privacy, Good Privacy and / or the goal of
finding correct information, results suggest they should always stick with Non-Profit
websites.
We find no statistical evidence suggesting the information associated with Com-
mercial TLDs is more or less correct than information with non Commercial TLDs.
Therefore we cannot conclude a user is worse off visiting .com and .net websites
versus other websites. However, the results strongly indicate Commercial websites
should be avoided by users concerned about privacy during their search tasks.
Search results linked to Other TLDs visited by users in our study are significantly
more likely to contain incorrect information compared to TLDs not defined as Other,
suggesting users (with the goal of finding correct information) should stick to search
results with Non-Profit and Commercial TLDs. The same findings are also true
for users with the goal of maintaining Highest Privacy in their search task; with
non-significant findings for Good Privacy.
Also included in Table 7.4 is the analysis for websites using HTTPS. Although
encryption of websites with HTTPS is more secure than HTTP, counter-intuitively
search results with HTTP visited by users are more likely to offer privacy protection
(based on privacy definitions in Section 7.3.2.2 and Table 7.2). We also perform
exploratory analysis on links to correctness of information. Interestingly, though
significance is not found with α = .05, results suggest that correct information is
more strongly associated with HTTPS than HTTP websites. Also noted is the
skewed sample of search results visited with HTTP (n = 30), compared to those
with HTTPS (n = 493). Regardless of the findings around the HTTP feature, we
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suggest that search results with HTTP (especially those requiring login credentials)
should be avoided, as they come with privacy risks due to their lack of encryption.
7.5 Discussion
The findings from the experiments demonstrate how two ‘easy-to-use’ elements
common in search environments are useful in differentiating information that is high
quality (correct) from low quality (incorrect) as well as information that is more or
less impactful to one’s privacy.
While seemingly obvious that TLDs, such as .org and .gov, are indicative of
search results with higher quality information and / or web pages which are more
or less privacy impactful, to our knowledge, no one has performed analysis of this
type. Our empirical evidence provided in Section 7.4 is therefore a benchmark for
future research.
Additionally, TLDs treated as Non-Profit TLDs are found to be a very promising
feature (as indicated by the results in Section 7.4) to assist users in finding infor-
mation that is more likely to be correct and furthermore likely to protect personal
privacy. Findings for TLDs treated as Commercial are congruent with our hypothe-
ses about privacy impacts, that is for users visiting search results with these TLDs,
their privacy is more likely to be reduced. It is a promising finding with respect to
information quality for Commercial TLDs, that visiting search results from com-
mercial websites with these TLDs does not significantly increase your likelihood of
encountering incorrect information.
The analyses, in particular those considering the categorical measures of websites
offering best odds of highest privacy and correct information suggest a possible link
between third party tracking data and the quality of information on the website.
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That is, the number of third party trackers is inversely linked to the correctness
of information. A plausible explanation of such a link being the TLDs used in our
analyses (.org and .gov) are associated with organisations that are both focused on
publishing information with the least harmful outcomes (e.g. government funded
health campaigns) and simultaneously not driven by profit of users of their website
(e.g. 3rd party trackers are used for display advertising5).
In summary, our findings strongly suggest that users should stick to search results
with .org and .gov in the URL, for search tasks in the area of medical search (as that
was the focus of our study). We suggest that TLD is an ‘easy-to-use’ feature that is
not only simple to evaluate, but also can be evaluated quickly, two important factors
when taking into consideration the economic factors of search [12, 15], and thus are
a pathway for future work. For instance, user studies that consider approaches such
as Nudging or Boosting (as outlined in Section 7.1) might consider TLD as a useful
feature to compare both approaches. In the case of Nudging, the search system
might be altered in a manner that increases the likelihood of encountering Non-
profit TLDs. In the case of Boosting , a search system could highlight and explain
to a user how they can alter their search behaviour (based on TLDs) to increase
the likelihood of finding correct information, ultimately teaching the user how to
better navigate search environments. The findings may also be useful as additional
features for algorithms, such as learning-to-rank and those used for recommender
systems.
7.5.1 Limitations
Our experimental findings demonstrate a pathway for increased likelihood of
finding correct information but are not a guarantee, as demonstrated in recent find-
5For example compare the trackers and advertising on mayoclinic.org vs. healthline.com
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ings regarding user trust of website TLDs [35]. Furthermore, the results are only
for 10 search tasks within the search domain of medicine. There are many other
search domains beyond medicine (e.g. search for financial advice) with potential for
very harmful search outcomes that should be investigated. We also only consider
search tasks that are fact-based in nature, and have a clear answer. There are many
different search tasks, task types and user search intents that come into play in the
online environment. Search tasks such as those published by Wildemuth et al. [248]
provide a set of other tasks to consider in future work.
We have made the assumption that 3rd party trackers are a good proxy for
privacy impacts for websites visited by users during the search process. There are
other potentially nefarious privacy impacts not considered in the experiment (e.g.
1st party cookies, web beacons, browser finger printing, location data), for which
3rd party tracking is assumed to be strongly linked, however no analysis has been
performed to confirm this. However, the process to test such a link may prove
difficult, as it is not yet established what elements of a website are more or less
impactful to one’s own privacy. For future work, using a privacy statement corpus
(e.g. [250]) is a suggested starting point to confirm or reject such a link.
With respect to the tools used for 3rd party trackers in our experiment, we
utilized WhoTracks.me [117] 3rd party data for our analysis. This choice was made
due to the willingness of the authors to provide data to academic researchers. We
recognize that there are other tools for 3rd party tracking, such as Privacy Badger,
that might also be used. Analysis comparing the two might be one future area for
exploration.
We also assume that 3rd party trackers for each search result and web page
are independent of one another, which is not always the case as demonstrated by
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[117, 257]. There are multiple organizations (e.g. Google and Facebook) which have
cross-platform trackers that are far-reaching, and thus not necessarily independent.
A future study might consider these links, and we note that WhoTracks.me also
provides the tracking company (e.g. Google Analytics) information which could be
leveraged for users wanting to prevent companies from tracking their search behavior
across platforms.
The analysis utilized the Online Nudging Test Set, therefore our experimental
setup did not consider search results not visited by users. A future study might
annotate all of the search results not visited by users in the experiment.
Finally, we did not consider further breakdowns of the TLDs in Table ??. For
instance, the ’.uk’ TLD could be broken down further into sub-domains and linked
to equivalent definitions in Table 7.1, as websites hosted in the United Kingdom
sometimes end in ’.co.uk’ or ’org.uk’ which are analogous to ’.com’ and ’.org’, re-
spectively.
7.5.2 Conclusions
We expose ourselves to risks that we may not be aware of throughout the online
search process. Ranking algorithms and personal experience may reduce these risks,
however many risks still exist due to the current landscape of the search environment.
Searching for information is perhaps analogous to the process of searching for food.
Unlike spoiled food, search results and websites presently do not give off smells,
or turn brown, when they contain wrong information or take personal (potentially
private) information.
Our findings on the analysis of 523 unique web pages visited in a user study
indicate that sticking with .gov and .org TLDs is the best option when users care
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about privacy and correct information. Commercial websites with .com and .net
TLDs are important indicators when a user is concerned about correct information,
but not their privacy. We suggest that our findings regarding the TLD features
as predictors of correct and more privacy protective search results, are not only a
benchmark for future researchers but more importantly will be useful in assisting
individuals interested in strategies that help them find correct information more
efficiently while simultaneously maintaining their privacy. These features might
also be leveraged by designers of IR systems.
7.6 Summary
The overall goal of the study completed was to answer FEATURE-RQ and
ultimately identify features promising for the research question related to the com-
parison of boosting and nudging (G-RQ-3 ).
Assuming our findings around the simple features are consistent predictors of
reduced privacy impacts and higher quality information, we believe the TLD pre-
dictors coupled with appropriate methods, will foster opportunities for individuals
to better navigate a somewhat risky and uncertain IR environment. The findings
related to these features tie in directly to the behavioural and cognitive methods
proposed in FC-Cognitive , along with system design considerations ( FC-System )
which include the potential for improvements to learning-to-rank algorithms.
The methods introduced here demonstrate how one might identify new informa-
tional cues based on log and metadata, which is yet another aspect of the system
component ( FC-System ) of the framework. Based on the methods used and find-
ings in the previous sections, we are confident that TLD is a quite promising feature
to use for both harm prevention in the space of both privacy and misinformation.
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The current findings provide direction in the next chapter and empirical study,
which aims to identify the most effective and viable approach to present a boost
strategy.
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The following sections outline the methods used and findings from a pilot study
to evaluate ( FC-Evaluation ) different variants of a harm prevention strategy known
as boosting , an intervention from the cognitive sciences (within FC-Cognitive ) de-
signed to empower individuals with skills for improved decision-making. In the
current study several variants of a fact box boost (strategy S4 ) are designed and
evaluated for learning a competency for reduced privacy impacts during Web search.
The target competency, if adhered to, should reduce data sharing with 3rd party
companies during the process of Web search.
The primary aim of this study is the identification of effective and viable boosting
approaches (G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ) for use in the subsequent empirical study (see
Chapter 9) which compares boosting and nudging (G-RQ-3 ). In this study, an
abstract simulation of a search system ( FC-System ) is used as part of the evaluation
to determine which strategies are most likely to perform best in an interactive search
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environment.
8.2 Motivation and Hypotheses
Both boosting and nudging interventions target the decision-making process with
the goal of reduced risk and harm. Nonetheless, it is worth a recap of some of the key
differences between a boost and a nudge, because they are quite different. We assume
(based on the introduction to behavioural and cognitive interventions in Chapter 2)
the distinction between boosts and ‘classic’ nudges is quite clear, therefore we focus
on the transparent ‘educational’ nudge for this recap, as this flavour of intervention
may cause confusion as it sometimes look similar to a boost on the surface.
Recall that ‘educational’ nudges (e.g. Stoplight strategy in earlier studies) are
suggested as an alternative that offers transparency (and thus more ethically sound)
over non-transparent ‘classic’ nudges (e.g. Filtering and Re-ranking systems in
earlier studies). Additionally, though an ‘educational’ nudge may produce less risky
decision making, it is not designed to enable users with a competency for better
decision making, and therefore an ‘educative’ nudge (like a ‘classic’ nudge) is unlikely
to be effective once the removed. This second point is referred to as ‘reversibility’.
A boost , on the other hand, is designed to empower users with a competency
to evaluate an environment for risks and / or uncertainty and therefore make more
informed decisions after the boost is removed (decision making is not reversed).
Furthermore, a boost is always transparent, whereas aside from the ‘educational’
variety, nudge interventions are predominantly non-transparent about their goal.
However, the cost of a boost is that it requires effort on the individual, which
often requires some motivation, a trait which applies to ‘educative’ nudges as well.
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Example comparing ‘educational’ nudges Consider two variants of an ‘ed-
ucational’ nudge for harm prevention in Web search: one variant is the Stoplight
nudge (see Figure 4.2) evaluated in our earlier studies and the other variant is in-
formation nutrition label (see Figure 8.1) as proposed by Fuhr et al. [74]. Both
provide informational cues to assist a searcher with in evaluating potential risk with
respect to the information they encounter. However, both do not provide any fur-
ther information, they suggest danger but they do not indicate what outcomes are
possible based on the actions the searcher can take (e.g. visit result 1 or result 3).
While it is possible that an individual with time may learn what types of informa-
tion to avoid with these interventions, learning would be purely a side effect of their
design (as opposed to a boost where for decision making is a primary goal). Also,
neither approach gives any indication of what to do when using a system where such
interventions are unavailable (a potential ethical concern).
Figure 8.1: Proposed Information Nutrition Label by Fuhr et al. [74] -
The label includes different dimensions (e.g. opinion) to make the searcher aware of
the potential risks associated with too much consumption of information high in these
dimensions.
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This recap and examples were used to highlight shortcomings of nudging in-
troduced in background Section 2.6 and provide further motivation to investigate
boosting as an alternative cognitive strategy.
8.2.1 Motivation for Fact Boxes
The case has been made for the evaluation of boosting as an alternative inter-
vention to nudging , but there remains an open question of what type of boost to
use.
Based upon existing theoretical and empirical research, boosting is made up of an
extensive set of interventions that can broadly be classed into three types (risk lit-
eracy, uncertainty management and motivational) [93] (see examples at Boosting1).
Risk literacy is the area we focus upon, as risk literacy is best used for problems
where risk is already known (as established in the previous study in Chapter 7).
There are a few features seen as necessary for a boost intervention in a Web
search environment.
• They should be easy to understand (to account for all aptitudes)
• They should be understood quickly (because people don’t have much time)
• Displayed in a concise graphical manner (so that they can be embedded in
browsers with limited impacts on the overall user experience)
Within the boosting literature, there are two approaches which stand out fitting
these criteria. Fast and Frugal Trees (FFTs) [82], which are simple decision trees
modelled on data linked to outcomes (e.g. heart attack) and independent variables
1Boosting at https://scienceofboosting.org/ (LA: 2020-10-01)
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Figure 8.2: Two Fact Boxes designed by the Harding Center for Risk Literacy. which
communicate the same risks graphically but in a different manner. The risk being
communicated are those related to screening for Prostate Cancer and the message is
the same in both Fact Boxes (outcomes are worse for those screened).
tied to those outcomes (e.g. blood pressure), are one approach. The other approach
being Fact Boxes [150], which are graphical mechanisms )used to understand risks
and possible benefits and harms of different choices (see examples in Figure 8.2).
We rule out FFTs for our studies for two reasons. First, as indicated (see Boost-
ing), FFTs are more appropriate for environments where uncertainty is a larger
concern (not the case in our studies as they are controlled lab settings). Second,
comparing the two approaches, it is our view they are less intuitive for someone un-
familiar with decision trees (and therefore less easy to understand and likely require
more effort and time).
8.2.2 Hypotheses
Based on the method of fact boxes as the boost approach chosen for the current
study, and the multiple nuances one might consider (e.g. how to best present a fact
box in a search environment), the initial aim is to identify the approach(es) which
produce the best learning effect. Learning, and related matters such as memory,
is an entire area of research much too large to investigate here. However, it must
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not be overlooked that cognitive effort is required by the individual for a boost
to be effective [93], and therefore one can conclude that more exposure permits
opportunity for cognitive effort.
Combined together, we formulate the following three hypotheses:
H1 Learning of risks communicated in the fact box will be significantly better for
individuals treated with fact boxes compared to those who are not.
H2 Learning of risks communicated in the fact box will be closer to truth for
individuals treated with more exposure than individuals with less exposure.
H3 Using time as a measure of cognitive effort, it is expected that more time spent
with the fact boxes will translate to better learning.
8.3 Method
Methods used to evaluate these hypotheses and results of the evaluation are
presented below.
8.3.1 Procedure
The main procedures to novel to this study are the various designs of the fact
box and overall study design used for evaluation.
8.3.1.1 Fact Box Design
Combining findings from the results in Chapter 7 and fact box methods to boost
individuals with skills for harm reduction [150], we developed two fact boxes (Figures
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8.3 and 8.4) designed to enable users with a skill to reduce the amount of data they
share with 3rd party companies.
Returning to the Harm Prevention Features Test Set developed in the previous
study (Chapter 7), the web pages were grouped by quartiles of the number associated
3rd party trackers . For instance, in Table 7.2 web pages with ‘Highest Privacy’ are
those falling in the lowest quartile of 3rd party trackers (less than or equal to 2
trackers). Though not included in Table 7.2, the upper quartile of web pages is
defined as those having 8 or more 3rd party trackers . In the fact boxes designed for
the current pilot study (Figures 8.3 and 8.4), the lowest quartile of trackers were
mapped to benefits and the upper quartile mapped to harms.
To ensure consistent dimensions for the user, the findings from the previous study
were normalized to be out of 100 websites. For example, for .org / .gov TLDs in
Table 7.3 a total of 86 .org / .gov websites contained 2 or fewer 3rd party trackers




, we solve for x and
round it to the nearest whole number and set this value to equal the number of .org
/ .gov websites out of 100 websites that share data (i.e. 59
100
of 100 websites). This
same process is repeated for the 3 remaining fact box cells.
The larger fact box (Figure 8.3) is closely aligned with the recommended ap-
proaches (see [150]), including a definition of the potential harms (as motivation to
learn the skill) and citations to the data used for the fact box (for credibility). The
larger fact box was the starting point to design the smaller fact box (Figure 8.4).
The large fact box was included in our study, as it is in line with fact box design
that is shown to be effective (again see [150]). We recognize that such a fact box
is unlikely to fit within an operational search engine, which therefore motivated the
design of a smaller fact box (see Figure 8.4) that hypothetically can be included in
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Figure 8.3: Large fact box to boost individuals with a skill to reduce privacy
impacts. - A large fact box allowing users to compare the benefits and harms of
different TLDs. Much more detail is provided in the large fact box compared to the
small fact box (Fig. 8.4).
Figure 8.4: Small fact box to boost individuals with a skill to reduce privacy





We conclude this introduction to the fact box designs for the curren study with a
prototype demonstrating how this might look when implemented in a search engine
(see Figure 8.5).
Figure 8.5: Prototype SERP to boost users with knowledge and skills to
protect personal privacy during Web search. - The small fact box (Figure 8.4)
is placed in the right hand rail of the results.
8.3.1.2 Study Design
Figure 8.6 provides an overview of the study design for the four experimental
groups (including a control group). All groups completed the same questions and
tasks. As a means to provide a baseline comparison against the boost interven-
tions under evaluation, the control group was not provided a fact box. The inline
only group was given the small fact box (Figure 8.4) during task 1 only. The
two remaining groups, large before and small before respectively had the large
fact box (Figure 8.3) and small fact box (Figure 8.4) presented during the pre-task
instructions. These two groups also had the small fact box available during task 1.
Simulated search tasks (Cochrane Medical Task 2 & 4 from Table 4.1) were used
in our pilot study to test the fact boxes. They are simulated because users had no
search results available, and only a small selection of URLs to choose from.
For Task 1, the instructions and questions provided in Table 8.1. Aside from
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Figure 8.6: Overview of the study design for piloting a fact box for boosting
skills for better privacy. - All groups completed 2 mock search tasks. The control
group had no fact box during the experiment. The inline group had the small fact box
(Fig. 8.4) visible during task 1, as did the remaining two groups. The small and large
fact box groups were each introduced to the small fact box 8.4 and large fact box 8.3
respectively in the pre-task instructions. In the second task, no fact box was available
across all groups. Post task questions asked participants to estimate the number of
websites that shared information with 3rd party companies.
the participants in the control group, the small fact box was visible for all other
participants during this task. Participants were given 5 web page URLs to choose
from for each question, they were only allowed to choose one URL, and only one
URL was the correct answer (e.g. a single web page ending in .org or .gov would be
the least likely to share information). The questions and answers were randomized.
Provided below are the instructions and questions in full for Task 1.
Task 2, which is provided in Table 8.2, asked the same questions (i.e. least
likely and most likely to share information), but used a different medical task
(Do benzodiazepines help alcohol withdrawal?) and therefore had different
URLs provided in as options to choose from. As a reminder, for Task 2, no fact
box was available for any of the participants, which was an important element for
evaluating the learning effects (H1 - H3 ).
After completing Task 2, participants were then asked to estimate values (see
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task in Table 8.3) corresponding to each cell in the fact box. For the estimation task,
no fact box was available for any of the participants (again an important mechanism
for evaluating the learning effect). Provided below are the four questions which map
the four cells in the fact box. The questions were randomized. Participants could
only give answers between 0 and 100.
The entire study was hosted on the Qualtrics online survey platform and ques-
tions associated with Task 1, Task 2 and the estimation task, were presented in a
randomized ordered.
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Instructions
Please read the text below carefully and imagine that the situation described is real.
You use your favourite search engine (e.g. Google) to find websites to help you answer:
Do benzodiazepines help alcohol withdrawal?
The following questions include website URLs from the results provided by the search engine you have used.
Please answer each question:












Table 8.1: Task 1: The first task and multiple choice questions asked to test knowl-
edge learned about TLDs and privacy. The fact box was visible for all participants
(except Control group) during this question. Correct answers are highlighted .




Please read the text below carefully and imagine that the situation described is real.
You use your favourite search engine (e.g. Google) to find websites to help you answer:
Do probiotics help treat eczema?
The following questions include website URLs from the results provided by the search engine you have used.
Please answer each question:












Table 8.2: Task 2: The second task and multiple choice questions asked to test
knowledge learned about TLDs and privacy. The fact box was not visible for any
participant during this question. Correct answers are highlighted .
Instructions
Please answer the following questions related to websites you might visit while searching for health and medical information.
Questions
Out of 100 .org websites, how many websites do you estimate will share your information with 2 or less 3rd party companies?
Please enter a value between 0 - 100.
Out of 100 .org websites, how many websites do you estimate will share your information with 8 or more 3rd party companies?
Please enter a value between 0 - 100.
Out of 100 .com websites, how many websites do you estimate will share your information with 2 or less 3rd party companies?
Please enter a value between 0 - 100.
Out of 100 .com websites, how many websites do you estimate will share your information with 8 or more 3rd party companies?
Please enter a value between 0 - 100.
Table 8.3: Estimation Task: Questions asked for the estimation task to test for
knowledge gained from the fact box boost . Correct answers are found in the fact box,
which was not visible to participants for this task.
8.3.2 Evaluation Metrics
The following three evaluation metrics were used for analysis on the main tasks
questions. All participant responses to the task questions were converted to boolean
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values.
All Task Questions Correct Score = 1 if all 4 multiple choice questions were
correct for task 1 and 2, otherwise Score = 0 .
Task 1 Questions Correct Score = 1 if both multiple choice questions were
correct for task 1, otherwise Score = 0 .
Task 2 Questions Correct Score = 1 if both multiple choice questions were
correct for task 2, otherwise Score = 0 .
For the post-task estimation questions, the following evaluation metrics were
used as dependent variables.




= participant estimated value of entry n in fact box. AVn = actual value of
entry n in fact box. N = the total number of entries in fact box.
8.3.3 Statistical Tests
Chi-Square was used to test the overall effect group differences for multiple choice
questions. For any significant findings, post-hoc analysis was performed with logistic
regression to determine odds-ratios.
One-way Anova was used to determine any significant group differences for the
estimation tasks. For any significant findings, post-hoc comparisons between the





A total of 209 participants took part in the experiment and were assigned at
random to the 4 experimental groups. Participants were recruited via the Prolific2
recruitment platform, which is a Crowdsourcing platform similar to Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (Prolific is much easier to setup and the company claims to have
higher quality samples.). As one goal of the pilot study was to inform design of the
United Kingdom based lab study outlined in Chapter 9, the Prolific participants
were limited to the same geographic region. The participants reported a mean age
(M = 39.1, SD = 11.8) of which n = 130 were female, n = 78 were male and n = 1
as other. n = 145 participants reported attainment of an undergraduate degree or
higher, and n = 191 were native English speakers. No significant differences were
found with distribution of these demographics across the 4 experimental groups.
Participants were required to provide consent for the experiment before taking
part in the tasks. Based on a pre-experiment estimation of 6 minutes for the entire
experiment all participants were paid £.50 for their time3. The median experiment
time was 5 minutes and 20 seconds.
8.4 Results
8.4.1 Task Questions
Using the boolean evaluation metrics as dependent variables and the experimen-
tal groups as independent variables, a Chi-Square test was performed to test for
overall group differences (see Table 8.4). In all cases, group differences were highly
significant.
2Prolific at https://www.prolific.co/ (LA: 2020-03-04)
3This payment is equivalent to the Prolific minimum requirement £5 per hour.
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We then used logistic regression to perform post-hoc analyses between each group
and the control group (see Table 8.5) and calculated the between group odds ratios
as a measure of effect. Again, all differences were found to be significant, with the







2(df = 3) p
Sample N 49 54 52 54 - -
All Task Questions Correct Yes 2 20 18 34 39.03 <.0001No 47 34 34 20
Task 1 Questions Correct Yes 4 20 18 35 35.591 <.0001No 45 34 34 19
Task 2 Questions Correct Yes 7 22 22 36 29.036 <.0001No 42 32 30 18
Table 8.4: Chi Squared Analysis was performed on the 3 boolean metrics for the task
questions to compare differences between the 3 experimental groups and the control
group.
Dependent
Variable Control vs. Coef. S.E. Wald (Z) PR (> |Z|) OR
All Task Questions Correct
Inline Only 2.6264 0.7750 3.39 .0007 13.82
Small Before 2.5210 0.7786 3.24 .0012 12.44
Large Before 3.6876 0.7750 4.76 <.0001 39.95
Task 1 Questions Correct
Inline Only 1.8897 0.5930 3.19 .0014 6.62
Small Before 1.7844 0.5977 2.99 .0028 5.96
Large Before 3.0313 0.5945 5.10 <.0001 20.72
Task 2 Questions Correct
Inline Only 1.4171 0.4933 2.87 .0041 4.12
Small Before 1.4816 0.4954 2.99 .0028 4.40
Large Before 2.4849 0.5000 4.97 <.0001 12.00
Table 8.5: Post-hoc analysis was performed on all 3 boolean metrics for the task
questions. Logistic regression is used to calculate the odds ratio (as a measure of
effect) for each experimental group against the control group. In all cases, exposure
to the fact box is found to produce significantly positive odds ratio when compared to
the control group.
8.4.2 Post-Task Estimations
Using the experimental groups as independent variables and the Total Absolute
Deviation of Fact Box Estimate as the dependent variable, one-way Anova was per-
formed with significant differences found F (3, 205) = 11.51, p =< .0001. Post-hoc
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analyses were performed with Welch’s two sample t-test to compare the experimental
fact box groups with the control group (see Table 8.7) and Cohen’s d was calculated
as a measure of effect size (a large negative effect was found in all comparisons).
Summary statistics for the estimation metric are provided in Table 8.7.
Group N M SD T-Test Results (compared to Control)
Control 49 120.2 42.85 -
Inline Only 54 84.31 42.87 t(100.05) = 4.25, p =< .0001, d = −0.84
Small Before 52 77.94 46.19 t(98.98) = 4.77, p =< .0001, d = −0.95
Large Before 54 70.35 51.95 t(100.13) = 5.33, p =< .0001, d = −1.05
Table 8.6: Welch’s two sample t-test is used to perform post-hoc analysis for the
experimental groups against the control group for the post-task estimation questions
which are combined to produce the dependent variable Total Absolute Deviation of
Fact Box Estimate. Cohen’s d is calculated as a measure of effect size. A summary of
the dependent variable is found in Table 8.7.
Group Median M CIlower CIupper
Control 117.0 120.2 107.9 132.5
Inline Only 77.5 84.3 72.6 96.0
Small Before 77.5 77.9 65.1 90.8
Large Before 68.0 70.4 56.2 84.5
Table 8.7: Summary statistics for the dependent variable Total Absolute Deviation
of Fact Box Estimate. Median and means (M) are provided, along with the lower and
upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals (CIlower and CIupper respectively).
8.5 Discussion
The results suggest that all three fact box approaches transfer the skill of using
.org / .gov TLDs as a means to reduce the risk of harms from 3rd party data sharing.
The findings from the estimation questions indicate that knowledge of 3rd party
sharing was significantly improved for all fact box variants when compared to control
variant. There was a large effect for all variants, with the effect being strongest for
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the largest fact box and weakest for the inline only variant.
Given the odds ratios (Table 8.5) and effect sizes (Table 8.6) were strongest with
the large fact box variant, this suggests that the details included (e.g. potential
harms that could occur) provide motivation to adapt the skill. The effect sizes for
both the large and small fact box variants (both providing longer exposure time to
the fact box) are stronger than the inline only variant, a finding suggesting that
longer exposure time to the fact box is necessary to encourage skill development.
We therefore conclude that both H1 and H2 are confirmed. Unfortunately,
due to a technical problem with the data collection, we could not test H3 .
8.5.1 Limitations
There are several limitations to the pilot study worth mentioning, which are
possible pathways for future work. First, the participant sample was from the United
Kingdom to more closely match the expected sample for the planned in lab study,
and likely does not represent populations in other places around the globe (e.g.
Southeast Asia). Second, there are alternative methods for analysing estimation
tasks which were not considered, such as the methods outlined by [37]. There is also
the possibility that members of one or more of the groups in our study had biased
beliefs about TLDs (e.g. .org and .gov TLDs are more / less safe than other TLDs
with respect to privacy), and is a challenge difficult to overcome in the between
group design used in the current study. This last point highlights the need for
understanding cultural and regional differences, for example running a study that
compares beliefs around TLDs and privacy for participants in the United Kingdom
versus those in America.
Additionally, fact boxes are one of multiple methods to boost an individual with
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skills for harm reduction. There are others to consider, such as fast and frugal trees
(FFTs), which have not been tested in the current study. Last but not least, we
only consider longitudinal learning effects of the intervention over the very short
time span of our study, future work should consider much larger time scales (such
as days, weeks and months).
8.5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations
We have run a study to compare the effectiveness of different fact box approaches
to boost searchers with a skill to better protect themselves from potential harms from
3rd party data sharing by websites they visit during the search process. Boosting ,
a cognitive intervention to enable people with skills to prevent harms, was the un-
derlying methodology guiding this study. We find that all approaches evaluated in
our pilot study are effective at teaching this skill.
Based on our findings, our recommendations are as follows. First, the inline
only variant used in our study is highly desirable as it is the least impactful to
existing search environments and therefore the most viable (G-RQ-1 ) in a com-
mercial search setting. However, this same variant, though effective (G-RQ-2 ),
also produced the weakest effect towards the goal of harm prevention. The inline
only approach is nonetheless one that should be examined further. Second, when
comparing the two approaches that present a fact box before search tasks, the large
fact box is clearly better at teaching the skill when compared to the smaller and
less detailed fact box. Given that any intervention providing such fact boxes prior
to a search task will require extra time an effort for the searcher, we therefore rec-
ommend that the large fact box approach be used as only a limited amount of effort
is needed for the searcher over the smaller fact box.
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We close with some comments with respect to the implementation of fact boxes
in practice. We advocate for placement of small fact boxes (e.g. the inline variant)
in existing search environments, such as in the right hand rail of the SERP or as
Web browser plug-ins. With respect to the more highly detailed large fact boxes,
it is unlikely that such an approach could easily be incorporated into an existing
search engines (due to space constraints on the page). Nonetheless, the large fact
boxes show such a strong effect that other methods should be considered, such as
education campaigns in school and providing links to them in the SERPs for users
that wish to educate themselves.
8.6 Summary
Related to the framework, we have introduced several boosting strategies
( FC-Cognitive ) and implemented them in a simulated search environment
( FC-System ). As boosting interventions are designed with transfer of a competency
for better decision making, we have evaluated ( FC-Evaluation ) the interventions
both for immediate effect (results Section 8.4.1) and long-term effect (Sections 8.4.1
and 8.4.2).
The study presented here determined the inline fact box as the most viable
(G-RQ-1 ) approach with respect to real-world implementation, which appears to
have some potential to produce reduced privacy impacts, however this potential ap-
pears to be quite weak and therefore expected to be minimally effective(G-RQ-1 ).
The large fact box was deemed least viable (G-RQ-1 ) in a commercial Web
search setting, however may have applications in environments where education is a
focus (e.g. primary and secondary schools). Nonetheless, this approach is certainly
the most effective (G-RQ-1 ) with respect to understanding of the risks which are
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being communicated and therefore expected to perform the best in an interactive
environment.
The findings from this pilot study will be used as a guide for hypotheses in
our final empirical chapter which compares the most effective nudging and boosting
strategies a controlled lab environment. Decisions will have to be made as to how
best to cope with findings (for the inline only and full fact box approaches) that
strongly contrast one another.
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Experimental evidence from results presented in the previous studies suggest that
both nudging (Chapters 5 and 6) and boosting (Chapter 8) are effective strategies
for steering Web search behaviour in a direction that results in less risky decision
making, that in many cases reduced overall harms (with respect to harms from
privacy).
Recall that boosting provides a competency to cope with the environment (Web
search in the current case), versus nudging which changes behaviour through ‘choice
architecture’ of the environment, a long-term effect should remain for the boost after
removal of the intervention (see cognitive interventions in background Section 2.6
and recap of interventions in Section 8.2.2).
Based upon these theoretical statements, the main goals of the current study is
a) to test the theories across nudging and boosting (G-RQ-3 ) and b) to confirm
the viability and effectiveness of the interventions (G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ).
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As the high-level research questions (G-RQ-1 and G-RQ-2 ) are common
thread through all studies covered the current thesis, the following hypotheses were
formulated.
H1a Both nudging and boosting strategies will significantly outperform the Control
search environment with respect to the harm being evaluated (privacy impact).
H1b Both nudging and boosting strategies will significantly increase compliance to
the intervention (interactions with .org and .gov web pages) when compared
to the Control system.
Results from the pilot study already give indications that a long-term effect on
harm reductions can be expected based on the recall of risk information commu-
nicated to participants. Though the pilot study did not test for an effect in an
interactive search environment, results in the pilot study, other studies in this the-
sis, and the literature (see [88] for example) guide us to formulate the following
hypotheses with respect to the nudging and boosting strategies. Upon removal of
the boost and nudge strategies:
H2a The boost strategy treatment group will perform significantly better than the
Control group.
H2b No significant differences will be found between the nudge strategy treatment
group and the Control group.
H2c The boost treatment group will perform significantly better than the nudge
treatment group.
As it relates to the framework in Chapter 3, the methods and results that
follow are most heavily focused on the cognitive ( FC-Cognitive ) and evaluation
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( FC-Evaluation ) components, and demonstrates how future IR researcher can eval-
uate across theories of decision making.
9.2 Method
The methods used to test the hypotheses make use of many already introduced
in the general methods. As with the other empirical chapters, we give extra atten-
tion to methods unique to this study. Unlike other studies, where procedures were
introduced first, here we begin with the evaluation test set.
9.2.1 Evaluation Test Set
Only briefly introduced in the general methods, the Offline Boosting/Nudging
Test Set used in the current study is quite similar to the test set in the offline nudge
study, in that it contains a static set of web pages associated with the same Cochrane
medical search tasks. The main motivation for a static test set being that it allows
for a highly controlled experiment (like the offline nudge studies).
The evaluation test set was developed with data collected during the online
nudge study (Chapter 6). Using the assumption that commonly submitted queries
are representative of search results, the most frequently submitted query for each
search task in the online experiment was used to create the current test set. Using
the most frequent queries, the first 10 results in Bing (recall Bing was used in the
online study) for each query-task pair were included in the dataset. 3rd party tracker
data was then linked to each of the results (as covered in 4.3.1).
To reduce the experiment length, we excluded two tasks from the test set before
running in-lab experiments. Criteria for omission was to ensure an equal number
of helpful and does not help search tasks and secondarily based upon imbalances of
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results linked to .org and .gov TLDs (the feature indicative of reduced risk of harm
for privacy and misinformation, see Chapter 7). Using this criteria, three of the
Cochrane tasks (3, 7 and 10) were linked to only 1 result with a TLD of .org or .gov.
Task 3 and 10 were both similar and Task 3 (classed as does not help) was chosen at
random for removal. To maintain balance between helpful and does not help search
tasks, Task 6 (classed as helpful) was removed (chosen at random).
Summary metrics of the evaluation dataset are provided in the Table 9.1. Com-
paring the current dataset to values in the fact boxes (Figures 8.4 and 8.3) and
findings on the usefulness of TLD for privacy protection (Chapter 7) we note the
following. Using the same extrapolation methods in Section 8.3.1.1 to calculate
harms and benefits per 100 websites, the values were calculated for the test set used
in the current study as well. This allowed for direct comparisons of the values in the
fact boxes presented during the experiment (Figures 8.4 and 8.3) to actual values
of the test set used. There were notable differences in the values, however the fact
boxes were not changed for this study, as they are seen as more representative of
real world data.
Nonetheless, for posterity, it is important to report these differences, noting the
following points: First, the mean number (M = 4.3 in Table 9.1) of 3rd party
trackers for .org and .gov TLDs as a ratio to the mean for other TLDs (M = 8.2 in
Table 9.1) is approximately half (1.0 : 1.9), and that a ratio (1.0 : 2.3) is found with
means in the earlier study (Chapter 7). Second, when comparing the harms and
benefits values of .org and .gov TLDs in the current dataset (to those communicated
in fact boxes) the benefits are dampened and the harms are increased relative to
those expressed in the fact boxes.
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.gov / org Other TLDs
Overview of Evaluation Dataset
Total Results Available 17 63
Mean 3rd Party Trackers 4.3 8.2
Median Trackers 3 6
Shared with ___ 3rd Party Companies 2 or Less (Benefits) 5 68 or More (Harms) 4 25
Sharing Extrapolated (per 100 Websites) for
Comparison with Fact Box Presented
Benefits 29 10
Harms 24 40
Table 9.1: Summary of the (Offline Boosting/Nudging Test Set) used for evaluation
in the current study. A total of 8 search tasks were used in the study. 10 results
were available for each search task. Comparing the last two rows in the table to the
fact boxes (Figures 8.4 and 8.3) , one will see that the benefits of .org and .gov are
weakened and the harms increased, but nonetheless still offer better protection than
other TLDs
9.2.2 Procedure
The following subsections introduce the key design elements for the experiment.
9.2.2.1 Search Tasks
Search tasks used in the current study are a subset of tasks in Table 4.1 (eight
tasks in total + one practice task). Justification for the chosen tasks are included
in Section 9.2.1, which outlines the evaluation test set.
9.2.2.2 Search Systems (and SERPs)
Many elements (e.g. SERPs and search task decision page) of the systems in-
troduced in the general methods and used in the offline nudge study were carried
over to the current study, with some tweaks necessary to meet requirements of the
study design. Also, much of the code developed (in Python) to run the systems in
the current studies was taken from that of earlier studies.
In total, three search systems were developed and used in the current study
(Control, nudge and boost). All systems presented results in a static manner, like
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the offline study, therefore participants could not enter queries (as with the offline
nudge study). As only a few participants in the prior offline and online nudge studies
made use of privacy protection switch (the mechanism used to opt-out of the nudge),
the choice was made to remove this switch as removal greatly reduced the technical
complexity of implementing the study design.
Those key differences aside from previous studies, the Control system is exactly
as described in the general methods Section 4.2.2.1. The result rankings for this
Control are the original ranking the Offline Boosting/Nudging Test Set detailed in
Section 9.2.1.
Given previous findings for the three nudging strategies, we implement the Re-
ranking system (see Figure 9.1) in the current study, as this nudge strategy was
found to be highly effective at reducing privacy impacts. Though Re-ranking was
determined not as viable as the Stoplight strategy S3 , it was far more effective than
the Stoplight strategy and more viable than the Filtering system and combined was
the motivation for choice of this nudge. The Re-ranking nudge system (strategy
S2 ) is nearly the same as described in general methods Section 4.2.2.4. However,
contrary to the previous ranking approach based upon 3rd party trackers , result
rankings were instead based upon the TLD. In this manner, the original result
ranking was maintained, however results with a .org or .gov TLD appear before any
other result.
For the boost variant, the small fact box evaluated in the pilot study was placed
in the right hand rail of the SERP (see Figure 9.2). Rankings used for this variant
are the same as the Control system (original rankings). Two sub-variants of the
boost were included in the study, modelled after the inline only variants and full fact
box variants evaluated in the pilot study. The full fact box (the same as Figure 8.3)
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was included (presented on a screen before the main experiment), as it was the most
effective approach in the pilot and assumed more likely to produce an effect in the
participant sample. The inline only variant was also evaluated in the current study
(as appears in Figure 9.2).
Figure 9.1: Re-ranking Search System for Nudging Users Towards .org /
.gov TLDs. - The Re-raking nudge as appeared for Cochrane Task 9. The results
are re-ranked so those with a .org or .gov TLD appear first in the results. The Control
system looked exactly the same, however the results used the original ranking.
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Figure 9.2: Search System with Fact Box to Boost Individuals with the
Harms and Benefits of Results (based upon TLDs). - The boost system used
in the current study with Cochrane Task 9 displayed. A fact box (the same as Figure
8.4) about harms and benefits related to TLDs appears in the right hand rail. The
original result ranking is used (same ordering as used in the Control).
9.2.2.3 Study Design
For the most part, study design specifics already introduced the general methods
Section 4.2.3 are used in the current study. A between group design was used for
in data collection of in lab experiments. Latin Squares and randomization was used
for determining search task and system assignment (e.g. Control, nudge, boost) for
each participant. As with the previous lab studies, participants filled out a consent
form before the interactive experiment, completed a survey after the interactive
experiment and were given a debriefing at the end of the survey. The same labs (and
computer setup) used in previous studies were used again here. Once logged into
the study, the users would progress through pre-experiment pages (e.g. instructions
and practice task), pre-tasks, main tasks and post-tasks (see Figure 9.3).
The experiment was broken into two main phases, phase 1 (tasks 1 - 4)1 and




phase 2 (tasks 5 - 8). The “treatment” phase of the experiment (tasks 1 - 4). The
participants were randomly placed into one of the four experiment groups and pro-
ceeded through various phases (see Figure 9.3), where participants interacted with
either the Control, boost or nudge system. During the second phase of experiment
(tasks 5 - 8) all participants interacted with the Control system only, which was a
crucial part of the design for G-RQ-3 and H2c . Finally, to ensure balance of the
Cochrane medical tasks, an equal number of helpful and does not help were assigned
to each phase of the experiment and randomly assigned to each phase task.
Figure 9.3: Overview of the Study Design for Comparing Boost and Nudge
Strategies. - All participants completed 8 search tasks (a randomly selected Cochrane
medical task as outlined in section 9.2.1.
Pre and Post Task Questions Added for this study, were pre and post-task
questions (with Likert scale responses) about 3rd party data sharing. The pre-
task questions aim was to gain some understanding into the variations of privacy
concerns across the different tasks, as it is assumed some of these tasks may be
considered more privacy sensitive than others. The post-task questions were used as
a primer (to encourage behaviour for protection from 3rd party data sharing) and
to understand their beliefs in their privacy protective behaviour. For the post-task
questions, it is assumed that subjects in the boosting experiments groups reporting
high privacy protective behaviour and low possibility of 3rd party data sharing would
adhere to the boost more so than participants reporting otherwise. We recognize
that asking these questions also has the disadvantage of being unrealistic in a real
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world environment and furthermore has the potential to bias participants behaviour.
Prior to each search task, participants answered the following questions (with 7
point scale for response)
How concerned should you be that 3rd party companies may
collect information about you during this search task?
Not all concern (1) - Very concerned (7)
How much harm is possible due to 3rd party companies col-
lecting information about you during this search task?
No harm is possible (1) - Great harm is possible (7)
After each search task, participants answered the following questions (with 7
point scale for response)
To what extent did your search behaviour influence how many
3rd party companies collected information about you during
the search task?
Search behaviour had no influence. (1) - Search behaviour had a lot of
influence. (7)
What is the possibility that 3rd party companies collected in-
formation about you during the search task?
No possibility. (1) - High possibility. (7)
Post interactive experiment survey After all 8 search tasks were completed
(completion of main experiment), participants were taken to a survey hosted on the
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Qualtrics survey platform and completed survey items included in other studies.
Additionally, nearly identical questions (multiple choice and estimation questions)
to those used in the pilot study (see Section 8.3.1.2) are included in the current study
to measure knowledge gained. For the current study, and contrary to the pilot study,
fact boxes were not displayed in these questions for any of the participant groups.
9.2.3 Evaluation Metrics
The current study makes use of a much smaller set of metrics compared to those
used in the previous studies and include only those necessary to test the hypotheses
listed.
For evaluating the effects of the strategies on the privacy harm being prevented
we use Average Number of Trackers, however for the current study we only focus on
the harms from privacy and do not focus on the search task decisions. Though data
could be analysed in the future, evaluating effects on decisions was deemed much
lower priority for this study and analyses was therefore not performed.
Given the hypotheses for harm interventions being evaluated made use of previ-
ous findings (Chapter 7) demonstrating that .org and .gov TLDs can greatly reduce
the risk of personal data being shared with 3rd parties, three additional evaluation
metrics were developed based upon the TLD. The first metric, is simply based on
the number of visits to .org and .gov web pages normalized by the total number of
web page visits. This measure was motivated by the need to measure compliance to
the strategy (as introduced in Section 4.4.2, which was used to develop a compliance
measure based upon Stoplight colours in the online nudge study). The compliance
measure is defined as:
PercentOrgGov = Total visits to websites with a .org or .gov TLD / total
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number of website visits
While the PercentOrgGov metric is desirable for it’s simplicity and insights into
interactive behaviours, it has several problems. First, this metric does not take
into consideration the likelihood of encountering .org / .gov websites. Second, the
fact box distinguishes between benefits and harms and it is therefore important to
evaluate from this perspective as well. Finally, this metric does not provide a system
evaluation in the traditional sense. These problems combined motivated adaptation
of IR system metrics (see adaptation of IR metrics in Section 4.4.3.2).
In the case of the current study, adaptation of the normalized discounted cumu-
lative gain (nDCG) [106] is the approach used. Taken from [106], the normalized



















Where IDCGp is the ideal cumulative gain of query Q at rank p and Qp is the
set of results ordered by relevance score of greatest to lowest value.
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With appropriate substitutions for reli, the following two evaluation metrics are
additionally used in the analyses.
The compliance measure is defined as:
nDCBp is defined as nDCGp where reli is 1 if result visited is .org or .gov and
0 otherwise.
nDCHp is defined as nDCGp where reli is 0 if result visited is .org or .gov
and −1 otherwise.
Finally, measures introduced in the pilot study to test for skills acquired from
the strategies are used in the current study. Three binary measures (All Task Ques-
tions Correct, Task 1 Questions Correct and Task 2 Questions Correct) and the
estimation measure Total Absolute Deviation of Fact Box Estimate as defined in
the pilot study Section 8.3.2 are used in the current study as well.
9.2.4 Statistical Tests
To account for variations in user behaviour for the interactive experiment, linear
mixed effects regression (LMER) was used to test the hypotheses, with the exper-
imental treatment groups (Control, Nudge, Boost Inline, Boost Large) as a single
fixed effect and participant and search task as two random effects. All four eval-
uation metrics (Average3rdParty, PercentOrgGov, nDCB10 and nDCH10)in Section
9.2.3 are used as dependent variables in the analyses.
For a direct comparison between post interactive survey questions in the current
study and the same questions in the pilot study (Chapter ??) the same statistical
tests are performed.
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As was used for analyses in the pilot study, Chi-Squared (logistic regression for
post-hoc analyses) is used for tests on the three binary count measures and one-way
Anova (Welch’s two-sample t-test for post-hoc analyses) for tests on the estimation
measure.
For all analyses, α = .05 is set as the threshold for significance.
9.2.5 Participants
Participants were recruited in almost the same manner as previous lab based
studies (with n = 30 to be assigned to each group), with the only difference being
told the study was about privacy protection in Web search, with a total of N = 120
subjects recruited. However, due to the Covid-19 crisis, and ethical concerns with
continuation of a lab study during the crisis, data collection was stopped. In total,
n = 70 participants completed the experiment. The participants reported a mean
age (M = 22.4, SD = 4.4) of which n = 50 were female, n = 19 were male and n = 1
as other. n = 26 participants reported attainment of an undergraduate degree or
higher, and n = 38 were native English speakers. No significant differences were
found with distribution of these demographics across the 4 experimental groups. As
with other lab based studies, each participant was paid £10 for their time.
9.3 Results
With respect to the interventions and hypotheses there were a mixture of re-
sults found. The results are split between those based on data collected during the
interactive Web search phase and the post experiment survey. Across the entire
study, no effects were found with the inline only variant of the boost , and therefore




9.3.1 Main Study Results
The results of the main interactive study are important for discussion related to
all hypotheses (H1a - H2c ) and high level research questions and in particular
G-RQ-3 .
Tables 9.2 - 9.5 provide results of the analyses using LMER to test hypothe-
ses with the 4 dependent variables (Average3rdParty, PercentOrgGov, nDCB10 and
nDCH10). Summary statistics are included in each table for the 4 experiment groups
(3 interventions + control). Interventions producing significant differences compared
to the control are bolded and those demonstrating strong tendencies (defined as
.05 < p < .10) are italicized.
Figures 9.4a - 9.4d are scatterplots (with smoothers) comparing each of the four
experimental variants across all 8 search tasks and dependent variables. The visual-
izations are included to provide additional insights with respect to the interventions
during the ‘treatment’ phase (tasks 1 - 4) and the ‘post-treatment’ phase (tasks
5 - 8). Based on the underlying theory of nudging and boosting and results from
previous studies, the idealized visualizations would include the following behaviours:
During the ‘treatment’ phase (task 1 - 4)
– Due to the ‘choice architecture’ of the nudge, performance (for all 4 met-
rics) should be optimal across all 4 tasks. It should also out perform the
boost and Control.
– Due to the learning effect, as the task number increases, Boosting should
produce improving performance (i.e. decreasing Average Number of 3rd
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party trackers and nDCHp, increasing PercentOrgGov and nDCBp. Fur-
thermore, this learning effect should behave asymptotically and at some
point outperform the Control.)
– The Control system is a baseline and therefore should remain generally
flat.
During the ‘post-treatment’ phase (task 5 - 8)
– Upon removal nudge, performance (for all 4 metrics) should perform sim-
ilarly to the Control as no skill was learned.
– After removal of the boost , performance should be maintained as a result
of the learning effect. That is all 4 performance metrics should remain
at a similar level to the asymptote of curve during the ’treatment’ phase.
Performance should be better than both the nudge and the Control)
– Again, the Control system is a baseline and therefore should exhibit sim-
ilar behaviour to the ‘treatment’ phase
Insights gained from these figures are provided in the subsequent discussion (Sec-
tion 9.4).
Strategies on the Harm Being Prevented (Privacy) Results Table 9.2 and
Figure 9.4a indicate a very large effect on reduction of privacy impacts for the nudge
strategy during the ‘treatment’ phase and ‘post-treatment’ phase of the interactive
study when compared to the control. A significant effect is found as well for the





Group First 4 Tasks Last 4 Tasks
Median M SE CIlower CIupper Median M SE CIlower CIupper
Control 6.99 7.93 0.52 6.90 8.96 9.24 9.42 0.50 8.43 10.41
Boost Inline 7.30 8.16 0.54 7.09 9.23 8.35 8.66 0.59 7.49 9.83
Boost Large 6.84 7.57 0.50 6.58 8.56 5.47 6.91 0.50 5.90 7.92
Nudge 6.00 6.64 0.40 5.85 7.44 7.94 7.98 0.48 7.02 8.94
Results
Group First 4 Tasks Last 4 Tasks
vs. Control Estimate SE df t Pr(> |t|) Estimate SE df t Pr(> |t|)
Boost Inline -0.17 0.53 66.80 -0.33 .7441 -0.13 0.67 66.92 -0.19 .8489
Boost Large -0.94 0.53 65.41 -1.77 .0812 -1.85 0.67 66.05 -2.76 .0076
Nudge -1.06 0.52 64.05 -2.04 .0459 -1.65 0.66 65.10 -2.50 .0150
Table 9.2: Comparison of Boost vs. Nudge strategies on harms from privacy. Metric
used is Average 3rd Party Trackers. See corresponding scatterplot in Figure 9.4a.
Compliance with strategy (visit .org and .gov to reduce privacy harms)
Results Table 9.3 and Figure 9.4b indicate a massive effect related to compliance
(visiting .org and .gov) with the nudge strategy during the ‘treatment’ phase, how-
ever this effect disappears entirely during ‘post-treatment’ phase when compared to
interactions in the Control system. During the ‘treatment’ phase a significant effect
is found as well for the boost strategy (large fact box) and a strong tendency for this
behaviour is apparent during the ‘post-treatment’ phase.
Group First 4 Tasks Last 4 Tasks
Median M SE CIlower CIupper Median M SE CIlower CIupper
Control 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.21
Boost Inline 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.11 0.22
Boost Large 0.25 0.27 0.04 0.20 0.34 0.17 0.23 0.03 0.16 0.29
Nudge 0.33 0.34 0.03 0.28 0.40 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.10 0.19
Results
Group First 4 Tasks Last 4 Tasks
vs. Control Estimate SE df t Pr(> |t|) Estimate SE df t Pr(> |t|)
Boost Inline 0.01 0.05 67.50 0.19 .8533 0.01 0.04 68.23 0.34 .7386
Boost Large 0.14 0.05 66.72 2.80 .0067 0.07 0.04 66.89 1.73 .0885
Nudge 0.21 0.05 65.90 4.35 .0000 -0.01 0.04 65.53 -0.37 .7161
Table 9.3: Comparison of Boost vs. Nudge strategies on compliance to the strat-
egy (stick with .org and .gov TLDs). Metric used is the ratio of Visits on .org/.gov
Websites. See corresponding scatterplot in Figure 9.4b.
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System Comparisons with nDCBp (Benefits of System) Turning to system
comparisons based upon the adapted normalized discounted cumulative gain metric
for system benefits (nDCBp), results in Table 9.4 and Figure 9.4c indicate a strong
effect for system benefits of the Re-ranking nudge strategy during the ‘treatment’
phase when compared to the Control system, but effects are not present in the
‘post-treatment’ phase. Benefits are not indicated for the boost system.
Summary
Group First 4 Tasks Last 4 Tasks
Median M SE CIlower CIupper Median M SE CIlower CIupper
Control 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.24
Boost Inline 0.00 0.18 0.03 0.12 0.23 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.19
Boost Large 0.24 0.23 0.03 0.18 0.28 0.22 0.21 0.03 0.15 0.26
Nudge 1.00 0.79 0.06 0.68 0.90 0.00 0.18 0.03 0.13 0.24
Results
Group First 4 Tasks Last 4 Tasks
vs. Control Estimate SE df t Pr(> |t|) Estimate SE df t Pr(> |t|)
Boost Inline 0.02 0.08 66.74 0.28 .7781 -0.03 0.04 67.62 -0.71 .4798
Boost Large 0.10 0.08 66.37 1.26 .2133 0.02 0.04 66.65 0.48 .6325
Nudge 0.65 0.08 65.94 8.63 .0000 0.00 0.04 65.60 -0.09 .9266
Table 9.4: Comparison of Boost vs. Nudge systems with the adapted IR system
metric nDCBp. See corresponding scatterplot in Figure 9.4.
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System Comparisons with nDCHp (Harms of System) Analyses was per-
formed with a harm based version (nDCHp) of normalized discounted cumulative
gain metric. Again, strong effects for the nudge strategy S2 system for the ‘treat-
ment’ phase (but no effects in the ‘post-treatment’ phase) as indicated in results
Table 9.5 and Figure 9.4d. The results indicate a strong tendency for reductions in
harm with the boost fact box strategy S4 system in the ‘post-treatment’ phase.
Summary
Group First 4 Tasks Last 4 Tasks
Median M SE CIlower CIupper Median M SE CIlower CIupper
Control 0.52 0.55 0.03 0.48 0.61 0.56 0.53 0.03 0.47 0.59
Boost Inline 0.48 0.50 0.03 0.44 0.56 0.49 0.48 0.03 0.42 0.53
Boost Large 0.46 0.49 0.04 0.41 0.56 0.40 0.41 0.03 0.35 0.48
Nudge 0.29 0.35 0.03 0.28 0.41 0.51 0.54 0.04 0.47 0.62
Results
Group First 4 Tasks Last 4 Tasks
vs. Control Estimate SE df t Pr(> |t|) Estimate SE df t Pr(> |t|)
Boost Inline -0.04 0.07 66.83 -0.52 .6039 -0.07 0.07 66.72 -0.96 .3390
Boost Large -0.06 0.07 66.44 -0.87 .3867 -0.12 0.07 66.29 -1.76 .0833
Nudge -0.20 0.07 66.00 -2.94 .0045 0.01 0.07 65.78 0.19 .8479
Table 9.5: Comparison of Boost vs. Nudge systems with the adapted IR system
metric nDCHp. See corresponding scatterplot in Figure 9.5.
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(a) Average # of 3rd party trackers. Lower
values imply a less harmful outcome has oc-
curred (data shared with 3rd parties). Fig-
ure corresponds to analysis in Table 9.2.
(b) Ratio of visits to .org and .gov. Higher
values imply higher potential for less harm-
ful outcomes. Figure corresponds to anal-
ysis in Table 9.3.
(c) Normalized discounted cumulative ben-
efit (nDCB). Higher values imply higher
potential for less harmful outcomes. Fig-
ure corresponds to analysis in Table 9.4
(d) Normalized discounted cumulative
harm (nDCH). Lower values imply higher
potential for less harmful outcomes. Figure
corresponds to analysis in Table 9.5
Figure 9.4: Boost vs. Nudge scatter plots (with smoother) for dependent variables
tested. The first four tasks (treatment phase) and last four tasks are separated by a red
dashed line. Participants were assigned at random to the four experimental variants
(Control, Nudge, Boost Inline or Boost Large).
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9.3.2 Evaluation of Knowledge Gained
After the main interactive experiment, all participants responded to the same
survey questions asked in the pilot study (Chapter 8). Using the binary count and
estimation metrics introduced in Section 9.2.3, analysis was performed as outlined
in Section 9.2.4.
Results provided below are relevant for G-RQ-3 and hypotheses (H2a - H2c ).
Interventions and Knowledge Gained (Binary Measures) Though the re-
sults are non-significant, there are clear tendencies for the boost intervention (with
Large fact box) to outperform participants in the Control as well as other interven-




2(df = 3) p
Sample N 18 17 17 18 - -
All Task Questions Correct Yes 1 2 5 1 5.8894 0.1171No 17 15 12 17
Task 1 Questions Correct Yes 2 4 6 2 4.3954 0.2218No 16 13 11 16
Task 2 Questions Correct Yes 6 3 6 3 2.7143 0.4378No 12 14 11 15
Table 9.6: As was performed in the pilot study (Chapter 8), Chi Squared Analysis
was performed on the 3 binary metrics for the task questions to compare differences
between the 3 experimental groups and the control group.
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Interventions and Knowledge Gained (Estimation Measures) For the esti-
mation one-way Anova was used for our analysis resulting in non-significant findings
F (3, 66) = 0.649, p = .586. As the results were non-significant, no post-hoc analyses
were performed. We do provide summary statistics (see Table 9.7) as it provides use-
ful insights regarding the different interventions. For instance, both boost strategies
have measures of central tendency indicating performance better than the control
and the nudge.
Group Median M CIlower CIupper
Control 118.5 123.9 100.5 147.4
Boost Inline 99.0 108.6 75.6 141.6
Boost Large 101.0 117.9 80.5 155.2
Nudge 134.5 134.5 116.6 152.5
Table 9.7: Summary statistics for the dependent variable Total Absolute Deviation
of Fact Box Estimate. Median and means (M) are provided, along with the lower and
upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals (CIlower and CIupper respectively). The
questions asked were the same as those used in the pilot study covered in (Chapter 8)




As with the other lab based studies, we break the discussion apart to first high-
light findings related to the hypotheses and then focus on the research questions.
The key findings from the results of the main interactive experiment are summarised
in Table 9.8 and are used as a guide for this discussion.
To simplify the discussion, we address the non-significant findings for the inline
only variant of the boost here. Though this boost strategy is certainly the most viable
of the two boost approaches evaluated in the experiment, there is no signal detected
to suggest it is an effective approach (at least for prevention of harms related to
privacy). This approach was the weakest performer of the three boost fact boxes
evaluated in the pilot study, so the finding is not entirely surprising. With this topic
out of the way, the focus is simplified to comparison of the other boost (with large
fact box presented before the main experiment), the nudge, and the Control.





Dependent Variable Boost Nudge Boost Nudge
Average3rdParty + * ** *
PercentOrgGov ** *** + ns
nDCB10 ns *** ns ns
nDCH10 ns ** + ns
Table 9.8: A summary of findings across the four performance metrics are provided for
comparison of the boost (small fact box in SERP with large fact box presented before
experiment), nudge system with the Control system. Interventions were removed
during the ‘Post-Treatment’ Phase. *** = p < .001, ** = p < .01 , * = p < .05,
, + = .05 < p < .1 and ns = p > .1.
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9.4.1 Findings Related to Study Specific Hypotheses
9.4.1.1 Treatment Phase ( H1a and H1b )
For the ‘treatment’ phase (tasks 1 - 4) the nudge approach is a significant in-
tervention when compared to the control across all 4 dependent variables. The
PercentOrgGov for the large fact box intervention is significantly higher when com-
pared to the control and the same intervention produces strong tendencies for
Average3rdParty encounters.
9.4.1.2 Post-Treatment Phase ( H2a - H2c )
Ultimately the overall goal of this study (and to a major extent the goal of this
thesis) was to compare the claims of the two popular and quite different harm preven-
tion strategies from the behavioural and cognitive sciences (boosting and nudging)
adapted as interventions for harm prevention in Web search.
For the “post-treatment” phase (tasks 5 - 8), Average3rdParty is significantly less
for both the boost and nudge interventions when compared to the control. During
this phase strong tendencies were found for the PercentOrgGov and nDCH10 depen-
dent variables, however not for the nDCB10 variable. For the nudge intervention,
none of the findings were significant nor were the tendencies strong.
9.4.1.3 Mixed Phases ( H2a - H2c )
H1b is central to the overall risk mitigation strategies to prevent harm, in
this case being that one should stick to websites with .org and .gov TLDs. The
PercentOrgGov, nDCB10 and nDCH10 evaluation metrics were motivated by this
hypotheses. The results do provide strong evidence the nudge intervention is an
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effective strategy, however they also provide strong evidence that without this inter-
vention the user behaviour is no different than of users in the Control environment
(no intervention), which subsequently confirms H2b .
9.4.1.4 Knowledge Evaluation ( H2a - H2c )
9.4.2 Findings in the Context of Research Questions
For this particular study, the focal harm was loss of privacy as a result of 3rd party
data sharing and G-RQ-2 was central to this matter. The results provided suggest
that both boosting and nudging strategies exhibit significant harm reduction with
respect to this parameter. Interestingly, the results are counter to the expectation
that harms would return after removal of nudge. However, this finding does not
necessarily counter the expectation, as the evaluation dataset was static and a much
smaller than planned participant sample was used in the analyses.
Turning to G-RQ-3 , which goes beyond Web search and applies to the theo-
retical claims of nudging vs. boosting , the findings do suggest that a skill is learned
with the boost while nudging does not produce such a skill. This claim is particu-
larly evident for nudging when considering the data in Figures 9.4b - 9.4d, where
large drop-offs in performance occur once the intervention is removed. Also notable
across all dependent variables (based upon the smoothers in Figure 9.4) a learning
effect appears to be present in the ‘treatment’ phase for both boosting approaches
(however is much more notable for the large fact box group), which is in line with
expected behaviour. Furthermore, the data in the last 4 tasks (again based upon
smoothers in Figure 9.4 as well as Tables 9.6 and 9.7) suggest that some skill is being
learned for boosting , whereas there is little (outside of the Average Number of 3rd
party trackers) to suggest this is the case for nudging . Both nudging and boosting
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appear to be effective interventions at steering users towards results and decisions
that are less risky, however when comparing the results for first 4 tasks (Figures
9.4b - 9.4d) the nudge intervention is definitely stronger. This effect is very likely
due to the trust bias commonly exhibited in SERPs, where users typically do not
go beyond the second result.
Finally, G-RQ-1 is an important factor that must not be overlooked. As already
stated, the in line boost is certainly the more viable for commercial settings for
privacy harm prevention, however it is certainly not viable for the sample tested.
Additional analysis is desirable to consider user differences in a similar manner to
the other lab studies (e.g. considerations for privacy actions in daily life), however
the small sample did not permit such analyses. The nudge approach is certainly
the most effective, but previous findings in the online nudge study certainly suggest
that caution must be used with such an approach. Finally, the large fact box boost
may not be viable in a commercial Web search environment, but we certainly argue
that it has viability in the context of educational policy. For instance, we argue that
it would be quite simple to include such information in the curriculum at a school.
9.4.3 Limitations
There are several limitations to our study to consider.
First and foremost, due to the Covid-19 pandemic the study was not run to the
full extent that was planned. Just over half (n = 70) of the recruited participants
(N = 120) completed the study. Findings from this study are quite likely underpow-
ered (however we have not performed post-hoc power analyses), thus results should
be interpreted cautiously. In line with the underpowered sample, there is a very
high possibility that type I errors (related to significant findings) and type II errors
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have occurred with respect to the non-significant findings. Also, due to the small
sample, we could not test potential differences based on user differences (based upon
self-report measures). Running the same study with a larger sample is the obvious
pathway to address these matters.
As with previous studies we have run, 3rd party tracking is only one pathway
to harm in Web search, there are many others. Future work should consider other
pathways, such as the misinformation factors related to TLDs (see findings Chapter
7).
There are other interventions that can (and should be) considered. We have
evaluated fact boxes as a boost (strategy S4 ) and a Re-ranking nudge (strategy
S2 ). Studies in the future should compare other boost approaches such as Fast and
Frugal Trees (FFTs) and nudge interventions such as filtering.
Cultural and regional difference certainly exist that have not been tested. For
instance, .gov websites are in English and Spanish and would not commonly be used
in countries with other languages as the mother tongue.
Last of all, the evaluation dataset is static and therefore not fully representative of
a dataset in the wild. User behaviour (and the results visited) would most certainly
change if the experiment were connected to an online environment allowing free
query entry (in a similar manner to the online nudge study). For example, with a
large enough participant sample, it is expected that some users provided with the
boost intervention will enter wild cards (e.g ’alcohol benzodiazepines site:*.org’) in
the query knowing that it reduces risk related to loss of privacy in Web search.
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9.5 Summary
A study investigating two approaches (boosting and nudging) from the behavioural
and cognitive sciences as interventions to reduce potential harms as a result of online
Web search was completed.
Similar to the earlier online nudge study, there are several novel contributions
with respect to the framework worth noting. Related to evaluation( FC-Evaluation ),
we adapted nDCG to compare systems with respect to the harms and benefits of
different results in each system. Additionally, we introduced a behavioural interac-
tive measure (PercentOrgGov) with respect to the informational cue (TLD), similar
to the Stoplight interactive measures developed in the online study, which allowed
for comparison of interactive behaviour indicative of adherence across the systems.
For the nudge system, there are no signals of adherence to the intervention after it’s
removal, whereas this is seen for the boost (demonstrating a new competency). Novel
methods were also introduced to compare across different theoretical paradigms for
behavioural and cognitive ( FC-Cognitive ) based decision making interventions.
The study utilized previously published search tasks and included interventions
based upon findings (Chapter 7) showing that results with .org and .gov TLDs
are less risky than other TLDs with respect to data being shared with 3rd party
companies. The nudge intervention demonstrated a strong effect on user behaviour,
where users visited significantly more .org and .gov websites and reduced 3rd party
data sharing compared to the control. Strong signals (some significant) were also
found for the boost intervention, however the intervention appears to be weaker
than the nudge approach. As proponents of boosting point out, the intervention
is more ethically sound than nudging as there is transparency provided, however
such interventions are likely most effective for users that are motivated to minimize
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personal harm during Web search, which leaves much space for further investigation.
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10.1 Summary of Thesis
A theoretical framework was proposed as the foundation to address potential
harms one might encounter during Web search. The framework suggests that be-
havioural and cognitive interventions (see FC-Cognitive ) should be considered
as part of the evaluation (see FC-Evaluation ) of search systems designed (see
FC-System ) with harm prevention as the paramount goal. FC-System and FC-Evaluation
of the framework (system design and system evaluation) are seen as extensions of
approaches already used in the development and evaluation of Web search systems.
Policy ( FC-Policy ), the remaining component of the framework, is also a critical
for efforts to reduce harms to individuals and broader society related to Web search
systems. However, as this thesis was focused on the empirical science of harm pre-
vention, no studies made consideration of FC-Policy , and in fact see the other three
components as necessary to inform policy.
Taken from FC-Cognitive , this thesis investigated nudging and boosting , two
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approaches commonly used in many domains (e.g. medicine, finances) to promote
decision making for minimized harm to individuals and broader society. Four general
strategies ( S1 - S4 ) and were developed from the nudging and boosting paradigms,
which were first introduced in the general methods and provided again below. These
strategies were evaluated across four user studies, of which three were lab-based (two
offline and one online).
S1 Filtering nudge of to remove results with high privacy risk.
S2 Re-ranking nudge to place results with lowest privacy risk at the top and
higher privacy threats deeper in rank.
S3 Stoplight nudge with coloured lights indicating levels of privacy risk.
S4 Fact box boost to teach a skill for reduced privacy risk.
There were two sub-variants of strategy S4 evaluated in the final user study:
S4 Small One (of two) variants of the fact box boost strategy S4 . This strategy
displayed a small version of the fact box (Figure 8.4) in the right-hand side of
the search system.
S4 Large One (of two) variants of the fact box boost strategy S4 . Provided a
large and more detailed fact box (Figure 8.3) before the experiment began,
and was in addition to the small version in SERP (as in strategy S4 Small ).
The first two lab-based studies (Chapter 5 and 6) focused specifically on the
Nudge based strategies ( S1 - S3 ). The final lab based study (Chapter 9), which
compared boosting and nudging against a Control Web search environment, relied
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upon findings from a non-lab based user study run on a popular Crowdsourcing
platform (Chapter 8) and result of a study to identify useful cues for harm prevention
in Web search (Chapter 7).
The first of these studies utilized a highly controlled offline environment (Chapter
5) and was the foundation for the development and refinement of general methods
(Chapter 4) used through much of the other user studies. One of the key findings
from this study being that strategies S1 and S2 are both highly effective at harm
prevention related to privacy in Web search. Another main finding being that for a
subset of participants, those taking some form of privacy protective action outside
of the lab, the Stoplight strategy S3 also appears to be effective at reducing privacy
impacts. There were no significant impacts across these strategies with respect to
impacts to task behaviour (i.e. time to complete) and search outcome (medical deci-
sions). The conclusions of this study provided some initial answers to G-RQ-1 and
G-RQ-2 .
The second study (Chapter 6) investigated the same nudge strategies, in a much
more naturalistic online Web search environment connected to the live web. The
study was less controlled, but had a fully interactive environment and therefore per-
mitted a much richer set of analyses. Analyses considered the target harm of privacy
impacts, and additionally considered exposure to misinformation as an additional
harm. This dual axis of harms considered provided in depth insights related to the
three nudge strategies, which were not visible with privacy impacts alone. A key
finding from this study being that nudge strategy S1 is highly effective at privacy
reductions, but non-viable due to a quite significant increase of exposure to low
quality information. This dual consideration gave quite surprising findings related
to the Stoplight system (strategy S3 ) as it compared to the Control system (across
the participant sample), being that privacy impacts were not significantly reduced
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but exposure to high quality information was increased (in some cases significantly).
Other findings were fairly consistent with the offline nudge study, most notably that
only a subset of users, those who take actions for privacy protection outside of the
lab, are the individuals most compliant with the Stoplight approach.
The last study (Chapter 9), compared Control search system with systems de-
signed upon nudge strategy S2 and boost strategies S4 Small and S4 Large . The
study was in an offline environment, was much like the offline nudge study, in that
participants could not enter queries. It was much different from both nudge studies
(which compared the strategies with a within-group design), in that a between-group
design was used where each participant was randomly assigned to one and only
one strategy (or Control group) for the entire study. This key difference in design
was necessary as boosting strategies are designed to teach skills; where learning is a
temporally driven process, and therefore motivated the between-group approach as
the best means to give time for learning. One key finding from this study indicates
that the large fact box boost (strategy S4 Large ) was the only effective of the two
boost strategies evaluated ( S4 Small and S4 Large ). Furthermore, the Re-ranking
nudge was again found to be highly effective at reduced harms related privacy. The
most interesting findings related to G-RQ-3 were several findings in support of the
claims related to boosting and nudging , where for example, participants treated with
strategy S4 Large were compliant with the skill taught after the boost was removed,
whereas participants treated with nudge S2 were non-compliant after removal of
the nudge.
Fundamental to G-RQ-3 , which entailed the evaluation of strategies S4 Small
and S4 Large with a nudge based approach (strategy S2 in the current thesis),
was the identification of cue(s) which could be translated to heuristics for harm
prevention. Chapter 7 introduces the methods used to identify the cues used in
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subsequent studies, to first pilot different fact boxes (Chapter 8), and second to
compare nudging and boosting approaches (Chapter 9). While the methods devel-
oped and findings related to cue identification (Chapter 7) are important to the
overall body of work presented here, they (and to some extent the pilot study to
compare fact boxes) are given much less attention in the discussion that follows.
However, the methods developed in these studies (Chapters 7 and 8) are relevant
for future directions of research.
10.2 Discussion
Ultimately, the aim of the thesis was to understand the viability and effectiveness
of each of these strategies, and furthermore to evaluate theoretical claims about
Nudging and Boosting . This aim helped formulate the overall research questions,
which are restated below.
G-RQ-1 “Are the behavioural and cognitive strategies viable for prevention of
harm during Web search?”
G-RQ-2 “Which of these behavioural and cognitive strategies are most effec-
tive at harm prevention?”
G-RQ-3 “To what extent do the claims about boosting compared to nudging
exist within the experimental search environment?”
Revisiting these questions in turn are the main focus of the discussion, for which
one must keep in mind these questions can only be addressed in the context of the
experiments and the specific harms they considered (primarily loss of privacy and
secondarily exposure to misinformation).
291
10. CONCLUSIONS
10.2.1 Viability of Strategies ( G-RQ-1 )
The question around viability G-RQ-1 is, in our view, the most important ques-
tion with respect to each of the strategies investigated. Reason being, no matter
how effective a strategy may be at preventing the harm it is designed to address, if
this same strategy results in other issues, issues such as increased exposure to mis-
information, degraded user experience, or simply users just don’t like the strategy,
then the strategy is likely non-viable.
In the case of the strategies evaluated, three of the strategies ( S2 , S3 and S4 )
are deemed viable approaches in the context of strategies for reduced harms related
to privacy.
The Filtering nudge strategy is non-viable, for two reasons. First, and perhaps
most concerning, is the strategy greatly increased exposure to to low-quality infor-
mation discovered in the online nudge study. Though medical decisions were not
significantly impacted with this strategy, this result is likely due to a limitation of
the study, being the low number of participants. There is already evidence from
previous findings (see findings in [179]) with the search tasks used in our study, that
results biased towards lower quality information will result in poorer decisions with
potentially grave medical outcomes, and there is no reason to expect why poorer
decisions will not occur with strategy S1 . This finding alone would be sufficient
evidence to avoid using it for prevention of loss of privacy for 3rd party trackers .
But there is also the other finding from the online study that participants really do
not like this approach when compared to the other two nudge strategies, and is a
finding that shows this approach has limited (if any) commercial viability.
The two other nudge strategies ( S2 and S3 ) are viable as contrast to the
two reasons that Filtering is not viable. With respect to misinformation, though
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strategy S2 performs slightly worse than the Control, the differences are minimal
(as indicated in the online study) and can likely be improved with some tweaks
to the Re-ranking approach (e.g. only Re-rank the first 10 results rather than all
50 returned by the API used). Findings from the Stoplight strategy S3 support
Re-ranking in this manner, where it was found that information quality increased in
the first 10 results compared to the Control system (see online study Discussion for
more specifics), most likely due to the association of Green lights to higher quality
information. Both of these strategies (counter to Filtering) were more preferred
(especially the Stoplight approach), and therefore may be okay to use in commercial
settings.
The boost approach, considered two sub-strategies ( S4 Small and S4 Large ),
which are certainly both viable from an implementation standpoint. The small fact
box (strategy S4 Small ) can certainly be placed in the SERP itself (as our study
demonstrated) without having other negative impacts, but it is not effective for
reductions to privacy impacts for the participants sample used in the evaluation.
Turning to the other boost approach (strategy S4 Large ), as the discussion in the
Chapter 9 indicates, the large fact box is not fit for purpose in a commercial search
engine, as it takes up too much space. To reiterate our suggestion from this study,
we see this approach most viable in education focused settings, such as educations
campaigns in schools or through browser based plug-ins for teaching skills.
Several major limitations were also raised with respect to the boost vs. nudge
study that suggest one must use caution related to the viability of the boost strate-
gies. First, data collection had to be cut short due to the Covid-19 pandemic,
therefore a more limited analysis was performed. Though data was collected for self-
report measures, encounters with misinformation and search task decisions, these
analyses were not performed due to the low sample size. Additionally, the questions
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related to preferences for each strategy were incorrectly entered and therefore could
not be determined.
10.2.2 Effectiveness of Strategies ( G-RQ-2 )
In the studies covered, effectiveness was evaluated with respect to two general
objective measures, with the primary measures related to reductions in privacy loss
due to 3rd party trackers and the secondary measures related to compliance to the
strategy (e.g. visiting .org and .gov sites) significantly more so than the Control.
There is not much else to say with respect to the primary measures (e.g. mean
number of 3rd party trackers) that was not already said in study specific results and
discussions. Non-transparent strategies ( S1 and S2 ) are highly respective with
this matter compared to the Control system. Where as the transparent Stoplight
strategy ( S3 ) demonstrated no global effect, but did show some effects for users
that do take privacy actions in their daily lives. Similarly, the transparent boost
strategy (only strategy S4 Large ) showed a small positive impact compared to the
Control. These findings, of course could have turned out entirely different in the
instance other harms (e.g. hate speech reduction) were made the primary focus,
which is a limitation of the studies.
Measures related to compliance were an important factor overlooked in the initial
offline nudge study, but investigated heavily in the later two lab based studies. In
the online nudge study, the measures were based upon compliance to the Stoplight
colours (and related risks), where as the final study (comparing nudging and boost-
ing) focused on compliance to the TLD risks in the Fact box. Evaluation of strategy
compliance was motivated by the possibility of type II errors with the analyses of
the primary privacy measures, due limitations of the sample size and evaluation
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test sets. Analysis of compliance was particularly important for the transparent
strategies ( S3 and S4 ), as in both cases there primary measures did not indi-
cate harm reductions. However, the less granular compliance measures used in both
studies indicate that participants were being significantly more compliant with these
strategies when compared to the Control.
10.2.3 Nudging vs. Boosting ( G-RQ-3 )
Much was already covered (see Chapter 9 and Section 9.4) with respect to inves-
tigating the claims related to nudging and boosting . Related to the measures used
in the study, especially the measures specific to compliance with the strategy, the
findings are in line with what the theory states. Nudging and boosting both work
well when the intervention is turned on (e.g. results are Re-ranked or a fact box is
displayed). After the interventions were removed, the participants that were treated
with the boost continued to demonstrate compliance to the intervention (i.e. con-
tinued to visit .org and .gov) more so than the Control, and the participants treated
with strategy S2 returned to performance in line with the Control. Therefore, a
finding demonstrating that users (at least some) were enabled with a new decision
making competency, which is in line with findings from the earlier pilot study.
However, there were many limitations in this study, which were detailed in the
study specific discussion, of which some are worth re-highlighting here. Limitations
mainly caused by the already mentioned incomplete sample as a result the Covid-19
pandemic, a limitation which greatly raises the possibility of both type I and type II
errors. Furthermore, the study compared a transparent boost with a non-transparent
‘classic’ nudge, where a comparison against a transparent ‘educational’ nudge is
an important comparison one should make in the future. Additionally, strategy
S4 Small , suggested to be much more viable in commercial settings than strategy
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S4 Large , showed no positive or negative effect in our sample when compared to
the Control.
10.2.4 Validity of Studies
The general methods chapter (Chapter 4) included motivation for the use of
lab based studies, specifically the highly controlled environment they offer. A key
challenge of this approach is that all of the experiments had a partially artificial
component to them, thus validity of the findings presented must be framed within
the constraints of the studies.
One artificial component to highlight is in the offline nudging and boosting stud-
ies. Participants were instructed to imagine they had performed a search for the
medical task, as they could not enter queries (a static set of results were provided).
This is not how search tasks are performed in the wild and one must certainly be
cautious with extrapolation of findings from these studies more broadly.
The online nudge study permitted users to enter queries, thus no instructions
were necessary for them to imagine they had entered a query. Nonetheless, partici-
pants had no choice with respect to the search tasks provided, whereas in a non-lab
setting users perform their search tasks based upon a naturalistic information need.
All participants across all studies took part because they chose to do so, which
means that the sample is non-representative of Web searchers in general. This is one
disadvantage of the ethical requirements for informed consent academic research, as
opposed to Web platforms (e.g. Google, Facebook) which can run an A/B test [96]
on a random sample of users without telling them. Experiments on Web platforms





As with any study, there are many limitations one must consider, in addition to
those mentioned above.
A within-group design was used in both nudge studies, as it allowed for more
participants assigned to each strategy. This reduced the number of search tasks
assigned to each strategy to two. This was not so problematic in the offline evalu-
ation the Offline Nudging Test Set, as the data collected still met assumptions for
the statistical tests. However, the noisier online Online Nudging Test Set was less
well behaved with respect to assumptions (e.g. homoscedasticity) for parametric
statistical tests. As a result, we performed analyses with non-parametric tests in
addition to parametric tests. Both type I and type II errors are therefore more likely
with the findings reported in the online nudge study when compared to findings in
the other empirical studies.
Furthermore, eye tracking was not considered for any of the studies, which would
be a useful method for measuring participant efforts (and underlying motivating
factors) with respect to strategies S3 , S4 Large and S4 Small .
With respect to measuring encounters with misinformation, the annotation method-
ology to classify the quality of information (e.g. correct , incorrect) was limited in
that annotators were graduate students, not medical professionals (e.g. medical
doctors, researchers with the Cochrane review board).
Specific to the privacy measures used, tools that give better coverage of to identify
leaks of data to 3rd parties were considered during study design, however all tools
considered would have greatly degraded the search experience. For example, the
Selenium automated browser library (tested in the design phase of the experiment)
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indicated that with parallelisation (4 pages loaded in parallel), at best we could
expect the first 10 results could be opened in no less than 10 seconds (often times
many more seconds). Given the length of time, such approaches were determined to
be infeasible for a user study, and lookup tables containing 3rd party tracker data
were used instead.
The background section also introduced several other cognitive strategies (e.g.
Technocognition) which were not considered in our current studies. As the choice
of comparisons was driven by the digital human rights focus of the overall project
supporting this thesis, a comparison was made between the highly ethical boost with
the less ethical nudge.
10.3 Avenues for Future Work
There are many directions one could head with our framework in future work.
Here we highlight what would come next if given the chance.
10.3.1 Nudging vs. Boosting
An obvious choice are analyses of data collected with a larger participant sample
in the nudge versus boost study. Furthermore, a study comparing the two approaches
could (and should) be run in an online environment similar to the online nudge
study, as the data analysis would be much richer and allow for greater insights.
A comparison of a transparent ‘educative’ nudge (e.g. the Stoplight) with a boost
would also be a natural step forward.
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10.3.2 Harms and Strategies
In the current thesis, we focused on the harms related to privacy, finding that
participants have a broad set of beliefs and practices related to privacy on the Web.
It therefore would also be wise to consider other harms. In the introduction, other
harms of Web search including misinformation, climate impacts and hateful speech
were just some examples to consider in addition to privacy. Furthermore, just like
privacy, other harms are likely to be more or less important dependent on the context
(e.g. searcher preferences and the domain of the search task) and overall priority
based upon societal norms.
There are a number of different strategies one might develop and evaluate. Find-
ings from the study (Chapter 7) identified TLDs as a useful feature for both mis-
information and privacy impacts (we designed strategies specific to privacy). In
future research, the findings on TLDs suggest a different strategy for misinforma-
tion, where individuals use majority voting to determine the correct answer for the
search tasks used (i.e. the answer to the Cochrane medical question is determined
when two out of three results visited agree). In a similar vein, fact boxes may not
be the most appropriate method, Fast and Frugal Trees (a type of boost) are one
alternative strategy to consider.
There are potentially many different strategies one might discover through inves-
tigation of behavioural logs captured in naturalistic settings. Several notable studies
have identified strategies in the logs including: identification of links between known
cognitive models of risk preference (prospect theory) [77], expert searcher behaviour
[22], and behaviour indicating the usage of cues for credibility assessments ([94]).
All of the studies mentioned here are a template for discovering new strategies. Fur-
thermore, these studies identified skills that could be transferred to people that do
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not have them (a boost), however only the expert searcher investigation actually
attempted this [22].
Returning to the extensive set of cues highlighted by Smith and Rieh [208],
there is certainly opportunity for novel information extraction techniques (e.g. pri-
vacy impact metrics gathered for all Web sites in a search index). Addressing these
opportunities opens the door to identification of more strategies, as well as presen-
tation of cues in the search environment itself (e.g. with an information nutrition
label nudge [74]).
Purely algorithmic strategies, though seemingly the focus of much research at
present, should continue to be investigated and improved. Specific to privacy, sug-
gested approaches, such as those to minimize data collection [28], are just one im-
portant area of interest.
10.3.3 Different Contexts
When one considers the many search contexts, there are again many different
directions for research.
In the current thesis, we focused on medical search tasks with known answers.
Search task, as introduced in the background, is a very broad topic in and of itself.
Exploratory and navigational search are areas yet to be considered. Furthermore,
different domains of task outside of medical search also have the potential for harms,
for instance domains such as finance and law.
Also, we investigated Web search in the context of a search environment simu-
lating a search engine. Other examples where information is searched for include
mobile applications, social media platforms and conversational assistants. These are
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all contexts allowing one to evaluate strategies through a different lens.
10.4 Closing Remarks
We introduced a framework (Chapter 3) as a pathway to reduce the risk of
harms present in modern Web search. Central to the framework are behavioural and
cognitive science based decision making tools along with three further components:
policy, system design and overall evaluation. In the current set of studies, we made
use of existing and study specific evaluation metrics to evaluate and compare the
two popular decision making paradigms (nudging and boosting) in the context of
Web search and the proposed framework. The findings are promising, but only a
beginning. Further investigations may eventually lead to real world applications
aimed at addressing some of the bigger problems at present in Web search.
Baeza-Yates’ recent commentary on the interactions between IR systems and
searchers [16] as a cause of harms in Web search systems, is direct real-world evidence
of the pervasive nature of the current Web search setup. Implementing one (or more)
of the strategies evaluated in our studies are a possible pathway to improving the
overall nature of Web search and the related risks. Given current algorithms and
their ability to learn from log data, hypothetically it would only require a subset
of users concerned about harms in Web search to shift the results for everyone else
(i.e. a positive externality). The environment could naturally evolve to something
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A.1 Questionnaires and Scales
A.1.1 Pre/post-task
A set of pre-task and post-task (Table A.1)questions were given to participants
during each search task in the experiment. These questions were used to formulate
metrics out lined in general methods Section 4.4.4.3
Table A.1: Two questions were given before and after each search task in the lab
studies (both offline and online). Questionnaire item numbers and language used
to capture pre-task knowledge of the search task and post-task confidence on their
decision are included along with Likert scales used. Items are grouped by pre-task and
post-task questions.
Item Language Used
1 Pre-Task How knowledgeable are you of this health issue?
2 Pre-Task What level of knowledge do you have in regards to this treatment?
Scale 1 = I have no knowledge 7 = I have expert knowledge
1 Post-Task How confident are you in your decision about the effectiveness of the treatment for the medical condition?
Scale 1 = I am very unconfident in my decision 7 = I am very confident in my decision
2 Post-Task To what extent are your certain about your decision?
Scale 1 = I am very uncertain about my decision 7 = I am very certain about my decision
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Figure A.1: Interface used to ask pre-task and post task questions. In the screen
shot the pre-task questions are visible.
A.1.2 Privacy Attitudes
The following tables (A.2 - A.3) contain questions asked to participants during
offline and online lab based studies. These questions were used to formulate metrics
introduced in general methods Section 4.4.4.4 related to individual attitudes related
to privacy.
A.1.3 Privacy Protective Behaviors / Actions
The following tables (A.4 - A.6) contain questions asked to participants during
offline and online lab based studies related to individual actions taken to protect pri-
vacy. These questions were used to formulate metrics introduced in general methods
Section 4.4.4.4.
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Table A.2: Questionnaire item numbers and language used to capture general at-
titudes towards privacy. Likert scales used varied across the questions (which are
grouped appropriately).
Item Language Used
How likely do you think it is that personal information submitted / shared on the internet will be:
1 Shared or sold to others
2 Used by others to harm you
3 Use virtual private networks (VPNs) when viewing information on the internet
Scale 1 = Not at all Likely 7 = Very Likely
I believe that in giving personal information to online:
4 The damage that could be caused by a data security breach is
5 The likelihood of a data security breach is
Scale 1 = Very Low 7 = Very High
6 In general, how worried are you about your personal privacy?
Scale 1 = Not Worried At All 7 = Very Worried
Different private and public organizations have personal information about us.
7 How concerned are you about whether or not they keep this information confidential?
Scale 1 = Not Concerned At All 7 = Very Concerned
Table A.3: Questionnaire item numbers and language used to capture attitudes
towards privacy in the domain of health information. These questions were asked for
other information domains (e.g. Age, Location, Religion) but those data were not
included in the analysis. Likert scales used were consistent for all three questions.
Item Language Used
1 How concerned are you about the sensitivity of the following personal information that you share?
2 How concerned are you about your privacy when sharing the following personal information?
3 How concerned are you about personal damage when sharing the following personal information?
Scale 1 = Not Concerned At All 7 = Very Concerned
Table A.4: Questionnaire items, labels, and questionnaire language (6 point scale
where 0=I have never heard of this, 1=Never, 2=Sometimes , 3=About half the time,
4=Most of the time, 5=Always). Items 1 - 10 were asked in all lab based studies.
Items 11 - 14, denoted by underlined questions were developed after the initial offline
nudge study (Chapter 5).
Item Label Language "When using the internet, how regularly do you do the following?"
1 Anon. Com. Use anonymous communications networks (e.g. Tor)
2 Encrypted Use end-to-end encryption tools for messaging (e.g. Signal)
3 3rd Party Run browser extensions to block 3rd party tracking cookies (e.g Ghostery, Privacy Badger)
4 VPN Use virtual private networks (VPNs) when viewing information on the internet
5 Fingerprint Run software to prevent browser fingerprinting (e.g. uBlock, Privacy Badger)
6 Cookie Del. Delete your browsing cookies automatically (with software)
7 HTTPS Use software to ensure HTTPS communications with websites
8 Javascript Disable javascript in your browser
9 Cookie Dis. Disable cookies in your browser
10 Anti-virus Have anti-virus software installed on your devices (e.g. Norton, Sophos)
11 Do Not Track Use the ‘do not track’ feature of my browser
12 Incognito Use the ‘incognito’ / ‘anonymous’ mode of my browser
13 Read State. 1 Read the privacy policies of websites I visit
14 Read State. 2 Review privacy statement updates sent to me by applications I use
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Table A.5: In a post experiment questionnaire given to participants during all lab
based studies the following question was asked. "When using the internet, how
frequently do you use the following Web browsers?" Privacy enhancing browsers were
defined as any browser listed on thePrivacyTools resource Website.).
Item Label Privacy Enhancing?
1 Chrome No
2 Internet Explorer No
3 Safari No
4 Mozilla Firefox Yes
5 Tor Yes
6 Brave Yes
Table A.6: In a post experiment questionnaire given to participants during all lab
based studies the following question was asked. "When using the internet, how
frequently do you use the following search engines?" Privacy enhancing browsers were
defined as any search engine listed on the PrivacyTools resource Website.).






6 Duck Duck Go Yes
7 Qwant Yes
A.2 Latin and Graeco-Latin Square Design
To ensure a balanced design for the within-group online and offline nudge studies,
we follow the methodology of Pogacar et al. [179] who created a 10 x 10 Graeco-Latin
matrix to provide randomization and balance of search task and system treatments.
The first step to creation of this matrix was building three pre-cursor Latin squares:
one each for the helpful and does not help search tasks (Tables A.7 and A.8 respec-
tively) along with one (see Table A.9 containing the three experimental treatments
( S1 - S3 ) + Control treatment + Baseline treatment (task without search results).
Following the procedures of [179], we overlaid the Latin square of the systems with
each of the helpful and does not help Latin squares, resulting in two 5x5 Graeco-
Latin squares for these task-system pairs. Finally, as with [179], we randomized the
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columns and rows of the Graeco-Latin overlays twice to produce the 10x10 matrix
used in our studies (see Table A.10).
T2 T5 T6 T8 T9
T5 T6 T8 T9 T2
T6 T8 T9 T2 T5
T8 T9 T2 T5 T6
T9 T2 T5 T6 T8
Table A.7: Latin Squares table of all search tasks classified as helpful . Full definitions
of the tasks are found in methods Table 4.1
T1 T3 T4 T7 T10
T3 T4 T7 T10 T1
T4 T7 T10 T1 T3
T7 T10 T1 T3 T4
T10 T1 T3 T4 T7
Table A.8: Latin Squares table of all search tasks classified as does not help. Full
definitions of the tasks are found in methods Table 4.1
Control Filter Baseline Re-ranking Stoplight
Baseline Re-ranking Stoplight Control Filter
Stoplight Control Filter Baseline Re-ranking
Filter Baseline Re-ranking Stoplight Control
Re-ranking Stoplight Control Filter Baseline
Table A.9: Latin Squares table of the 5 experimental treatments for the online and
offline nudge studies. Full descriptions of the variants are found in methods section
4.2.2.
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T7-Re T2-Co T5-Fi T8-Re T4-Ba T6-Ba T9-St T3-Fi T10-St T1-Co
T3-Ba T8-St T2-Fi T4-Re T6-Re T9-Co T7-St T5-Ba T1-Fi T10-Co
T4-St T8-Co T9-Fi T6-St T7-Co T3-Re T1-Ba T5-Re T2-Ba T10-Fi
T5-St T6-Co T10-Ba T2-Re T8-Fi T3-St T9-Ba T1-Re T7-Fi T4-Co
T9-Re T4-Fi T7-Ba T1-St T3-Co T2-St T5-Co T8-Ba T6-Fi T10-Re
T2-Re T10-Fi T9-Fi T3-Ba T8-Co T5-Ba T1-Re T6-St T4-St T7-Co
T6-Co T1-Ba T9-Re T3-St T5-St T7-Fi T10-Re T4-Co T8-Fi T2-Ba
T2-St T6-Fi T5-Co T9-Ba T7-Re T1-St T8-Re T10-Ba T3-Co T4-Fi
T8-Ba T10-St T4-Re T5-Fi T9-St T6-Re T1-Co T7-Ba T3-Fi T2-Co
T2-Fi T7-St T3-Re T1-Fi T10-Co T5-Re T8-St T4-Ba T6-Ba T9-Co
Table A.10: Graeco Latin Square Design - Task and Experimental Variants used in
the online and offline nudge studies. A 10 x 10 Graeco-Latin squares matrix showing
the different variants used in the experiments. Ba = Baseline, Co = Control, Fi =
Filtering Re = Re-ranking and St = Stoplight.
A.3 Supplemental to Online Nudge Study
Sending Queries to Commercial API and Linkage to Privacy Impacts
All queries submitted in the SERPs (3 experimental + control) were sent to the
Microsoft Azure Cognitive Services Bing API. In the query request, we lower cased
all queries for normalization, we set the market to the country (United Kingdom)
where our experiment was run, and requested the maximum number of results (which
was 50 at time of our experiment). Per API documentation, we received related
searches and spelling suggestions in the API response but did not use these in our
experiment (a possible avenue for future research). It is noteworthy that the Bing
API automatically corrects spelling in the query (e.g. a query for ‘catt videos’ would
return results for ‘cat videos’), we accepted the corrections as another form of query
normalization.
Once results were retrieved by the Bing API, we used a lookup table to retrieve
the number of privacy trackers for each result. Privacy trackers were available for
many (but not all) of the results. We calculated descriptive statistics for the subset
of results where the number of privacy trackers was known during the experiment
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(e.g. if 22 of 50 results were returned from the Bing API could be linked to privacy
trackers, we would calculate descriptive statistics for the 22 results). We recorded
the maximum number of privacy trackers for all results in the subset. We also
calculated the median and upper quartiles for number of trackers in the subset,
which were used as demarcations for low risk, medium risk and high risk to personal
privacy (this is the same method used in our offline studies). We also marked each
result where no tracker was available (using the same example, there would be 28
websites of 50 that did not have trackers). At this point, all results could be updated
appropriately dependent on the SERP variant the subject was given. Descriptions of
the different SERPs and how these results were displayed are further outlined below.
For procedures to produce the lookup table for 3rd party trackers and explanation
of why 3rd party trackers are not available for all results, see Section 4.3.1.
It is worth noting that query response times, the time between when the user
submitted a query and when results were displayed to them, were well under 1
second. This was the case for all experimental SERP variants.
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